The Pythagoreans also maintained the dogma of conflagration. To this purpose Hippasus, of Metapontum, taught that the universe is finite, is always changing, and undergoes a periodical conflagration. Philolaus, who flourished in the time of Plato, maintained that the world is liable to destruction both by fire and water. Mention of the conflagration is also several times made in the books of the Sibyls, Sophocles, Lucan, &c. Dr. Burnet, after F. Tachard and others, relates that the Siamese believe that the earth will at last be parched up with heat, the mountains melted down, and the earth’s whole surface reduced to a level, and then consumed with fire. And the Bramins of Siam do not only hold that the world shall be destroyed by fire, but also that a new earth shall be made out of the cinders of the old. The sacred Scriptures announce this general destruction of the world by fire in a variety of passages.
2. Various are the sentiments of authors on the subject of the conflagration; the cause whence it is to arise, and the effects it is to produce. Divines ordinarily account for it metaphysically; and will have it take its rise from a miracle, as a fire from heaven. Philosophers contend for its being produced from natural causes; and will have it effected according to the laws of mechanics: some think an eruption of a central fire sufficient for the purpose; and add, that this may be occasioned several ways; namely, either by having its intensity increased, (which, again, may be effected either by being driven into less space by the encroachments of the superficial cold, or by an increase of the inflammability of the fuel whereon it is fed,) or by having the resistance of imprisoning earth weakened; which may happen either from the diminution of its matter, by the consumption of its central parts, or by weakening the cohesion of the constituent parts of the mass, by the excess or the defect of moisture. Others look for the cause of the conflagration in the atmosphere; and suppose that some of the meteors there engendered in unusual quantities, and exploded with unusual vehemence, from the concurrency of various circumstances, may be made to effect it, without seeking any farther. The astrologers account for it from a conjunction of all the planets in the sign Cancer; “as the deluge,” say they, “was occasioned by their conjunction in Capricorn.” This was an opinion adopted by the ancient Chaldeans. Lastly: others have recourse to a still more effectual and flaming machine; and conclude the world is to undergo its conflagration from the near approach of a comet, in its return from the sun. It is most natural to conclude, that, as the Scriptures represent the catastrophe as the work of a moment, no gradually operating natural cause will be employed to effect it, but that He who spake and the world was created, will again destroy it by the same word of his power; setting loose at once the all-devouring element of fire to absorb all others. Beyond this, all is conjecture.
CONFUSION OF TONGUES is a memorable event, which happened in the one hundred and first year, according to the Hebrew chronology, after the flood, B. C. 2247, at the overthrow of Babel; and which was providentially brought about, in order to facilitate the dispersion of mankind, and the population of the earth. Until this period, there had been one common language, which formed a bond of union, that prevented the separation of mankind into distinct nations.
2. There has been a considerable difference of opinion as to the nature of this confusion, and the manner in which it was effected. Some learned men, prepossessed with the notion that all the different idioms now in the world did at first arise from one original language, to which they may be reduced, and that the variety among them is no more than must naturally have happened in a long course of time by the mere separation of the builders of Babel, have maintained, that there were no new languages formed at the confusion; but that this event was accomplished by creating a misunderstanding and variance among the builders, without any immediate influence on their language. But this opinion, advanced by Le Clerc, &c, seems to be directly contrary to the obvious meaning of the word שפה, lip, used by the sacred historian; which, in other parts of Scripture signifies speech, Psalm lxxxi, 5; Isaiah xxviii, 11; xxxiii, 19; Ezekiel iii, 5. It has been justly remarked, that unanimity of sentiment, and identity of language, are particularly distinguished from each other, in the history: “The people is one, and they have all one language,” Gen. xi, 6. It has been also suggested, that if disagreement in opinion and counsel were the whole that was intended, it would have had a contrary effect; they would not have desisted from their project, but strenuously have maintained their respective opinions, till the greater number of them had compelled the minority either to fly or to submit. Others have imagined, that this was brought about by a temporary confusion of their speech, or rather of their apprehensions, causing them, while they continued together and spoke the same language, to understand the words differently: Scaliger is of this opinion. Others again account for this event, by the privation of all language, and by supposing that mankind were under a necessity of associating together, and of imposing new names on things by common consent. Another opinion ascribes the confusion to such an indistinct remembrance of the original language which they spoke before, as made them speak it very differently; so that by the various inflections, terminations, and pronunciations of divers dialects, they could no more understand one another, than they who understand Latin can understand those who speak French, Italian, or Spanish, though all these languages arise out of it. This opinion is adopted by Casaubon, and by Bishop Patrick in his Commentary, and is certainly much more probable than either of the former: and Mr. Shuckford maintains, that the confusion arose from small beginnings, by the invention of new words in either of the three families of Shem, Ham, and Japhet, which might contribute to separate them from one another; and that in each family new differences of speech might gradually arise, so that each of these families went on to divide and subdivide among themselves. Others, again, as Mr. Joseph Mede and Dr. Wotton, &c, not satisfied with either of the foregoing methods of accounting for the diversity of languages among mankind, have recourse to an extraordinary interposition of divine power, by which new languages were framed and communicated to different families by a supernatural infusion or inspiration; which languages have been the roots and originals from which the several dialects that are, or have been, or will be, spoken, as long as this earth shall last, have arisen, and to which they may with ease be reduced.
3. It is, however, unnecessary to suppose, that the primitive language was completely obliterated, and entire new modes of speech at once introduced. It was quite sufficient, if such changes only were effected, as to render the speech of different companies or different tribes unintelligible to one another, that their mutual coöperation in the mad attempt in which they had all engaged might be no longer practicable. The radical stem of the first language might therefore remain in all, though new dialects were formed, bearing among themselves a similar relation with what we find in the languages of modern Europe, derived from the same parent stem, whether Gothic, Latin, or Sclavonian. In the midst of these changes, it is reasonable to suppose that the primitive language itself, unaltered, would still be preserved in some one at least of the tribes or families of the human race. Now in none of these was the transmission so likely to have taken place, as among that branch of the descendants of Shem, from which the patriarch Abraham proceeded. Upon these grounds, therefore, we may probably conclude, that the language spoken by Abraham, and by him transmitted to his posterity, was in fact the primitive language, modified indeed and extended in the course of time, but still retaining its essential parts far more completely than any other of the languages of men. If these conclusions are well founded, they warrant the inference, that, in the ancient Hebrew, there are still to be found the traces of the original speech. Whether this ancient Hebrew more nearly resembled the Chaldean, the Syrian, or what is now termed the Hebrew, it is unnecessary here to inquire; these languages, it has never been denied, were originally and radically the same, though, from subsequent modifications, they appear to have assumed somewhat different aspects.
CONGREGATIONALISTS, a denomination of Protestants who reject all church government, except that of a single congregation under the direction of one pastor, with their elders, assistants, or managers. In one particular, the Congregationalists differ from the Independents: the former invite councils, which, however, only tender their advice; but the latter are accustomed to decide all difficulties within themselves. See [Independents].
CONSCIENCE is that principle, power, or faculty within us, which decides on the merit or demerit of our own actions, feelings, or affections, with reference to the rule of God’s law. It has been called the moral sense by Lord Shaftesbury and Dr. Hutcheson. This appellation has been objected to by some, but has been adopted and defended by Dr. Reid, who says, “The testimony of our moral faculty, like that of the external senses, is the testimony of nature, and we have the same reason to rely upon it.” He therefore considers conscience as an original faculty of our nature, which decides clearly, authoritatively, and instantaneously, on every object that falls within its province. “As we rely,” says he, “upon the clear and distinct testimony of our eyes, concerning the colours and figures of the bodies about us, we have the same reason to rely, with security, upon the clear and unbiassed testimony of our conscience, with regard to what we ought and ought not to do.” But Dr. Reid is surely unfortunate in illustrating the power of conscience by the analogy of the external senses. With regard to the intimations received through the organs of sense, there can be no difference of opinion, and there can be no room for argument. They give us at once correct information, which reasoning can neither invalidate nor confirm. But it is surely impossible to say as much for the power of conscience, which sometimes gives the most opposite intimations with regard to the simplest moral facts, and which requires to be corrected by an accurate attention to the established order of nature, or to the known will of God, before we can rely with confidence on its decisions. It does not appear, that conscience can with propriety be considered as a principle distinct from that which enables us to pronounce on the general merit or demerit of moral actions. This principle, or faculty, is attended with peculiar feelings, when we ourselves are the agents; we are then too deeply interested to view the matter as a mere subject of reasoning; and pleasure or pain are excited, with a degree of intensity proportioned to the importance which we always assign to our own interests and feelings. In the case of others, our approbation or disapprobation is generally qualified, sometimes suspended, by our ignorance of the motives by which they have been influenced; but, in our own case, the motives and the actions are both before us, and when they do not correspond, we feel the same disgust with ourselves that we should feel toward another, whose motives we knew to be vicious, while his actions are specious and plausible. But in our own case, the uneasy feeling is heightened in a tenfold degree, because self-contempt and disgust are brought into competition with the warmest self-love, and the strongest desire of self-approbation. We have then something of the feelings of a parent, who knows the worthlessness of the child he loves, and contemplates with horror the shame and infamy which might arise from exposure to the world.
2. Conscience, then, cannot be considered as any thing else than the general principle of moral approbation or disapprobation applied to our own feelings or conduct, acting with increased energy from the knowledge which we have of our motives and actions, and from the deep interest which we take in whatever concerns ourselves; nor can we think that they have deserved well of morals or philosophy, who have attempted to deduce our notions of right and wrong from any one principle. Various powers both of the understanding and of the will are concerned in every moral conclusion; and conscience derives its chief and most salutary influence from the consideration of our being continually in the presence of God, and accountable to him for all our thoughts, words, and actions. A conscience well informed, and possessed of sensibility, is the best security for virtue, and the most awful avenger of wicked deeds; an ill-informed conscience is the most powerful instrument of mischief; a squeamish and ticklish conscience generally renders those who are under its influence ridiculous.
Hic murus aheneus esto,
Nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa.