Yet, though this be true, the invention of general rules is not without its merit, nor the application of them without its use, as may appear from the following considerations.
It may be affirmed, universally, of all didactic writing, that it is employed in referring particular facts to general principles. General principles themselves can often be referred to others more general; and these again carried still higher, till we come to a single principle, in which all the rest are involved. When this is done, science of every kind hath attained its highest perfection.
The account, here given, might be illustrated from various instances. But it will be sufficient to confine ourselves to the single one of criticism; by which I understand that species of didactic writing, which refers to general rules the virtues and faults of composition. And the perfection of this art would consist in an ability to refer every beauty and blemish to a separate class; and every class, by a gradual progression, to some one single principle. But the art is, as yet, far short of perfection. For many of these beauties and blemishes can be referred to no general rule at all; and the rules, which have been discovered, seem many of them unconnected, and not reducible to a common principle. It must be admitted however that such critics are employed in their proper office, as contribute to the confirmation of rules already established, or the invention of new ones.
Rules already established are then confirmed, when more particulars are referred to them. The invention of new rules implies, 1. A collection of various particulars, not yet regulated. 2. A discovery of those circumstances of resemblance or agreement, whereby they become capable of being regulated. And 3. A subsequent regulation of them, or arrangement into one class according to such circumstances of agreement. When this is done, the rule is completed. But if the critic is not able to observe any common circumstance of resemblance in the several particulars he hath collected, by which they may, all of them, be referred to one general class, he hath then made no advancement in the art of criticism. Yet the collection of his particular observations may be of use to other critics; just as collections of natural history, though no part of philosophy, may yet assist philosophical inquirers.
We see then from this general view of the matter, that the merit of inventing general rules consists in reducing criticism to an art; and that the use of applying them, in practice, when the art is thus formed, is, to direct the caprices of taste by the authority of rule, which we call reason.
And, thus much being premised, we shall now be able to form a proper judgment of the method, which some of the most admired of the ancients, as well as moderns, have taken in this work of criticizing. The most eminent, at least the most popular, are, perhaps, Longinus, of the Greeks; P. Bouhours, of the French; and Mr. Addison, with us in England.
1. All the beautiful passages, which Longinus cites, are referred by him to five general classes. And 2dly, These general classes belong all to the common principle of sublimity. He does not say this passage is excellent, but assigns the kind of excellence, viz. sublimity. Neither does he content himself with the general notion of sublimity, but names the species, viz. Grandeur of sentiment, power of moving the passions, &c. His work therefore enables us to class our perceptions of excellence, and consequently is formed on the true plan of criticism.
2. The same may be observed of P. Bouhours. The passages, cited by him, are never mentioned in general terms as good or bad: but are instances of good or bad sentiment. This is the genus, in which all his instances are comprehended: but of this genus he marks also the distinct species. He does not say, this sentiment is good; but it is sublime, or natural, or beautiful, or delicate: or, that another sentiment is bad; but that it is mean, or false, or deformed, or affected. To these several classes he refers his particular instances: and these classes themselves are referred to the more comprehensive principles of the excellence or fault of single sentiment, as opposed to the various other excellencies and faults, which are observed in composition.
3. Mr. Addison, in his criticism on Milton, proceeded in like manner. For, first, these remarks are evidently applicable to the general observations on the poem; in which every thing is referred to the common heads of fable, morals, sentiments, and language; and even the specific excellencies and faults considered under each head distinctly marked out. Secondly, The same is true concerning many of the observations on particular passages. The reader is not only told, that a passage has merit; but is informed what sort of merit belongs to it.
Neither are the remaining observations wholly without use. For such particular beauties and blemishes, as are barely collected, may yet serve as a foundation to future inquirers for making further discoveries. They may be considered as so many single facts, an attention to which is excited by the authority of the critic; and when these are considered jointly with such as others may have observed, those general principles of similitude may at length be found, which shall enable us to constitute new classes of poetical merit or blame.