The noblemen and gentlemen of her party, immediately adopted measures for mustering their retainers and followers, and with that view repaired to Exeter, sent for Sir John Arundel, and Sir Hugh Courtenay, and raised forces in Somersetshire, Dorsetshire, Wiltshire, and afterwards in Cornwall and Devonshire; and proceeded from Exeter by Taunton, Glastonbury, and Wells, to Bath, and from thence to Bristol: their forces being continually increased on their march. Their intention was to have marched through Gloucestershire into Wales, where Jasper Earl of Pembroke, [133f] a powerful and staunch Lancastrian, was in arms, and raising forces for that party; and they also expected to receive assistance from their partisans in Cheshire and Lancashire.
Edward, in the mean time, after receiving intelligence of the landing of Queen Margaret, being uncertain towards what quarter the Lancastrians would bend their course, departed on the 19th of April, with some of his forces, furnished with artillery and other things requisite, from London for Windsor, where he remained a short time, for the double purpose of celebrating the feast of St. George, and of awaiting the arrival of other troops, whom he had appointed to assemble there. He commenced his march from Windsor, against the enemy, on the morrow after St. George’s day, the 24th of April. He reached Abingdon on Saturday the 27th, remained there all Sunday, and on Monday the 29th, proceeded to Cirencester, [134a] where he received information, that on the next day (Tuesday), his enemies intended to be at Bath, and that on the Wednesday they would come forward, and give him battle; and Edward, desirous to see his men in order of battle, led them out of the town, and encamped in the field three miles from it.
On the next day, Edward, still seeking to encounter his enemies, marched to Malmesbury, when he learned that they had turned aside and gone to Bristol. On Thursday [134b] Edward arrived at Sodbury, and shortly before the arrival of the main body of his army there, a skirmish took place; a few of his men, riding into the town to secure quarters and accommodations, encountered and were attacked by some of the enemy, who had been sent forward from the Lancastrian army, and five or six of the Yorkists were made prisoners. Edward having some reason to think that the Lancastrians were near at hand, sent out scouts to endeavour to obtain intelligence of their movements; but not hearing any certain tidings of them, he lodged his vanguard in a valley, beyond the hill, towards the town of Sodbury, and lay himself with the residue of his forces at Sodbury Hill. About three o’clock after midnight, he received information, that the Lancastrians had taken their way by Berkeley towards Gloucester; and he in consequence, after taking the advice of his council, sent with all speed to Sir Richard Beauchamp, the son of William Lord Beauchamp of Powick, [135] to whom he had committed the government of the city and castle of Gloucester, with orders not to admit Margaret’s forces into them, but to defend them to the utmost.
At Bristol the Lancastrians received assistance, both in men, victuals, money, and artillery, and on Thursday proceeded to Berkeley, and marched from thence towards Gloucester, travelling all night, and arrived before Gloucester at ten o’clock on Friday, and hoped to be admitted into that city, and to pass the Severn there, in order to effect a junction with the Earl of Pembroke.
But as King Edward IV. had previously sent orders to the Governor of Gloucester, to refuse admittance to Margaret and her adherents, and had promised that, if the city were assailed, he would advance immediately to its relief, his orders were obeyed, and Margaret was unable to obtain admittance. To the circumstance of her being baffled in the design of passing the Severn at Gloucester, may be ascribed, the utter ruin, which so soon after befell her and her army; in fact the issue of the campaign might very probably have been completely different, if she had succeeded in getting possession of Gloucester, and of securing a safe passage for her forces over the Severn, and, consequently, of effecting a junction with the troops raised by the Earl of Pembroke.
She proceeded from Gloucester towards Tewkesbury, having then no alternative, with reference to her design of passing the river, but to march to the latter town; and on the way thither, some of her artillery were captured from her rearguard. [136a] She arrived at Tewkesbury on Friday the 3rd of May, about four in the afternoon, having travelled on that day and the preceding night, thirty-six long miles, through bad roads, between woods, and without proper refreshment, so that both men and horses were greatly fatigued. It became absolutely necessary, to give some rest to her exhausted troops, most part of which consisted of infantry; and it was determined by the leaders of her forces, to await at Tewkesbury the coming up of Edward’s army, and to take the chances of a battle.
The Lancastrians, as we learn from one of our old historians, encamped “in a close even hard at the Townes end having the Towne and Abbeie at their backes, and directlie before them, and upon each side of them they were defended with cumbersome lanes, deepe ditches, and manie hedges, beside hils and dales, so as the place seemed as noisome as might be to approach unto.” [136b] Whether the position was or was not as strong and difficult to be assailed, as is here represented, it is at all events certain, that the Lancastrians fortified it, at least to some extent, and prepared to act on the defensive; with the hope of holding out against Edward, until the arrival of the Earl of Pembroke, who was supposed to be rapidly approaching. There can scarcely be a reasonable doubt, that during the evening and night previous to the battle, the Lancastrians exerted themselves assiduously to intrench and fortify their position. It is worthy of notice, that we do not hear of any attempt by the Lancastrians, to pass the Severn at Tewkesbury; and as they prepared to act on the defensive, and not to be the attacking party at the approaching battle, it may at first sight perhaps appear remarkable, that they do not seem to have endeavoured to have had the river Severn interposed between themselves and their enemies, especially as it flows close to Tewkesbury. But the reason for their not attempting it, may easily be found, in the exhausted state of their troops, and the near approach of Edward’s army, which rendered it a very dangerous attempt to cross the river with the enemy so close upon them. [137a] Besides which, there was not a bridge over the Severn at Tewkesbury, before the present iron bridge was completed in 1826, at the place where there was an old ferry called the Upper Lode; and Leland expressly states, that even as late as when he wrote (in the reign of Henry VIII.), there was not any bridge there:—“There is noe Bridge on Severne beneath Gloucester—neither is there any bridge on Severne above Gloucester, till the Townlett of Upton a 11 or 12 miles from Gloucester.” [137b]
If Margaret and her army had attempted to cross the Severn at Tewkesbury, in hopes of joining the Earl of Pembroke, the want of a bridge would naturally have compelled them, to have crossed it by fords and ferries, as they best could: a perilous attempt, and one which would almost certainly have exposed the rear of the army to destruction. That would of course be an additional and powerful reason, for their being compelled to take the chances of a battle. [137c]
King Edward, having received tidings that the Queen’s forces were proceeding towards Tewkesbury, commenced his march from Sodbury, with his army in good order of battle in three bodies, very early in the morning of Friday, the 3rd of May, and passed over Cotswold. The day was very hot, and the King marched with his forces more than thirty miles; during which, they could neither find food for man or horse, and his troops were much distressed for want of water, having met with only one small brook, which soon became so disturbed and foul, by so large a number of men, carriages, and horses passing through it, as to be unfit for use. During a considerable part of that day, the King’s army and that of his enemies were within five or six miles of each other: his in a plain country, and theirs amongst woods. He had constantly useful scouts, to inform him of the movements of his enemies. At length he came with his army to Cheltenham, “unto a village called Chiltenham,” [138a] where he had certain intelligence, that the Queen’s forces were already come to Tewkesbury, and were encamped, and intended to remain and give him battle there.
Edward did not remain long at Cheltenham; but after his troops, which consisted of 3000 infantry and a large body of cavalry, had had some refreshment, they marched forward towards Tewkesbury, and passed the night of the 3rd of May encamped in the field, near [138b] the Lancastrian position.