The University of Cambridge was possessed of a jurisdiction over its own members, as clerici, many years before any was granted to it by charter from the Crown. This jurisdiction, being ecclesiastical, seems to have been originally derived from the Bishop of the diocese. The causes cognisable by the University were chiefly causes of correction; the rule of proceeding in the Court was the ecclesiastical law, and Statutes of their own making, consonant to that law. The censures inflicted upon offenders were either ecclesiastical, viz. excommunication, suspension, &c.[101] or such as were appointed by the Statues for particular crimes; and the names of places, offices, pleaders, the same as are used in Ecclesiastical Courts to this day.
This jurisdiction was not usually exercised by the University in its collective capacity. But a particular officer was empowered to exercise it, under the name of Chancellor; who as official[102], acted by an authority derived to him from the University, was accountable to them for the use of it, and liable to have his acts annulled at their discretion; every person who thought himself aggrieved by the Chancellor being at liberty to apply to the Body for redress.
When an Appeal was brought before the University, they usually authorized Delegates to hear and judge it, as was agreeable to the practice in other Ecclesiastical Courts.
The jurisdiction here described was not originally independent; for no academical decision appears to have been final. An Appeal always lay from the judgement of the University by their Delegates to the Bishop of the diocese, till the University was exempted from his authority, and their jurisdiction made final by Royal Charters, confirmed by Act of Parliament.
In the reign of Henry III. attempts were made to carry Appeals directly from the Chancellor to the Bishop, and so to pass over the Appeal to the University, which ought to have been an intermediate step. But Hugh de Balsam, Bishop of Ely (the founder of Peter-House), by a rescript, dated Dec. 1264, entirely frustrated all such attempts.
Hitherto, the Appeals to the University had been from causes of correction and censure. The University was not as yet possessed of jurisdiction in civil causes. Scholars were first allowed to implead the burgesses and other laics of the town of Cambridge, in all kinds of personal actions, before the Chancellor of the University, anno 33 Ed. I. From that time, the University began to acquire a civil jurisdiction, which, by degrees, was inlarged and established by grants from the Crown in succeeding reigns. And now, in consequence of this jurisdictions, Appeals were extended from criminal to civil causes. Accordingly, in a rescript of Simon de Montacute, Bishop of Ely, which bears date 16 cal. April, anno 1341, there is express mention of Appeals to the University in causes of both kinds. For the design of this rescript is to commission the University to determine finally in all civil causes, without a further Appeal to his Court; and to prevent frivolous and vexatious Appeals from the University to him in criminal causes, by laying the Appellant under the obligation of an oath.
This addition of civil power did by no means abrogate or lessen the spiritual. We find, in the reign of Hen. VI. that all sorts of ecclesiastical authority were adjudged to belong to the University, by the Prior of Barnwell, the Pope’s delegate; and it was then made appear, that all these branches of power had both been claimed and exercised time out of mind. It is certain, the probate of wills hath at all times belonged, and still belongs, to the University. The power of excommunication was exercised as late as the reign of Hen. VIII. and the power of absolution is exercised at this day. This ceremony is constantly performed on the concluding day of each term. And here, to observe it by the way, gentle Reader, a goodly and reverend spectacle it is, to behold the spiritual Head of our University spreading his paternal hands, like another Pope, over his erring and misguided flock, who, in all humility, receive his ghostly absolution on their knees.
It is true, the new objects of litigation, introduced by the royal charters, occasioned an alteration in the Law of the University. For the ecclesiastical laws did not suffice for the decision of controversies about civil rights, particularly contracts between scholars and townsmen, and breaches of the peace. From the time, therefore, that these new causes came before the Chancellor, to the reign of Edward VI. his Court was directed, as our Spiritual Courts are now, by a mixed kind of law, made up of canon and civil law[103]. Yet this must not be understood without restriction. For the University, like other corporations, had all along a power of making local Statutes; and not unfrequently particular usages acquired the force of Statutes, from long continuance.
But whatever changes were made, either by express Statute, or in consequence of a more extended jurisdiction, the practice of appealing from the Chancellor to the University still continued; only, as was observed, with this difference, that it now was allowed in civil, as before it had been in criminal causes.
The right of appeal which then subsisted received a fresh confirmation from the Statutes made by the University itself. In these Statutes the right is not only referred to and presupposed, but directions are given in regard to the manner of exercising it[104]; which directions, till cancelled by succeeding Statutes, established the right as effectually as if it had been originally introduced by Statute. The times when many of these Statutes were made cannot be fixed; but it is certain they were collected and transcribed into the Proctors’ books between the year 1490 and 1500.