(1.) First, The serious working of the thoughts in a quick denial of a temptation with a reason implied or expressed, though it admit not Satan to any further dispute or argument, may in some sense be called a disputing; for the Scripture useth διαλογισμὸς for any inward, serious thought. Such a kind of disputing as this is necessary. It cannot be wanting to any that refuse a sinful motion, this being, as we shall see afterward, one of those directions which Christ intended us by his example, and the very thing which Christ practised in every temptation; for he contented not himself to give a naked denial, but still adds a reason of such refusal. Those who in general terms urge that temptations are not to be disputed, do not reckon this as any disputing; and others that do, taking disputing for the refusal of a thing with a reason assigned, think that his procedure in the two first temptations is not imitable by us, but only that of the third, wherein he chased away the devil with angry denial; but the mistake is obvious.
(2.) Secondly, There is a disputing of unnecessary curiosity and conference. This is when a sinful motion injected into our hearts is not directly consented to, but then instead of a full denial men begin to raise questions and make objections of lesser moment, or some impertinent queries which strike not at the root; as one observed of himself, that instead of denying a sinful motion, he began to dispute whether it came from Satan or his own inclination; and so, instead of quenching the fire, he busied himself to inquire whence it came. Men deal with temptations in this case as they who being asked whether they will buy such a commodity, hastily answer no, but yet call back the party again and ask whence it came, or what it must cost, and by such entanglements of curiosity engage themselves at last to buy it. Eve failed by such an inconsiderate conference with Satan, for the abrupt beginning of the serpent’s speech, ‘Yea, hath God said ye shall not eat,’ &c., and the summing up of the arguments which prevailed with her to eat, ‘When the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and pleasant to the eyes,’ &c., [Gen. iii. 6,] do clearly evidence that there was more discourse than is there expressed, and that also tending to ascertain the goodness, pleasantness, and profit of the fruit. This kind of disputing is always unlawful and dangerous, for it is but a wanton dalliance with a temptation, a playing upon the hole of the asp, and commonly ends in a sinful compliance.
(3.) Thirdly, There is a disputing of a deliberating and parleying indifferency. This is when the devil puts a thought of sin into their minds, and, while they seem not to be forward to embrace it, leaves it to further consideration, and then they float betwixt resolved and unresolved, betwixt pro and con, being at a great dispute within themselves what is best to be done, whether the conveniences on the one hand will weigh down the inconveniences on the other. This, in cases of apparent sin, is a wicked halting betwixt two, always unlawful.
(4.) Fourthly, There are also treacherous partial arguings, wherein the heart takes part with Satan. These are those debates that are to be found in natural men, about the doing or not doing of sinful things. This looks so like the combat betwixt the flesh and the Spirit, that it hath occasioned an inquiry how they may be distinguished each from other. It is generally concluded that in that strife of the natural man, the light of the understanding and conscience gives opposition to the bent of the affections, and the same faculties, though sanctified in part in the regenerate, are the parties that give opposition each to other; but with this principal difference, that in this strife of the flesh and Spirit the man takes part with God, whereas in the other the affections take the devil’s part, and in a malignant averseness to the light, strive to put it out and to get over the conviction of conscience, so that the man strives to sin, and to stop the mouth of such objections as come in to the contrary; this kind of disputing is always sinful.
(5.) Fifthly, There is yet a disputing in a strict sense, which is a full and solemn debating of a satanical injection, by giving it the full hearing, and admitting Satan to be a respondent to our objections. Of this it is queried how far it may be convenient and how far inconvenient, because we see Christ in this place did not thus dispute with Satan, and yet we find instances in Scripture of some holy men that have been unavoidably engaged to dispute a temptation to the utmost.
To answer this query, I shall, secondly, shew in what cases it may be necessary or convenient to enter the lists with Satan in a holy arguing, and in what cases it is inconvenient and dangerous. There are four cases in which we may dispute a temptation:—
[1.] First, When the motion is of things doubtful and disputable, whether they be lawful or not. Here it cannot be avoided; for albeit, as the apostle adviseth, Rom. xiv. 1, ‘doubtful disputations’ are not to be imposed upon others, so as to tie them up to our persuasions, yet in these things every man, before he can act clearly, is to endeavour his own satisfaction in the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the thing, that so he may be ‘fully persuaded in his own mind,’ ver. 5. And he gives two strong reasons of this, ver. 22, 23: (1.) From the rack and trouble which otherwise the man may be put upon, while his conscience, unsatisfied, ‘condemneth him in that which,’ by a contrary practice, ‘he alloweth.’ (2.) In that this condemnation of conscience, while he doth that, the lawfulness whereof he believeth not, is an evidence of his sin, as well as an occasion of his trouble.
[2.] Secondly, Disputings have place, when a temptation hath taken hold upon the thoughts, and so far possessed itself that our corruption riseth up in the defence of the suggestion. Satan will not quit that hold, though he be an intruder without our leave, till he be beat out of his quarters. The apostle, Eph. vi. 16, implies so much by that expression, of ‘quenching the fiery darts’ of Satan. It is not proper to understand it of a refusal of the first motion of sin—though interpreters do usually make it comprehensive both of the keeping out of the dart, and the plucking it out—because this evidently supposeth that the dart hath pierced the soul, and now begins to burn and inflame, which will require more labour for the quenching of it, than a refusal of the first motion would put us to. As when fire hath taken hold upon our houses, we shall be forced to bring water for the extinguishing of the flame, which before it had broke out upon the building, an ordinary care might have prevented. And this we [are] further taught by a distinction which the same apostle useth in the same place, of στῆναι and ἀντιστῆναι, standing and withstanding. We must keep off the temptation, that it enter not, by standing against the assault in a peremptory refusal; but if it do enter, then we must be put to it, by a force of holy arguing, to pull out the arrow, and to withstand it.
[3.] Thirdly, Much more need have we of disputing, when the present temptation is a motion of such a sin which we are habituated unto, and have long practised; for these kind of sinful motions are not cast out easily. In this case, David adviseth his enemies, Ps. iv. 2-4, who had for a long time, ‘loved vanity, and sought after leasing,’ that by ‘communing with their own heart,’ and by disputing against their sinful practices, they should bring themselves under a holy awe, and by that means stop the course of their sinning, ver. 4. This, indeed, is the great thing that sinners are called to by God, to ponder their estate, to consider their ways, to study the evil and danger of sin, to examine themselves, and to reason together with God about the wickedness and ingratitude of their actions, and about the contrary loveliness, blessedness, and happiness of the ways of God, that so they may be brought to repentance; all which are done only by a serious arguing of their case and hazard.
[4.] Fourthly, It is convenient, and in some cases necessary, to dispute a temptation which Satan offers to us, by the mouths of men, who entice us to share with them in their wickedness; for here, by arguing, we may not only discourage their further solicitation, and so free ourselves from the like temptation for the future, but we also, by the exercise of a holy charity, endeavour to ‘pull them out of the fire,’ Jude 23. When Joseph’s mistress tempted him, he considered that he had to deal both with the devil and his mistress, Gen. xxxix. 7, 8, and therefore that he might ‘resist the devil,’ he peremptorily refused the temptation; but that he might take off his mistress from her unlawful prosecution, he argues with her about the ingratitude, danger, and unlawfulness of such an act, ‘My master wotteth not what is with me in the house, and he hath committed all that he hath to my hand: there is none greater in this house than I, neither hath he kept anything back from me but thee, because thou art his wife: how then can I do this great wickedness, and sin against God?’ When sinners do entice us to cast in our lot amongst them, pity to them, and care of ourselves, will engage us to argue the folly and danger of their ways with them, except they behave themselves as dogs and swine; their carriage giving us just ground to conclude, that they are so set on wickedness, that it may endanger us, rather than profit them, to debate with them. And so was it likely—and the text seems to hint so much—that when Joseph perceived his mistress was resolved upon the pursuit, and that his reasonings were not minded, he persisted in his denial, but forbore his arguings.