As God is an infinite Mind or Spirit, perfectly acquainted, at every Instant of Time, with whatever hath been, is, or shall be; and all Things possible to be; ’tis evident, that all possible Relations of Persons and Things are fully known to him; and that all moral and divine Obligations, arising from the Relation we stand in to God, and to each other, did, in their own Nature, previous to actual Law or Commandment, exist; because the one was in Time, and the other Eternal; one commenced only (at best) with the Being and Beginning of Creatures, the other was from all Eternity, co-existent with the Divine Wisdom itself; and such an inseparable Concomitant therewith, that, in regard to the Divine Being, himself, it was absolutely impossible, but that, on his creating such a Rank of Beings as we are, moral and religious Obligations must have been invariably and unalterably the same; and if, as these Men teach, God’s having commanded the Practice of Virtue, be its peculiar Sanction, and that alone which distinguishes it from Vice or Evil; then, by the same or as good an Argument, his commanding Light in the Beginning, is all the Reason we have for esteeming Light and Darkness different, (as they really are) the one being the actual Pretence of a real Body, and the other a mere Name, to signify its Absence; not that Vice is therefore a mere Name, to signify the Absence of Virtue, for Comparisons seldom hold good in every minute Particular; but there is a Parity between the two Cases, sufficient to justify my bringing in the one, as an Illustration of the other. There is no Knowledge more certain, than what Mankind commonly have of Good and Evil; and he who, in order to serve any private Scheme of Religion, goes about to depreciate this Knowledge, robs Mankind of all Truth and Certainty whatever, and in the End subjects his own darling Schemes to the same Uncertainty; for if we cannot judge of the Fitness, of plain moral Truth and Duty, neither can we of any Scheme of Religion; especially such as hang together more by Art and human Contrivance, than by Reason or Revelation.
Being very desirous to get all the Information I could, concerning the Matter in Debate; I have attentively read over Mr. Cole’s Treatise on the Sovereignty of God. I know ’tis thought an unanswerable Performance; and, so far as it regards general Christianity, it is worth every Christian’s serious Notice: But as to the Doctrine it was wrote to support, it leaves it (in my Judgment) no better than it found it; but is miserably weak, and defective, as to any Thing that looks like sound Reason, or true Argument; and amounts to no more than this poor Assertion, That because God is a Sovereign, he may do what he pleases: And, from the Instances he brings from Scripture, ’tis plain, that Mr. Cole himself pays as little Regard to the intrinsick Worth and Excellence of Things, as is done by many of his Brethren. The manner in which he has been pleased to give us the Story of Jacob and Esau, proves the Truth of this Observation, I have no great Inclination to spend Time in explaining hard Passages of Scripture, (tho’ if any thing of that kind can be serviceable, or deem’d excellent, ’tis Mr. Taylor of Norwich his Book on Original Sin,) or to trespass on the Reader’s Patience, by throwing one Text of hard and uncertain Meaning against another; for by this means the Controversy hath been needlessly prolonged. Where the Scriptures are plain, positive and reasonable, their Authority ought to be conscientiously adhered to: But as this is not always the Case, the next Thing to knowing what is the true Meaning of any particular Text of Scripture is, to know what it neither does nor can possibly mean; in which Case, the Divine Attributes, and the Nature and Reason, or (if you please) Fitness of Things, is the best Rule. We cannot, it is impossible we should, understand the certain determinate Meaning of any Text of Scripture better, if altogether so well, as we do know certainly, that God is just and good, and know also as clearly, what Justice and Goodness mean, when applied to the Deity, as we do, when we apply them to ourselves. And this Rule, if duly observed, would be abundantly sufficient, to set aside many Interpretations of Scripture, too commonly admitted upon this and the like Occasions. And, besides this never failing Argument (to all who attend duly to its Force) it is worth while, just to remark, that though, as the Bible now stands, there are in it (as we must acknowledge) some Passages, which (especially at first sight) seem to favour the Doctrine of Sovereignty, &c. yet as it is possible, nay sometimes easy, to give them another interpretation, and the general Scope and Tenor of the Scripture being agreeable to such an Interpretation, we have abundantly more Reason to reject, than to admit of the Sense, in which these Gentlemen are pleased to understand and expound many Texts of the Bible, relating to this and other affinitive Points.
I would not, as I observed before, presume to impose on the Reader’s Time and Patience, by entering unnecessarily into the scriptural Part of the Argument; yet I must beg Leave, to make now and then an Observation or two as I go along: And the first Thing that falls in my way is, the Story of Jacob and Esau, and the Account which Mr. Cole gives of it. He not only relates the Story, but assures us, that Jacob’s obtaining the Blessing was of Divine Appointment, and (what is more extraordinary) that the Falsehood and Fraud he practised to accomplish it, was all of God’s own immediate Direction; and this he gives as an Instance of God’s Sovereignty, and proceeding contrary to the moral Fitness of Things, and the Nature of those Laws he hath given to Man. That God intended Jacob the Blessing, or preferred him to Esau, I readily grant; but cannot admit it to be inferred from thence, that the Means, by which it was, as we reckon, accomplished, were Divine also: There is a more natural or (at least) more justifiable way of accounting for the whole Matter. According to the History, it seems plain, that Rebecca only, and not her Husband, was privy to this Designation of the Deity: she had upon Inquiry (when with Child) received such an Assurance from the Lord; which might be the first Cause of her preferring Jacob to Esau, and which in Time, ’tis probable, grew up into a much greater Degree of Partiality and Fondness: All this Time the good Old Patriarch, her Husband, seems to have been entirely unacquainted with the Affair. And when the Time drew nigh, in which, according (as some think) to Custom, he was about to bless his eldest Son, Rebecca then grew diffident of the Accomplishment of the Promise made in Jacob’s Behalf, and applied herself to the Means, which the Text tells us was used on that Occasion. As to the Authority those Heads of Families had to confer Benefits on their Offspring, by way of Blessing, though I shall not now much contend about it, yet give me Leave to make a few Observations. It don’t appear to me that Isaac, in giving his Blessing, did so properly or so much bestow it on the Person of Jacob present, as he did on the Person of Esau absent; because it is the Intention which ought principally to be regarded, and Esau undoubtedly was intended. Again, this way of blessing, if considered in itself as a mere Tradition, could be no more efficacious, than what now prevails in some Parts of the Christian Church. All true Authority of this kind (if any there be) must result from immediate Inspiration and Command; and whether Isaac had these Qualifications, while Jacob stood before him, personating Esau, is a Matter of no small Doubt and Dispute. He was (’tis evident) much surprised at the Cheat, put on him by his Wife and Son, and would doubtless very willingly have given Esau the Preference, according to his first Intention; but something supernatural seems now to have seized and satisfied him, that Jacob was the Person intended; for he cries out, “I have blessed him, yea and he shall be blessed.” And this latter Assurance, and the Energy and Satisfaction wherewith the Words were pronounced, I take rather to have been the true Blessing than the other. For, as the Reason of Jacob’s Dissimulation was intirely owing to his Mother’s Diffidence and Impatience; so, there is no Doubt to be made, but that the Almighty himself would, had she not interfered, have brought it about in a manner becoming his Holiness, and not by Falsehood, Deceit, and Dissimulation. Religion can never be more dishonoured, or the Despensations of God to Mankind receive greater Reproach, than when Divine Purposes are (under God’s immediate Direction) said to be accomplish’d by Methods in themselves evil and immoral, and altogether opposite to His Commands. Hath he forbid us Lying, under the Penalty of Hell-Fire, and shall he himself practise it, or immediately influence another to do it, for the sake of bringing to pass some Event, which he could as easily have accomplish’d, by Methods purely righteous and honourable! And had Jacob never been prompted, or attempted to obtain the Blessing in the manner he did attempt it, ’tis more than probable, that God, who removed Isaac’s Surprise, and caused him to break forth as he did, “I have blessed him, yea and he shall be blessed,” would never have permitted or impowered Isaac, to have blessed Esau, in an effectual manner beyond his Brother: Or if a mere Pronouncing of Words, when uttered as a Blessing from the Heads of Families, was in itself an irreversible Blessing, and Isaac had attempted to bestow it on Esau, God no doubt would have stayed his Mouth by Intimations within; as he did, on another Occasion, the Hand of Abraham, by an Angel without: Provided, I say, it be allowed, that a formal Blessing, from the Mouth of Isaac, was necessary to confirm on Jacob those superior Privileges, which God had designed for him; and that this Interpretation of the Text is more honourable, and better becoming the Truth and Majesty of the Divine Being. I appeal not to Reason only, but to Mr. Cole himself: For whatever Influence Prejudice, or Enthusiasm, may have on some Minds, there are certain Seasons, wherein Truth will display itself to the Realm and Understanding of Mankind, and extort, even from the Mouths of those, who sometimes oppose her, the most ample Concessions in her Favour. Take the following as an Instance—Cole’s Sovereignty of God, Page 41, 2d Edit. “To this also might be added the strict Injunctions that God hath laid upon the subordinate Dispensers of his Law; as namely, to judge the People with just Judgment, not to wrest Judgment, nor respect Persons; yea, he curseth them that pervert Judgment, and will surely reprove them that accept Persons; and shall mortal Man be more just than God? will he, under such Penalties, command Men to do thus, and not do so himself?”
The Argument is undoubtedly equally applicable to the Sin of Lying, or indeed to any Sin whatever; and I appeal to every unprejudiced Reader, if any Thing more to the Purpose could be urged, against his own Account of the Affair between Jacob and Esau, or even against the Doctrine itself, which he writes his Book to support: and this, in Conjunction with my foregoing Arguments, may, I hope, be Answer sufficient for the Use they make of all other parallel Places of Scripture.
By this Concession ’tis plain, that Justice and Goodness in God are, by this Author, considered the same as in us; how else were it possible, to understand what the Laws of God truly mean? Be you perfect, as your Father which is in Heaven is perfect, is a plain Indication (taking in the Context) of the moral Perfections of the Divine Nature, in Part apparent to us, as the Text observes, from his admirable Bounty in the Creation; He causeth his Sun to rise on the Evil and on the Good, and sendeth his Rain on the Just and the Unjust. Though at other Times, when these Gentlemen are hard pinched with the Iniquity and Injustice of their Doctrines, they apply for Refuge to the Sovereignty of God, and give strong Intimations, that Justice and Goodness, when applied to him, are mere unmeaning Sounds, which at best signify, what mere Sovereignty pleases to do, and that when applied to Man, they signify quite another Thing. And this naturally leads me to the second Thing I proposed to consider, viz. That allowing the Doctrine of Election to be, as they say, resolveable into God’s Sovereignty; that God is just such a Sovereign, as this Doctrine supposes, and these Gentlemen take him to be; that they have his Word for their own Election and Salvation; yet even then, there could be no manner of Certainty as to Religion, no Dependance on the Promises and Threatnings of the Gospel; and consequently, the supposed Elect must beat the Air, and run at the same or as great Uncertainties, as any other Persons whatever, under the Government of such an arbitrary Being.
I have, to avoid Dispute, proposed this Argument more to the Advantage of the Elect, than I was strictly obliged to do, by allowing them to be absolutely certain, that God has told them, that they are his Elect, and that he will give them eternal Life; which, allowing the Doctrine of Election to be true, is generally much more than they can prove, either to themselves, or to others: allowing, I say, the Doctrine of Election to be clearly revealed in Scripture, there will be this Difficulty behind, as to the certain Marks of being of that Number. The Scripture must also as clearly reveal the Marks, as it does the Doctrine, or we shall not be able to apply with any Certainty to ourselves. Is believing the Doctrine, &c. and thinking myself one of this happy Number, a Rule sufficient to abide by? If so, no Man who has this Faith, concerning the Doctrine and himself, can ever depart from it. Yet, there have been many Instances of Persons, zealous in that way, who saw Occasion afterwards to renounce the Doctrine itself, and with it that imaginary and ungrounded Conceit of their being, for no Reason whatever, God’s dear Children and Favourites, and embraced, in its room, the Doctrines of universal Grace and Free-will; and upon the best Reasons too, for as without the one, God cannot be just, so without the other, Man, being no Agent, can be no Subject of Rewards and Punishments. These very Men were before thought to be elect, by their most spiritual and best judging Brethren, who pronounced them chosen in Christ, and unshaken in the Faith; and so indeed they judged concerning themselves: But the Grace of God being once permitted freely to operate in the Mind, it soon expelled that Ignorance, and Narrowness of Spirit, which (even in many well meaning Persons) is the genuine Effect of such narrow Doctrines. If having this Faith be no certain Mark, because a Man may depart from it, what Proof have they? surely none: But allowing them an absolute Certainty, as to themselves, that God hath told them, in Person, that they are his Elect, it will (on their own darling Principle of Sovereignty) amount to just nothing at all; because, as a Sovereign, God may promise one thing, and intend, nay do another, or the contrary; nor can they prove, or have they the least Assurance, he will not thus deal with them, without recurring to other Principles, which will hold equally strong against the Doctrines themselves—To this Dilemma are these Gentlemen inevitably reduced; they must either give up the Doctrines, or part with any Security of Dependance on God himself, as to their own Happiness. It will be in vain, here, to refer to the Goodness of God, though, on my Principles, the Argument would be unanswerable; on theirs, it is stark naught, and avails nothing. And pray observe the double Dealing this reduces them to; it is something like setting up two Gods instead of one, or, which is much the same, ascribing to the eternal, unchangeable Being, an inconsistent and contrary Conduct. Here is, first, a mere arbitrary Being, that decrees, or pretends to decree, by mere Sovereign Pleasure only, the Salvation of the Elect; but, because such a Being may as well break his Promise as keep it, here is another to make good the Promise, who invariably acts according to the moral Fitness of Things: Or, if you take it the other way, here is, 1st, A Promise made as a mere Sovereign, undetermined by, and unregardful of, all moral Obligations; and, 2dly, The Performance of this Promise is expected, from a Principle of Justice and Goodness; ever conformable to the moral Reason and Fitness of Things: And certainly, in either Case, it leaves Things very precarious; nor can the Promises of such a Being as this (I speak it with all possible Reverence to the true God himself) be any thing near so valuable, or fit to be depended on, as the Engagements of a good and worthy Man. [And whatever these Gentlemen, to put a more plausible Out-side on their Doctrines], say, concerning the Freedom and Excellence of that State, wherein our first Father Adam was created, and the Possibility of his having remained perfectly innocent, and the Blessings of eternal Life, which would have been thence derived to all his Posterity, it is plain to me, they generally believe no such thing; but that, on the contrary, God absolutely willed and decreed the Fall of Adam, Mr. Cole himself, their great Advocate, is far from supposing the Condition of Adam to have been proper for abiding long in Obedience to the Divine Command, or that, had he stood, his Posterity would have thence become impeccable and happy: on the contrary, he represents Adam’s Condition as a very weak and imperfect State, by no mean suited to the Temptations, which his Maker knew he would shortly be exposed to, and overcome with; and all his Posterity, had they been tried one by one, would, it seems, have failed as he did, Page 72. If all this does not amount to something equal to a positive Assertion, that God willed the Fall of Adam, and in Consequence of it, the Guilt and Desert of eternal Death, which is said to be thence derived, to all his prosperity, I do not know what is, or can be equal to it; and indeed all this, and much more, may easily be resolved into the Doctrine of God’s Sovereignty: and whoever thinks I have misrepresented their Faith, need only consult their great apostle Mr. Calvin. But let me further pursue my Argument, to prove, that tho’ a Man of this Faith has God’s own Word for his Election and Salvation, he cannot, on this Principle of mere Sovereignty, reasonably or safely depend on it: My Reason, which is short and plain, I have already given; because God, as a Sovereign, may do just what he pleases, keep his Promises, or break them. There can be no Possibility of evading this Argument, without coming back to the Goodness of God; which is at once to set aside mere Sovereign Pleasure, and evidently recurring to the moral Fitness of Things. As much as these Gentlemen are pleased to despise this moral Fitness, and superstitiously exalt the mere Will of God in Opposition thereto; and if the Goodness of God proves, that he cannot break the Promise he has made to them of eternal Life; it is at least as strong a Proof to me, that such a good Being could not possibly make me for eternal Misery, or, which is the very same Thing, will or decree the Fall of Adam, and pass the Sentence of eternal Death on all his Posterity; the far greatest Part of whom he leaves, in this Condition, to perish everlastingly, and miserable me among the rest!
A Due Survey of the two Cases, or Conditions, of the Elect and Non-elect, may serve to set this Matter in a clear Light, God being in himself antecedent to the Existence of all other Beings, infinitely glorious and happy, could have no Occasion for Creatures to add to his Blessedness; all that we call evil, such as Cruelty and Injustice in Man, ever arises from such a vicious and imperfect State of Mind, as cannot, for that Reason, possibly belong to Deity. As the Sources, therefore, whence these Evils arise, cannot be in God; such a Conduct, as these Doctrines suppose, is also equally impossible to proceed from God, whose only Intent in creating must be, to communicate Happiness to his Creatures: Creation infers Providence, and to bring a sensible rational Being into this World; and, instead of taking due Care of its Safety and Happiness, to decree and render it eternally miserable, is in its own Nature, much worse than making an absolute Promise of eternal Life to any created being, and disappointing that Being of its Happiness, whether by annihilation, or by changing it to another State, or Mode of Being, no more happy than the present mortal Life; ’tis only a Breach of Promise, which, in such a Sovereign, is a mere trifle. We have no natural Right to Immortality, much less to immortal Happiness; it is the mere Effect of Divine Bounty—But, being created in a weak, dependent State, and surrounded with Wants and Infirmities, we have a natural Right to the Care and Protection of our Maker; and tho’ we allow, no formal Promise is made on our Behalf, yet the very act itself, of creating such Beings, and the Condition we are placed in, contains in it the Substance of a Promise; and we may be assured, God will have proper Regard to such Beings. If God be gracious enough to give eternal Life, to which we have not the least natural Right, can he possibly with-hold that which, from our Make and Dependance on him, we have just Reason to expect? and how Much more impossible is it, that he should make us for everlasting Misery! To make one Man for Damnation, is much worse, than promising eternal Life to another, and breaking that Promise; he that does the former, cannot be depended on in the latter. Methinks, the very Creation itself, and bountiful Provision therein made, for the Accommodation and Happiness of Man, might assure us, that (Man being made principally for another World) a proportionate Care will be taken of his more important and everlasting Concerns. Which presents me with a fair Opportunity, of exposing a Notion these Gentlemen hold, or a Method they have, of interpreting such plain Texts of Scripture, as are brought to prove God’s general Care and Providence over his whole Creation; in particular, where David says, “The tender Mercies of the Lord are over all his Works:” This, if you believe them, relates only to this Life; so I think Mr. Gill says. But what then, Is no Inference thence to be made? If God be thus tender, to provide Temporals, how much more will he be kind to the Soul, and provide for that! ’Tis a natural and strong Way of arguing, and it was our Saviour’s own Method of arguing, as the most Plain and Conclusive: “Wherefore if God so cloath the Grass of the Field, &c. How much more shall he cloath you, &c.” Mat. vi. 30. The Argument rises in one Case, as much above the other, as immortal Life is preferable to the present mortal State; and suppose any of us should sympathise with a near Friend, under a small Degree of Pain and Affliction, would not the same Spirit of Friendship and Humanity have a stronger Sympathy, when Affliction becomes more intense and severe? To be tender and pitiful in the least and lowest Matters, and unregardful and cruel in important and everlasting Concerns, is, with regard to the Divine Being, a moral Impossibility; ’tis beneath human Nature and Prudence, and the Practice of a good Man; And yet these Doctrines teach this horrible impiety concerning the great God himself.
To sum up this Argument: That Being who can make a sensible rational Creature, on Purpose for Damnation, instead of taking a reasonable Care of it, which, from its Make and Dependance, it has a Right to expect, as much as though a formal Promise were made, may, with altogether as much (nay more) Justice, break its Promises of eternal Life, made to another Creature of the same Kind; its Claim not being founded in Nature, but built on Promise. As the former would be a more cruel and un-justifiable Proceeding than the latter, he that is capable of doing the one, can have no moral Perfections in his Nature sufficient to secure the Elect against his doing the other: and on this wild and boundless Principle of Sovereignty, it is possible that, with regard to Religion, Things may be quite reversed hereafter; the Elect, as they are called, made miserable, and the Non-elect, happy. I think we may challenge the whole World, to shew on this mad Principle the contrary; and why, as well as any thing else, such an Economy may not be resolved into Sovereign Pleasure. If God to Isaac conveyed such errant Falshoods, by the Instrumentality of Jacob’s Mouth, Why not make the same deceitful Use of the Bible, or even of his own immediate Word, in regard to the Elect? If God, as Mr. Gill (I think) observes, has two Wills, “One publick Will of Command, and another of Intention, which is private;” Why, with regard to the Elect, may he not promise one thing, and intend, nay resolve on another? One would think it impossible, for any understanding Man to judge thus of his Creator, that it is possible he should command one Thing under the severest Penalties, and at the same Time not only will and intend, but irresistibly and secretly work to accomplish just the contrary, and (what is amazing beyond Belief) after all punish severely the Creatures concerned, whom he actuates to bring his secret Purposes to pass: If there can be such a thing as arbitrary Power and tyrannical Government, in the very worst Sense of all, here it is. And here certainly is all the Phrensy, Folly, and Tyranny, which, I told you in the Beginning, the Government of such an arbitrary Being (as these Gentlemen represent the Deity to be) must ever be liable to.
It is evident, that as worthy Sentiments of God and of Religion, better the Mind, and improve the Understanding; so do weak and superstitious Principles corrupt the intellectual Faculty, and render the Soul more blind and inhuman, than it is in its natural State, unassisted and unimproved by Divine Grace. I have the rather made choice of this Argument, not only because I have never seen it urged before, but because I think it more nearly affects Men of this Faith, than any I have hitherto met with. I may be mistaken; but while it has such weight with me, I cannot but earnestly recommend it to the serious and impartial Consideration of all who profess this Faith, more especially those who preach it publickly to the World; whose Acknowledgment of what I take to be Truth, or friendly Animadversions thereon, will be Matter of no small Satisfaction to me: But I must here enjoin one Caution, viz. that it will be a absolutely in vain to produce Texts of Scripture, till this Point is better settled between us. In the Art of evading Scripture Proofs, I allow these Gentlemen to be very skilful and expert; nor can I help believing, that a small Part of the Penetration and Dexterity, usually exercised on these Occasions, would, in Men of contrary Principles, or even in themselves, could they be persuaded to think differently, be abundantly sufficient to overthrow even the Doctrines themselves: They have a peculiar Talent, at misunderstanding; and perverting the plainest Text, and rendering those which are difficult and obscure in their literal Sense, with much Boldness, and without Hesitation; they stumble in a plain Path at Noon-Day, and walk carelessly at Midnight amongst Rock, and upon the most dangerous Precipices. And here I might safely rest the Argument, and make a final End of it. Sovereignty, such an one as they contend for, once proved, any thing whatever may be allowed to follow, and all Disputations will be utterly in vain. Allow but the Roman Church its Infallibility, and the Truth of other Doctrines will unavoidably follow. Till these Gentlemen, I say, set my main Principles aside, all the Scripture in the World will be nothing to their Purpose. Not but in the main the Bible is against them; for the Scriptures reveal God’s Being and Attributes more clearly than they do most Points of Doctrine: the Reason is, because the Doctrines commonly embraced, are in themselves not so plain to Reason, as the Being and Attributes of God; the latter being generally acknowledged in all Christian Churches, tho’ at the same Time they widely differ about particular Doctrines, some of which have no doubt been greatly corrupted in passing through various Hands and Translations: and I have been informed, by much better Judges than I pretend to be, that the New Testament, even in these very Doctrines I have been contending against, has, by some Partiality or Neglect, been made to speak more roundly in their Favour, than the original Greek, or best Copies, will support; and that, in some Places, the Meaning of the Original is inverted in the Translation. The Scripture not only revealing to us the Being and Attributes of God, more clearly than it does many Doctrines, and that Fundamental of all true Religion being also in itself perfectly agreeable to the Light of Nature; ’tis evident, we are bound to reject the most positive Text of Scripture militating against this everlasting and fundamental Truth: and rather than part with this, we had much better suppose the Writer, as to disputable Points, to have been mistaken at the first, or the true Meaning corrupted by others. The Translators are allowed to have been fallible Men, and ’tis very probable some Errors might creep in at that Door: But it will not so easily be granted, that the inspired Writers could mistake, nor would I suppose it, unless in very extraordinary Cases, where either that or something worse must be supposed; and such a Supposition will, I am sure; much better become us, than to imagine it possible for God to make a Revelation of his Will to Man, which shall upon Examination be found contrary to his Being and Goodness, as well as expressly contrary to other plain Parts of this Revelation, Tho’ the Argument, I say, might be safely rested here, yet as there are some well meaning Persons, who believe that Adam was made upright, and furnished with a Stock of Strength and Understanding, sufficient to preserve his Innocence; that God made a Covenant with him, as our Federal or Representative Head, wherein it was stipulated, that if he continued upright, during the Time of Probation allotted, all his Posterity should be for ever happy; but that if he fell, all should be subject to everlasting Misery, as the counter Part of the Covenant; and he falling, the Restoration of his fallen Race should be intirely owing to the good Pleasure of God, who might redeem all or only a Part, and leave the rest to perish in the State wherein he found them, and in which Adam had involved them by his Transgression: This they call Preterition, or a Passing by, which sounds a little better than that harsh Word Reprobation, tho’ in reality no better at all: And on this first Transgression some found the Doctrine of Election, and others that of Infant-Baptism, as an Expedient to wash away this original Guilt; and it must be owned, the Virtue of the Remedy is admirably well suited to the Malignity of the Disease. I shall, for their sakes, inspect a little farther into the Affair; to me it appears unreasonable, and therefore improbable, that God should make with Adam any such Covenant or Agreement, or suffer the eternal State of all Mankind to hang upon the single Thread of one Man’s Behaviour, and who too (it seems) God knew would swerve from his Obedience: besides, in all equitable Covenants, every Party concerned has a Right to be consulted, nor can they be justly included to their own Detriment, without Consent first obtained, (especially if the Thing covenanted for, has an immediate, or may have a very fatal, tho’ very remote, Tendency, to make wretched and unhappy) which, in this Case, with regard to the Unborn, could not possibly be had. I am sensible the Gentlemen against whom I am arguing (especially Mr. Gill) have many pretty Inventions, to justify such a Conduct in the Divine Being, such as producing parallel Instances, drawn from the allowed Practice of Men, and Usage of the State; in particular, the Law relating to High-Treason, whereby a Rebel’s immediate Descendants are deprived of inheriting their Father’s Estate, with others of a like Kind; to all which, what I am about to offer may, I hope, be a sufficient Answer: The two Cases differ so widely, that it will be no easy Undertaking to make any Thing of this Instance in their Favour; and ’tis very surprising, to find Men of the brightest Intellects, so weak as to argue and infer, from the Laws of Fallible Men, to the Laws of an Infallible and Holy Being: The Inference ought rather to be just the Reverse; for such Institutions as Men, in this weak and imperfect State, may think convenient for their own Sakes, and the Good of Society, to establish and ordain, can be no Rule to him, whose Infinite Wisdom and Almighty Power set him far above all such Necessity. Nor, again, does this Case come up to the Matter in Dispute: It is true, that the Heir of a convict Rebel cannot, according to our Laws, inherit his Father’s Estate; but what then, does it deprive him of any thing that was his own before? No; the Law convicts the Rebel, while in Possession of his Estate, which it considers as his own Property, and which therefore it justly takes away for his own Offence. Perhaps, in Cases of Hereditary Possessions, it may seem a little hard, because it prevents the next Heir from inheriting; but if there be any Evil or Imperfection in this, we must excuse it, for the Sake of the Intent, which might be for the general Good, the more effectually to deter Men from treasonable Conspiracies against their Prince, whereby the Happiness of Society hath been often greatly disturbed, and whole Kingdoms and Countries depopulated: but in this Case, it is not strictly the Heir’s, till he comes into Possession; for the Law, by which he may possess hereafter, may be considered as having in it this particular Exception, as to the Crime of High-Treason, which, whenever it occurs as to the Parent, renders the Son incapable, &c. With regard to our Laws, we may, in some Sense, be said to make them ourselves, by our Representatives, whom we constitute for that End: and ’tis besides very probable, that some great Men, who formerly possessed Estates, and settled them on the Male Heirs in their Families, from one Generation to another, might help to make this very Law itself concerning Treason, and consequently they could not but acquiesce with this very Exception to the Right of Inheritance in their Posterity. But if it be still said to be unjust, though necessary, ’tis no Argument; for it cannot be unjust and necessary too: the Law, in this Case, ought rather (with Submission) so far as it unjustly affects a Man’s Children, to be alter’d; and if it robs us of the Security, which arises from deterring the Parent, on Account of the Evils which shall afterwards befall his Child, ’tis easy to remedy this, by laying an additional Punishment on the Traitor himself; which, as Self is much nearest to us all, might better prevent the Sin of Rebellion, If the present Law be just in itself, there can be no Objection to it; if it be unjust, no Argument of any Weight can be drawn from it, in regard to the Divine Being; who is holy, wise, and true, and so are all his Appointments concerning the Children of Men.
To bring this kind of Reasoning of theirs up to the Point, they should have produced a Law, which subjected the Son (for the Father’s Offence) to the same corporal Punishment with the Father, and then also they must have proved such a Law to be just and good. But, as these Gentlemen are so fond of bringing Instances from the Practice of Men in this frail State, in Justification of their own Doctrine, I shall present them with one or two of my own. Murder has sometimes been committed under such Circumstances, that though the Murderer has been arraigned, there hath been no room to condemn him, all Circumstances having concurred, in the Eye of the Law, to acquit him; will the Almighty therefore acquit him? Again, on the other hand, in the Case of Murder, things have so fallen out, as to make an innocent Person look like the Murderer, in the Eye of the Law or Court, which has therefore sometimes proceeded to Death itself; is this Man therefore guilty before God? I have put these two Cases, purely to shew the Absurdity of such kind of Arguments: and I hope they will consider better of it, and advance them no farther.