But here by the waye, I must aduertise my reader thus much, that I thinke a student ought rather to inuest himselfe in the habite of his writer, then to stand much vpon his title, and authoritie, in proofe or disproofe, seeing who knoweth not, that all our studies be generally detters to the first deuise, and fairest deliuerie? Therfore to auoide length therby, I will neither vse authoritie, nor example, seeing matter is the maine, and not the mans name, sauing onely where one mans deposition vpholdes or ouerthrowes: and the ground of the example is so excellent in that kinde, as it were to much vnkindenesse, not to let the person be knowen, where the fact is so famous. I will reste vpon reason the best, where I finde it, the next where that failes, and coniecture is probable, to proue such thinges, as reason must paterne. If the triall be in proofe, and experience must guide it, I will binde vpon proofe, and let triall be the tuche.
For with the alledging of authours, either to shew, what I haue read or to tuche common concordes, where any thing is to much, and nothing is enough, I meane not at all to buisie my selfe. Bycause we heape but vp witnesses, which be nothing needeful, in such cases, as be nothing doubtfull, when we vse many gaie names all agreeing in one, and none saying but so: wheras the naturall vse of testimonies is, to proue where doubt is, not to cloye, where all is cleare. In such cases for want of sound iudgement, a catalogue of names, and a multitude of sentences, which say but that is soothed, and no man denyes, are forced to the stage, to seeme to arme the alleadger, which fighteth without foe, and flyeth without feare.
In pointes of learning, which be wonne from quarrell, or resolute groundes, which be without quarrell, and neede no assurer, I referre my dealing to the iudgement of those, which can trace me, where I tread and shall finde my truth, without the authours name, whom they will confesse to be well alleadged, when I saye, as he sayeth, and proue as he proueth, either by habite got by reading, or by likenesse in iudgement, though I neuer red.
If controuersie arise, and be worth the recounting the matter shall not sleepe: if it hange of the man, and without him be lame, the man shall not slyp: but otherwise, no. Those that be learned know that witnesses, and wise mens names be verie good ware, where the question is, whether such a thing be done, and they be said to know it, and that Rhetorick takes testimonies for a principall proofe, and very neare the harte, as Logick placeth them in the utmost of her argumentes, being themselues of small pith, though their stuffe be worth praise, and both bind and loose, where reason beares the swaie, and probabilitie is to purpose. I do honour good writers but without superstition, nothing addicte to titles. But for so much as Reason doth honour them, they must be content to staie without them selues, and vse all meanes to preferre her to presence, as their ladie and mistresse, whose authoritie and credit procures them admission, when they come from her. It is not so, bycause a writer said so, but bycause the truth is so, and he said the truth, the truth giues him title, and that is it, which must passe, strong enough of it selfe, and oftimes weakened in the hearers opinion, though not in it selfe, by naming the writer: which commonly proues so when the hearer is wedded vnto names, and sworn to authoritie, not so much eying the thing which is vttered, as the persons title by whom it is vttered. If truth did depend vpon the person, she would oftimes be brought into a miserable plighte, and looke rufully vpon it, being constrained to serue fancie, and to alter vpon will, wheras she is still one, and should be bent vnto, neither will her selfe bend, howsoeuer opinatiue people do perswade them selues.
This the learned and wise know, whose curtesie I craue as I wish them well: for whose helpe and health, I vndertooke this paine, whose wisedom I appeal to, if either, diffidence do wrangle, or ignoraunce do quarrel. As for the vnlearned, I must needes ouertreat them, not to stand with me in pointes, where they cannot iudge themselues, if not for mine owne, yet for their sakes, which beleue me themselues, and will giue their word for me. In such pointes, as be intelligible to both, I must praie them both to waie me well, and euer to haue before them, that my will wisheth well, howsoeuer I perfourme, wherin will deserues well, and weaknes prayeth excuse.
CHAPTER 4.
What time weere best for the child to begin to learne. What matters some of the best writers handle, eare they determine this question. Of lettes and libertie whervnto the parentes are subiect in setting their children to schoole. Of the difference of wittes and bodies in children. That exercise must be ioyned with the booke, as the schooling of the bodie.
The first question that of any necessitie commeth in place, seemeth to be at what yeares children be to be put to schoole: for neither would they be differed to long for leasing of their time, nor hastened on to soone, for hindering of their health. The rule therfore must be giuen according to the strength of their bodies, and the quicknes of their wittes ioyntly.
The auncient antecedents.