Historical Sketches of Colonial Florida

by Richard L. Campbell

In pursuance of that policy, Galvez at once began his preparations for offensive operations against Forts Bute, Baton Rouge and Panmure, in the order in which they are mentioned. The great distance of Pensacola from them, as well as the want of facilities of communication, assured him that with an adequate force at his command, General Campbell’s first intimation of his operations would be the news of their capture.

In August, with a force of 2,000 men, Galvez began his advance on Fort Bute. As soon as Dickson was informed of his movement, he resolved to concentrate his forces at Baton Rouge, leaving at the former post a few men to man the guns, and to make such a show of resistance as would give him time to perfect the defenses of the latter.

On August 30, Galvez appeared before Bute. After a contest of some hours, its handful of defenders arrested his movements by the time consumed in an honorable capitulation. Bute having been secured, Galvez pushed on to Baton Rouge. In his first attack, he was repulsed with the heavy loss of 400 men killed and wounded, which was within 100 of Dickson’s entire force. In the next attack which was made on the following day, the Spanish loss was 150. Although the loss on his side was in both attacks only 50 men, Dickson realizing that he was cut off from all succor, and that he must either surrender, or see his command gradually waste away under the repeated attacks of an overwhelming enemy, capitulated upon the most honorable terms. The command was pledged not to fight against Spain for eighteen months unless sooner exchanged. With loaded guns and flags flying the garrison was to march to the beat of the drum 500 paces from the fort and there stack arms. The officers were to retain their swords and every one his private property. All were to be cared for and transported to a British harbor by the Spaniards.[^[27]] Fort Panmure, from which the garrison had been withdrawn for the defense of Baton Rouge, was included in the surrender.

It was not until the twentieth of October that a courier brought to Pensacola intelligence of the fall of the Mississippi Posts, although Baton Rouge had surrendered during the first days of September. When it was received it was not credited, but regarded as a false report coming from the Spaniards to entice the British commander from Pensacola in order that it might be captured in his absence. Even the report of a second courier coming, on the twenty-third, failed at first to work conviction; but at last all doubt was dispelled, and every effort directed to putting Pensacola in a defensive condition.

Why Galvez did not follow up his success at Baton Rouge by an immediate advance on Mobile, it is difficult to conceive, except upon the presumption of his ignorance of the weakness of the military forces there, and at Pensacola.

In December, 1779, Clinton’s expedition against Charleston sailed from New York; its destination veiled in such secrecy, that even General Washington, as well as the rest of the world outside of the British lines, was in the dark respecting it. Miralles, the Spanish agent, feared it was intended to recover the conquests of Galvez in West Florida, and signified so much in a letter to General Washington. By the time the letter was received, however, the General had become convinced “that the Carolinas were the objects,” and in reply so tells the Spanish agent.

It was during the interval of Galvez’s inaction between the capture of Baton Rouge, and his attack on Mobile, that Chevalier de la Luzerne had a conference with General Washington, on the fifteenth of September, 1779, at West Point, with the view of bringing about such concert of movement in the American forces in the Carolinas and Georgia, and the Spanish forces in Florida, as would be a check on the British in their movements against either.[^[28]] But with every disposition for such co-operation, the latter being without authority to that end, went no further than to show his sympathy with the Spaniards, and his readiness to afford advice and information, which he afterwards manifested in the letter to Miralles above mentioned.

In that letter, referring to the capture of Fort Bute and Baton Rouge, he says: “I am happy of the opportunity of congratulating you on the important success of His Majesty’s arms.” It is hardly probable, however, that General Washington would have been so ready to congratulate Miralles on those successes, had he known that in consequence of Galvez’s bad faith, their result would be to increase the ranks of the foe he was fighting.

In the beginning of March, 1780, Galvez again began military operations, by advancing against Fort Charlotte. On the twelfth, after his demand for a surrender had been refused by Captain Durnford, the British commander, the fort was assailed by six batteries.

By the fourteenth, after a conflict of ten days, a practicable breach having been made, Durnford capitulated upon the same terms which Dickson had exacted at Baton Rouge. Hunger had conspired with arms to make capitulation a necessity. For several days before that event the garrison had been comparatively without food. When the gallant Durnford marched out of the breach at the head of a handful of hunger-smitten men, Galvez is said to have manifested deep mortification at having granted such favorable terms to so feeble a foe. An effort was made by General Campbell to relieve Fort Charlotte, but it fell just as succor was at hand. The delay in rendering it was occasioned by rain storms, which, having flooded the country, greatly impeded the movements of the relieving force.[^[29]]