II. In the second place, how the lusts of men have perverted Civil Justice, as well as Religion, into an instrument of contention and hate.

The object of all civil, or municipal laws, is the conservation of private peace, in the equal protection they afford to the property and persons of men. Yet, how often have they been employed to other purposes, by those, who administer the Laws; and by those, for whose sake they are administered!

1. In reading the history of mankind, one cannot but observe, with indignation, how frequently the magistrate himself has turned the Law, by which he governs, into an engine of oppression: sometimes, directing it against the liberties of the state; and sometimes, against the private rights of individuals. It were a small matter, perhaps, if he only took advantage of a severe law, or drew over an ambiguous one, to countenance his iniquitous purposes. But how oft has he embittered the mildest, or tortured the plainest laws, by malignant glosses and strained interpretations! gratifying, in both ways, his revenge, his avarice, or his ambition; yet still in the forms of Law, and under the mantle, as it were of public justice!

Such abuses there have been in most states, and, it may be, in our own. God forbid, that, standing in this place, I should accept the persons of men, or give flattering titles unto any[63]. But truth obliges me to say, that there is, now, no colour for these complaints. The administration of justice, on the part of the Magistrate, is so pure, as to be the glory of the age, in which we live. The abuses all arise from another quarter; and the contentious spirit is kept alive and propagated by the lusts of private men. And what renders their iniquity without excuse, is, that the very equity of those forms, in which our laws are administered, is made the occasion of introducing all these corruptions.

2. To come to a detail on this subject, might be thought improper. Let me paint to you, then, in very general terms, the disorders that spring from this perversion of Law; and, to do it with advantage, let me employ the expressive words of an ancient Pagan writer.

The Roman governors of provinces, it is well known, had their times for the more solemn administration of civil justice. Suppose, then, one of these governors to have fixed his residence in the capital of an Asiatic province, to have appointed a day for this solemnity, and, with his Lictors, and other ensigns of authority about him, to be now seated in the forum, or public place of the city; and consider, if the following representation of an indifferent by-stander be not natural and instructive.

“See,” says the eloquent writer[64], whose words I only translate, “see that vast and mixt multitude assembled together before you. You ask, what has occasioned this mighty concourse of people. Are they met to sacrifice to their country Gods, and to communicate with each other in the sacred offices of their religion? Are they going to offer the Lydian first-fruits to the Ascræan Jupiter? or, are they assembled in such numbers to celebrate the rites of Bacchus, with the usual festivity? Alas, no. Neither pious gratitude, nor festal joy, inspires them. One fierce unfriendly passion only prevails; whose epidemic rage has stirred up all Asia, and, as returning with redoubled force on this stated anniversary, has driven these frantic crowds to the forum; where they are going to engage in law-suits with each other, before the Judges. An infinite number of causes, like so many confluent streams, rush together, in one common tide, to the same tribunal. The passions of the contending parties are all on fire; and the end of this curious conflict is, the ruin of themselves and others. What fevers, what calentures, what adust temperament of the body, or overflow of its vicious humours, is to be compared to this plague of the distempered mind? Were you to interrogate each cause (in the manner you examine a witness) as it appears before this tribunal, and ask, WHENCE IT CAME? the answer would be, an obstinate and self-willed spirit produced this; a bitter rage of contention, that; and a lust of revenge and injustice, another.”

It is not to be doubted, that this rage of the contending parties was inflamed, in those times, by mercenary agents and venal orators; by men, who employed every fetch of cunning, and every artifice of chicane, to perplex the clearest laws, to retard the decision of the plainest cases, and to elude the sentence of the ablest judges. Without some such management as this, the passions of the litigants could not have been kept up in such heat and fury, but must gradually have cooled, and died away of themselves. Add this, then, to the other features, so well delineated, and you will have the picture of ancient litigation complete.

And what think we, now, of this picture? Is there truth and nature in it? Are we at all concerned in this representation; and do we discover any resemblance to it in what is passing elsewhere, I mean in modern times, and even in Christian societies? If we do, let us acknowledge with honesty, but indeed with double shame, that, like the Pagans of old, we have the art to pervert the best things to the worst purposes; and that the lusts of men are still predominant over the wisest and most beneficent institutions of civil justice.

Indeed, as to ourselves, the mild and equitable spirit of our laws might be enough, one would think, to inspire another temper: but when we further consider the divine spirit of the Gospel, by which we pretend to be governed, and the end of which is charity, our prodigious abuse of both must needs cover us with confusion.