3. We are, lastly, to have a regard to the conditions, characters, and persons of those with whom we converse; this attention being especially requisite to render our virtues attractive and efficacious.
The philosopher that took upon him to discourse on the science of war, did not enough consider his own character. If he chose to do this in an age which wanted no such instructions, his conduct was certainly unseasonable. But when he presumed to instruct the greatest general and commander in the world, he deserved the censure which has disgraced him with all posterity[122]. A decorum like this is required in our attempts to promote truth and virtue. To dictate in such matters to persons wiser than ourselves, or to persons, who by their stations and characters should, in all reason, be supposed wiser, is a manifest indiscretion, and can never be attended with any good consequences. Were we ever so able to instruct, or were they ever so much in want of instruction, prudence would suggest a very different conduct. It would recommend to us all the honest arts of insinuation and address; it would oblige us to watch the fittest seasons and opportunities; or, perhaps, to content ourselves with the silent admonition of a good example. Or, were there nothing in the rank and condition of those we would work upon, to restrain us to this caution, we might even be required to shew a condescension to their very prejudices and humours. The errors of men may sometimes be removed by arguing with them on their own mistaken principles; by allowing all that truth and reason will warrant to their opinions; by putting the fairest construction upon their designs; by hinting objections to their wrong tenets, instead of fiercely declaiming against them; above all, by testifying a sincere disposition to advance truth and goodness, without any indirect views to our own interest. Or, were all other considerations out of the case, we could never be excused from proceeding in the way of gentleness and civility, from treating them with due respect, and expressing the sincerest good-will to their persons. Be their moral or religious defects what they will, we should hardly be wise; that is, we should take very improper methods of reclaiming them from either, if we reproved with bitterness, advised with insolence, or condemned with passion. In all addresses to mistaken or bad men, where our purpose is to inform or amend them, the gentlest applications are surely the best, because these excite no passion to counteract their virtue.
And now, at length, should it be asked who is that WISE CHRISTIAN whom the text designs and recommends to our imitation, we are able to furnish, at least, the outline of his character.
“He is one who sets before him the great END and prize of his high calling; who, in his progress through the various stages of this life, keeps in constant view the immortal happiness which his religion holds out in prospect to him in another: who, in humble adoration of his God and Saviour, is content to wait the appointed season which is to crown his hopes and expectations; and, for the present, is sollicitous to work out his salvation with fear and reverence, by an earnest application of his time and pains to those subservient duties, which are to qualify him for the enjoyment of Heaven; who subjects all the towering conceits of his understanding, to the doctrines of the Gospel, and the impetuous sallies of his will, to the precepts of it; who makes no audacious separation of what the wisdom of God hath joined together; but, whilst he adores the mysteries of his holy FAITH, walks on in the plain and humble path of moral OBEDIENCE. He is one, who thinks it not enough to rest in the mere MATTER of his duty, but performs it in such a MANNER as will render it most exemplary and efficacious. He knows it to be a great precept of his religion, to see, that his good be not evil spoken of. He would not disgrace the best cause in the world by the neglect of those decencies, which, as he observes, have sometimes the strange power to recommend the worst. The good he intends, therefore, is attempted in such a way, as is most BECOMING of himself; most SEASONABLE in respect of the opportunities which are offered to him; and most agreeable and PERSUASIVE to other men. In short, HE is one who, taking Prudence for his guide, and Innocence for his companion, thinks himself secure in these attendants; and therefore neglects no decorum, which the best philosophy prescribes; no art, which the soundest policy suggests; and no address, which the politest manners recommend: and so, in the high emphatic sense of the words, approves himself a WISE MAN; wise unto that which is good, to all purposes in this world, as well as in a better.”
SERMON XVI.
PREACHED DECEMBER 1, 1765.
Rom. xvi. 19.
I would have you wise unto that which is good, and simple concerning evil.
In considering the first part of this precept, I endeavoured to give some general description of Religious or CHRISTIAN WISDOM; both in respect of the END it has in view, and of the MEANS employed by it: I further exemplified some of those subordinate WAYS, in which the prudent application even of those means is seen and expressed: And all this, for the sake of those sincere, but over-zealous persons, who are apt to think that wisdom hath little to do in the prosecution of honest and upright purposes.
It now remains to treat that other part of the text, which requires us to be INNOCENT, as well as wise, to be SIMPLE CONCERNING EVIL. And this, perhaps, will be thought the more important branch of the subject. For, generally speaking, the ways of wisdom, when our purposes are the very best, are not only the most effectual, but the safest and most convenient. So that prudence is likely to be a favourite virtue with us. But the case is different with regard to simplicity concerning evil; which is often found a hard and disagreeable injunction; as it may happen to cross our passions and the more immediate views of self-interest. So that this SIMPLICITY will sometimes seem, what the world is ready enough to call it, folly: and therefore, for the credit of our sense, as well as virtue, we should be well apprized of the worth and excellence of this Christian duty.
The virtue of SIMPLICITY consists, in general, in following the plain ingenuous sense of the mind; in taking our measures according to the dictates of conscience, and acting, on all occasions, without reserve, duplicity, or self-imposture, up to our notions of obligation. It is the office of WISDOM to see that our conscience be rightly informed: But our INTEGRITY is shewn in doing that which conscience, be it erroneously informed or no, requires of us. It consists, in a word, in whatever we understand by an honesty of nature; in observing, universally, that which we believe to be right, and avoiding what we know, or but suspect[123] to be wrong.