Prop. V. If when I am injured, and thereby disabled from doing some good which I should else have done, I am not able by seeking reparation or the punishment of the person, to recover my capacity, and promote the service of God, I am bound to pass by and remit that injury. (I speak not of the criminal part, but the injury as such; for a man may be bound to bring a thief to punishment, on the account of God's honour, and the common good, though else he might forgive the injury to himself.)
Prop. VI. If it be probable that he that defraudeth me of my estate, will do more good with it than I should have done, I am not bound to vindicate it from him for my own interest (though as he is criminal, and the crime is hurtful, as an ill example, to the common good, so I may be bound to it). Nay, were it not for the said criminal respect, I am bound rather to let him take it, than to vindicate it by any such means as would break charity, and do more hurt than good.
Prop. VII. If I am absolutely trusted with the person or estate of another, I may so far forgive the wrongs done to that other, upon sufficient reasons, as well as against myself.
Prop. VIII. A private man may not usurp the magistrate's power, or do any act which is proper to his office, nor yet may he break his laws, for the avenging of himself; he may use no other means than the law of God and his sovereign do allow him. Therefore he may not rail, or revile, or slander, or rob, or strike, or hurt any, (unless in case of defence, as afterward,) nor take any other prohibited course.
Prop. IX. No rigour or severity must be used to right myself, where gentler means may probably do it; but the most harmless way must first be tried.
Prop. X. In general, all wrongs, and debts, and damages, must be forgiven, when the hurt is like to be greater, which will come by our righting ourselves, than that which by forbearance we shall sustain; and all must be forgiven where God's law or man's forbiddeth us not to forgive. Therefore a man that will here know his duty, must conduct his actions by very great prudence (which if he have not himself, he must make use of a guide or counsellor): and he must be able to compare the evil which he suffereth with the evil which will in probability follow his vindication, and to discern which of them is the greater; or else he can never know how far and when he may and must forgive. And herein he must observe,
1. That hurt that cometh to a man's soul is greater than the hurt that befalleth the body; and therefore if my suing a man at law be like to hurt his soul by uncharitableness, or to hurt my own, or the souls of others, by scandal or disturbances, I must rather suffer any mere bodily injuries, than use that means; but if yet greater hurt to souls would follow that bodily suffering of mine, the case is then altered the other way. So if by forgiving debts or wrongs, I be liker to do more good to the soul of him whom I forgive, or others, than the recovery of my own, or the righting of myself, is like any way to equal, I am obliged to forgive that debt or wrong.
2. The good or hurt which cometh to a community or to many, is (cæteris paribus) to be more regarded than that which cometh to myself or any one alone. Because many are of more worth than one; and because God's honour (cæteris paribus) is more concerned in the good of many than of one. Therefore I must not seek my own right to the hurt of many, either of their souls or bodies, unless some greater good require it.
3. The good or hurt of public persons, magistrates, or pastors, is (cæterisc paribus) of more regard than the good or hurt of single men: therefore (cæteris paribus) I must not right myself to the dishonour or hurt of governors; (no, though I were none of their charge or subjects;) because the public good is more concerned in their honour or welfare than in mine. The same may be said of persons by their gifts and interests more eminently serviceable to God and the common good than I am.
4. The good or hurt of a near relation, of a dear friend, of a worthy person, is more to be regarded by me, cæteris paribus, than the good or hurt of a vile, unworthy person, or a stranger. And therefore the Israelites might not take usury of a poor brother, which yet they might do of an alien of another land! The laws of nature and friendship may more oblige me to one than to another, though they were supposed equal in themselves. Therefore I am not bound to remit a debt or wrong to a thief, or deceiver, or a vile person, when a nearer or worthier person would be equally damnified by his benefit. And thus far, (if without any partial self-love a man can justly estimate himself,) he may not only as he is nearest himself, but also for his real worth, prefer his own commodity before the commodity of a more unworthy and unserviceable person.