These inadequacies hampered the Saipan planners but Tinian was another story. “Perhaps no other Pacific island ...,” Marine Corps analysts later concluded, “became so familiar to the assault forces because of thorough and accurate [photography and] mapping prior to the landings.”
A lot of the familiarization came from first-hand observation by division, regimental, and battalion commanders who used observation planes to conduct their own reconnaissance of the Tinian beaches and inland terrain. Lieutenant Colonel Justice M. Chambers, commander of the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, described his preinvasion visit to the island:
There was a lieutenant commander Muller, a naval aviator, who apparently had a set of roving orders. He had brought his flight of three Liberators to Saipan.... I thought it would be a good idea to take my company commanders and overfly the beaches that we’re going to use.... So the 3rd Battalion group took the flight and practically all the battalions did the same.
We took off from Saipan and of course the minute you were airborne you were over Tinian. I had talked it over with Muller and told him that the last beach we would overfly would be the one we were going to hit. I said, “Let’s take a look at a lot of other beaches first and fly over the interior.” We made passes at several beaches. I was standing up in a blister where I could see and my officers had the bomb bays open and were looking down. We flew around maybe 20 or 30 minutes, and then we made a big loop and came back over the beaches we were going to land on. I’m glad we did because we spotted ... mines in the water which the Navy got out.
We zoomed in on Mount Lasso, which was the only mountain on Tinian. The island was just one big cane field, and Mount Lasso was directly ahead of our beaches. Muller started pulling out and I began to see white things zipping by outside the plane.... I was fighting to keep my stomach down because a fast elevator is too much for me. I asked: “What’s that?” He replied, “Twenty millimeter. Where do you want to go now?” I said, “Saipan. There are no foxholes up here.”
The photographic coverage of Tinian, along with prisoners and documents captured at Saipan, and other intelligence available to U.S. commanders, made them, according to the official history, “almost as familiar with the Japanese strength at Tinian as was Colonel Ogata [the Japanese commander].”
The Drive South
Lieutenant Colonel William W. “Bucky” Buchanan was the assistant naval gunfire officer for the 4th Division at Tinian. His career later took him to Vietnam. After his retirement as a brigadier general he recalled the Tinian campaign:
We used the same tactics on Tinian that we did on Saipan: that is, a hand-holding, linear operation, like a bunch of brush-beaters, people shooting grouse or something, the idea being to flush out every man consistently as we go down, rather than driving down the main road with a fork and cutting this off and cutting this off in what I call creative tactics, you see. But this was the easiest thing and the safest thing to do. And who can criticize it? It was successful. Here, again, what little resistance was left was pushed into the end of the island ... and quickly collapsed.
The grouse-shooting metaphor is simplistic but even the 4th Division commander, Major General Clifton B. Cates, thought the campaign had its sporting aspects: “The fighting was different from most any that we had experienced because it was good terrain.... It was a good clean operation and I think the men really enjoyed it.”
Before the “brush beating” could begin in proper order, three things needed to be achieved. First, the 2d Marine Division had to be put ashore. This task was completed on the morning of 26 July—Jig plus 2.