This idea then of the sacred shield, the guard and glory of Rome, and on which, in this advanced situation, depended the fame and fortune of his country, the poet, with extreme elegance and sublimity, transfers to the shield which guarded their great progenitor, while he was laying the first foundations of the Roman Empire.
But to return to the subject before us. What has been said of the impropriety of double senses, holds of the construction of a single term in two senses, even though its authorized usage may equally admit both. So that I cannot be of a mind with the learned critic’s wise men[43]; who acknowledge an extreme elegance in this form, when the governing verb equally corresponds to the two substantives. But when it properly can be applied but to one of them, and with some force and straining only, to the second, as commonly happens with the application of one verb to two substantives, it then degenerates, as Mr. Addison observes, into a mere quibble, and is utterly incompatible with the graver form of composition. And for this we have the concurrent authority of the cordati themselves, who readily admit, durum admodum et καταχρηστικωτέραν fieri orationem, si verbum hoc ab alterutro abhorreat[44]. Without softening matters, besides the former absurdity of a second sense, we are now indebted to a forced and barbarous construction for any second sense at all.
But surely this venerable bench of critics, to whom our censurer thinks fit to make his solemn appeal, were not aware of the imprudence of this concession. For why, if one may presume to ask, is the latter use of this figure condemned, but for reasons, which shew the manifest absurdity of the thing, however countenanced by authorities? And is not this the case of the former? Or, is the transgression of the standing rules of good sense, in the judgment of these censors, a more pardonable crime in a writer, than of common usage or grammar?
After all, since he lays so great stress on his authorities, it may not be amiss to consider the proper force of them.
The form of speaking under consideration has been censured as a trifling, affected witticism. This censure he hopes entirely to elude by shewing it was in use, more especially among two sorts of persons, the least likely to be infected with wrong taste, the oldest, that is to say, the simplest; and the most refined writers. In short, he thinks to stop all mouths by alledging instances from Homer and Virgil.
But what if Homer and Virgil in the few examples of this kind to be met with in their writings have erred? And, which is more, what if that very simplicity on the one hand, and refinement on the other, which he builds so much upon, can be shewn to be the natural and almost necessary occasions of their falling into such errors? This, I am persuaded, was the truth of the case. For,
1. In the simpler ages of learning, when, as yet, composition is not turned into an art, but every writer, especially of vehement and impetuous genius, is contented to put down his first thoughts, and, for their expression, takes up with the most obvious words and phrases, that present themselves to him, this improper construction will not be unfrequent. For the writer, who is not knowing enough to take offence at these niceties, having an immediate occasion to express two things, and finding one word, which, in common usage, at least with a little straining, extends to both, he looks no further, but, as suspecting no fault, employs it without scruple. And I am the more confirmed in this account, from observing, that sometimes, where the governing verb cannot be made to bear this double sense, and yet the meaning of the writer is clear enough from the context, the proper word is altogether omitted. Of this kind are several of the modes of speaking, alledged by the writer as instances of the double sense. As in that of Sophocles[45], where Electra, giving orders to Chrysothemis, about the disposal of the libations, destined for the tomb of her father, delivers herself thus,
ΑΛΛ’ ἢ ΠΝΟΑΙΣΙΝ, ἢ βαθυσκαφει̃ ΚΟΝΕΙ ΚΡΥΨΟΝ νιν.
The writer’s first intention was to look out for some such verb, as would equally correspond to ωνοαις and κὁνει, but this not occurring, he sets down one, that only agrees to the last, and leaves the other to be understood or supplied by the reader; as it easily might, the scope of the place necessarily directing him to it. It cannot be supposed, that Sophocles designed to say, κρύψον πνοαῖς. There is no affinity of sense or sound to lead him to such construction. Again: in that verse of Homer[46], ἽΠΠΟΙ αἐρσίποδες, καὶ ποικίλα ΤΕΥΧΕ’ ΕΚΕΙΤΟ, the poet never meant to say ἵπποι ἔκειντο, but neglectingly left it thus, as trusting the nature of the thing would instruct the reader to supply ἔστασαν, or some such word, expressive of the posture required.
Nay, writers of more exactness than these simple Greek poets have occasionally overlooked such inaccuracies: as Cicero[47], who, when more intent on his argument, than expression, lets fall this impropriety; Nec vero supra terram, sed etiam in intimis ejus TENEBRIS plurimarum rerum LATET utilitas. ’Tis plain, the writer, conceiving extat, patet, or some such word, to be necessarily suggested by the tenor of his sentence, never troubled himself to go back to insert it. Yet these are brought as examples of the double application of single words. The truth is, they are examples of indiligence in the writers, and as such, may shew us, how easily they might fall, for the same reason, into the impropriety of double senses. In those of this class then the impropriety, complained of, is the effect of mere inattention or carelessness.