Historical Sketches of Colonial Florida

by Richard L. Campbell

Milfort was the commander intrusted with the expeditions against the Georgia settlements; and, doubtless, being fully aware of the conservative policy of the Grand Chief, he made every effort to observe it. A Frenchman, of his ability, was the very man to make such a show of warfare as would impose on the British, and at the same time to render it so barren in results as to make but a transient impression upon those against whom it was directed. That a man should have been selected so eminently qualified to execute such a singular task, affords the highest evidence of the capacity of the mind that made the selection. Such ability, is, indeed, after all, the surest test of the capacity of a ruler.

Though a band of the Creeks, as already mentioned, assisted the British at the time of Galvez’s operations against Pensacola, it is remarkable, that neither McGillivray, who was a colonel in the British army, nor Milfort, the Great War Chief, seem to have taken any part in the contest. Such a force as could have been raised by the Creeks and their confederate tribes, could have rendered great service to the British in resisting, if not, indeed, in defeating Galvez’s invasion. But an explanation is readily found in the Grand Chiefs policy of preventing his people from taking any large part in the quarrels and conflicts of the whites. Besides, he was doubtless impressed with the smallness of the British force in West-Florida, compared with the host the Spaniards had at their command; justifying the conclusion, that as the latter had been able to conquer the country west, they would prove equal to the conquest of that east of the Perdido. He, therefore, wisely refrained from such an interference as would array the Spaniards against his people, after they had expelled the British from the country. If the British proved victorious, the assistance rendered by the Creeks, aided by the Choctaws and Chickasaws, could be urged as the fulfillment of the obligations of an ally. On the other hand, if the Spaniards were successful, it was an easy matter to disavow the action of an adventurer like Bowles, at the head of a handful of Creeks and other Indians, as one in which the tribe had no concern; an explanation the more acceptable, as the conqueror would naturally seek to cultivate the like friendly relations with the Indians which the conquered had enjoyed.

Soon after McGillivray became Grand Chief of his tribe, he met William Panton at Pensacola. Panton was deeply impressed with his ability. It is probable, too, that he was acquainted with the elder McGillivray, and sympathized with him as a fellow victim, who, like himself, had suffered banishment and confiscation, for no other crime than loyalty to their King. That sympathy with the parent naturally inspired good will toward the son. But, aside from such a sentimental consideration, each soon discovering the great advantage he could be to the other, it was not long before they were united by the more practical bonds of mutual interests. McGillivray likewise saw great advantages to his people in dealing exclusively with a house of such great wealth and influence as that of Panton, Leslie & Co., whilst Panton was as quick to see, that by the management of the Grand Chief the firm could secure a monopoly of the entire Indian trade. It was immediately after this understanding between them was reached, that they had that meeting with Governor Chester in the Council Chamber of Fort George, of which a glimpse was had in a previous page.

The war in Georgia and South Carolina had cut off the Creek trade with the Atlantic coast; and consequently, McGillivray had no difficulty in directing the whole of it to Pensacola. But after peace was established, the Atlantic traders were again ready, with their pack ponies, to take the trails that led to western Georgia and eastern Alabama. Panton at once saw that the monopoly of his house was in danger; and that to avert it, he must bring about an understanding between the Spanish government, himself, and McGillivray, like that which he had previously effected with the British. He, accordingly, entered into the treaty with the Spaniards, of which mention was made in the previous chapter. To be effective, however, he knew that treaty must be supplemented by another between the Indians and the Spaniards.

In playing his cards, Panton was looking solely to the advantage of his house. But it was far otherwise with McGillivray. If he induced his people to make such a treaty, it was because he saw clearly it was to their advantage. He rejoiced, too, to find that he was about to reap the fruit of that policy by which he had brought them through the period of the Revolutionary War, stronger, and more numerous than they ever were before; a condition which excited the fears of the Spaniards, and disposed them to seek the alliance of such a powerful tribe by liberal concessions. Accordingly, a treaty between the Creeks and the Seminoles represented by McGillivray, and Spain by Governor Miro of New Orleans, assisted by O’Niell, Governor of West-Florida, and Don Martin Navarro, Intendent General of Florida, was entered into on the first of June, 1784, at Pensacola.[^[42]] The relations created by that treaty between the Indians and Spaniards were close and intimate, and seem to have been observed substantially, although not always in form, up to the last day of Spanish rule in Florida.

Its conclusion was followed by McGillivray obtaining a commission with the pay of Colonel in the Spanish army.

By that treaty he felt, as he had reason to feel, that he had secured for his tribe an alliance with a strong European power, one that had just expelled the British from the Floridas; and, that thus fortified, he was in a condition to meet the Americans on the eastern frontier in a manner that would prevent their threatened encroachment upon the rights of his people; not by war, however, in which the Creeks were to engage with the United States, for such a course, his judgment told him, would end in their destruction. His treaty with the Spaniards was but a card which he proposed to use, to give his nation the imposing aspect of one to be courted rather than despised. To render its attitude still more imposing, he announced his determination to prevent any further encroachments by the whites upon the Indian territory in Georgia.

These cards won the game, according to the calculations of the sagacious brain which conceived it. The United States met the threatening aspect of affairs in Georgia, by appointing commissioners in 1785, to treat with the Indians. One of them, Andrew Pickens, addressed a letter to McGillivray, expressing the wish of the government amicably “to adjust matters on an equitable footing.” This was the point for the attainment of which the treaty with the Spaniards, and the threats of hostility against the Georgians had been made. For it was the strength of the Creeks, which his policy had so successfully fostered in the midst of war, backed by the Spanish alliance, that induced the United States, exhausted by the Revolutionary struggle, to resort to peaceable means to avoid a conflict with such a powerful tribe.

The reply of McGillivray so clearly illustrates his profound policy, which previous pages have endeavored to unfold as the moving spring of all his actions as Grand Chief, that it must be given in extenso, especially as any attempt to present it by extracts would prove a mutilation in which its force would be impaired, if not destroyed.

Little Tallasee, 5th Sept., 1785.