PRE-EXISTENCE OF JESUS CHRIST is his existence before he was born of the Virgin Mary. That he really did exist, is plain from John iii, 13; vi, 50, &c; viii, 58; xvii, 5, 24; 1 John i, 2; but there are various opinions respecting this existence. Some acknowledging, with the orthodox, that in Jesus Christ there is a divine nature, a rational soul, and a human body, go into an opinion peculiar to themselves. His body was formed in the virgin’s womb; but his human soul, they suppose, was the first and most excellent of all the works of God; was brought into existence before the creation of the world, and subsisted in happy union in heaven with the second person of the Godhead, till his incarnation. These divines differ from those called Arians, for the latter ascribe to Christ only a created deity, whereas the former hold his true and proper divinity. They differ from the Socinians, who believe no existence of Jesus Christ before his incarnation: they differ from the Sabellians, who only own a trinity of names: they differ also from the generally received opinion, which is, that Christ’s human soul began to exist in the womb of his mother, in exact conformity to that likeness unto his brethren of which St. Paul speaks, Heb. ii, 17. The writers in favour of the preëxistence of Christ’s human soul recommend their opinion by these arguments: 1. Christ is represented as his Father’s messenger, or angel, being distinct from his Father, sent by his Father, long before his incarnation, to perform actions which seem to be too low for the dignity of pure Godhead. The appearances of Christ to the patriarchs are described like the appearance of an angel, or man really distinct from God; yet one, in whom God, or Jehovah, had a peculiar indwelling, or with whom the divine nature had a personal union. 2. Christ, when he came into the world, is said, in several passages of Scripture, to have divested himself of some glory which he had before his incarnation. Now if there had existed before this time nothing but his divine nature, this divine nature, it is argued, could not properly have divested itself of any glory, John xvii, 4, 5; 2 Cor. viii, 9. It cannot be said of God that he became poor: he is infinitely self-sufficient; he is necessarily and eternally rich in perfections and glories. Nor can it be said of Christ, as man, that he was rich, if he were never in a richer state before than while he was on earth. 3. It seems needful, say those who embrace this opinion, that the soul of Jesus Christ should preëxist, that it might have an opportunity to give its previous actual consent to the great and painful undertaking of making atonement for our sins. On the other side, it is affirmed that the doctrine of the preëxistence of the human soul of Christ weakens and subverts that of his divine personality. 1. A pure intelligent spirit, the first, the most ancient, and the most excellent of creatures, created before the foundation of the world, so exactly resembles the second person of the Arian trinity, that it is impossible to show the least difference except in name. 2. This preëxistent intelligence, supposed in this doctrine, is so confounded with those other intelligences called angels, that there is great danger of mistaking this human soul for an angel, and so of making the person of Christ to consist of three natures. 3. If Jesus Christ had nothing in common like the rest of mankind except a body, how could this semi-conformity make him a real man? 4. The passages quoted in proof of the preëxistence of the human soul of Jesus Christ, are of the same sort with those which others allege in proof of the preëxistence of all human souls. 5. This opinion, by ascribing the dignity of the work of redemption to this sublime human soul, detracts from the deity of Christ, and renders the last as passive as the first is active. 6. This notion is contrary to the Scripture. St. Paul says, In all things it behoved him to be made like unto his brethren,” Heb. ii, 17: he partook of all our infirmities, except sin. St. Luke says, He increased in stature and wisdom,” Luke ii, 52. Upon the whole, this scheme, adopted to relieve the difficulties which must always surround mysteries so great, only creates new ones. This is the usual fate of similar speculations, and shows the wisdom of resting in the plain interpretation of the word of God.

PRESBYTERIANS are those that affirm there is no order in the church, as established by Christ and his Apostles, superior to that of presbyters; that all ministers, being ambassadors, are equal by their commission; and that elder, or presbyter, and bishop, are the same in name and office, and the terms synonymous. Their arguments against the Episcopalians are as follows:--With respect to the successors of the Apostles, they seem to have been placed on a footing of perfect equality, the διάκονοι, or deacons, not being included among the teachers. They were inferior officers, whose province it originally was to care for the poor, and to discharge those secular duties arising out of the formation of Christian communities, which could not be discharged by the ministers without interfering with the much higher duties which they had to perform. These ministers are sometimes in the New Testament styled ϖρεσϐύτεροι, or presbyters, at other times ἐπίσκοποι, or bishops; but the two appellations were indiscriminately applied to all the pastors who were the instructers of the different churches. Of this various examples may be given from the sacred writings. The Apostle Paul, upon a very affecting occasion, when he was convinced that he could never again have an opportunity of addressing them, sent for the elders or presbyters of Ephesus, the persons to whom the ministry in that church had been committed; and after mentioning all that he had done, and intimating to them the sufferings which awaited him, he addressed to them what may be considered as his dying advice, and as comprehending in it all that he judged it most essential for them to do. Take heed, therefore, unto yourselves, and to all the flock over which the Holy Ghost hath made you bishops or overseers, to feed the church of God,” Acts xx, 17, 28. Here they whose duty it was to feed the church of God, as having been set apart through the Holy Spirit for that interesting work, are termed by the Apostle presbyters and bishops, and there is not the slightest allusion to the existence of any other ἐπίσκοπος, or bishop, superior to those ἐπίσκοποι, or bishops, to whom he gives the moving charge now recorded. In his epistle to Titus, St. Paul thus writes: For this purpose I left thee in Crete,” where, as yet, it is probable that no teachers had been appointed, that thou shouldest ordain elders, or presbyters, in every city.” He then points out the class of men from which the presbyters were to be selected, adding, as the reason of this, for a bishop must be blameless as the steward of God,” Titus i, 5, 7. It is quite plain that the epithet bishop is here applicable to the same persons who were a little before styled elders, and both are declared to be the stewards of God, the guardians and instructers of his church. The Apostle Peter, in his first epistle addressed to the Jewish converts, has these words: “The elders which are among you I exhort, who am also an elder, ὁ συμπρεσϐύτερος, and a witness of the sufferings of Christ, feed the flock of God which is among you, taking the oversight of it, ἐπισκοποῦντες, being bishops of it, not by constraint but willingly,” 1 Peter v, 1, 2. This passage is a very strong one. The Apostle speaks of himself in his extraordinary capacity, a witness of the sufferings of Christ, and in his ordinary capacity as a teacher; showing, by the use of a very significant term, that as to it he was on a footing of equality with the other pastors or presbyters. He gives it in charge to them to feed the flock of God; the charge which, under most particular and affecting circumstances, he had received from the Lord after the resurrection, and which includes in it the performance of every thing requisite for the comfort and the edification of Christians; and he accordingly expresses this by the word ἐπισκοποῦντες, being bishops over them. It cannot, with any shadow of reason, be supposed that the Apostle would exhort the elders or presbyters to take to themselves the office, and to perform the duties, of a bishop, if that term really marked out a distinct and higher order; or that he would have considered the presbyters as fitted for the discharge of the whole ministerial office, if there were parts of that office which he knew that it was not lawful for them to exercise.

It seems, by the passages that have been quoted, to be placed beyond a doubt, that, in what the Apostles said respecting the ministers of Christ’s religion, they taught that the ἐπίσκοποι and the ϖρεσβύτεροι were the same class of instructers; and that there were, in fact, only two orders pointed out by them, bishops or presbyters, and deacons. This being the case, even although it should appear that there were bishops, in the common sense of that term, recognized in the apostolic age, all that could be deduced from the fact would be, that the equality at first instituted among the teachers, had, for prudential reasons, or under peculiar circumstances, been interrupted; but it would not follow either that the positive and general declarations on the subject by the inspired writers were not true, or that it was incumbent at all times, and upon all Christians, to disregard them. It has been strenuously contended that there were such bishops in the infancy of the church, and that allusion is made to them in Scripture; but without directly opposing the assertion, this much must be admitted, that the proof of it is less clear than that bishops and presbyters were represented as the same in rank and in authority. Indeed, there does not appear to have been any occasion for this higher order. To presbyters was actually committed the most important charge of feeding the church of God, that is, of promoting the spiritual improvement of mankind; and it is remarkable that their privilege of separating from the people by ordination the ministers of religion, is explicitly acknowledged in the case of Timothy, whom the Apostle admonishes not to neglect the gift that was in him, and which had been given by prophecy, and by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery; by which can be meant only the laying on of the hands of those who were denominated presbyters or bishops. But although all the parts of the ministerial duty had been intrusted to presbyters, it is still contended that the New Testament indicates the existence of bishops as a higher order. There has, however, been much diversity of opinion in relation to this point by those who contend for the divine institution of episcopacy. Some of them maintain that the Apostles, while they lived, were the bishops of the Christian church; but this, and upon irrefragable grounds, is denied by others. Some urge that Timothy and Titus were, in what they call the true sense of the term, bishops; but many deny that, founding their denial upon these evangelists not having resided within the bounds, or been limited to the administration of any one church, being sent wherever it was resolved to bring men to the knowledge of divine truth. Many conceive that the question is settled by the epistles in the book of Revelation being addressed to the angels of the respective churches named by the Apostle. But it is far from being obvious what is implied under the appellation angel; there has been much dispute about this point, and it is certainly a deviation from all the usual rules by which we are guided in interpreting Scripture, to bring an obscure and doubtful passage in illustration of one, about the import of which, if we attend to the language used, there can be no doubt. It may, therefore, be safely affirmed that there is nothing clear and specific in the writings of the New Testament which qualifies the positive declarations that bishops and presbyters were the same officers; that the ground upon which the distinction between them is placed, is, at least, far from obviously supporting it; and that there is not the slightest intimation that the observance of such a distinction is at all important, much less absolutely essential to a true Christian church, insomuch that, where it is disregarded, the ordinances of divine appointment cannot be properly dispensed. If therefore it be established,--and some of the most learned and zealous advocates for the hierarchy which afterward arose have been compelled to admit it,--that Scripture has not recognized any difference of rank or order between the ordinary teachers of the Gospel, all other means of maintaining this difference should be with Protestants of no force. It may be shown that the admission of the distinction is not incompatible with the great ends for which a ministry was appointed, and even in particular cases may tend to promote them; but still it is merely a matter of human regulation, not binding upon Christians, and not in any way connected with the vital influence of the Gospel dispensation. The whole of the writers of antiquity may be urged in support of it, if that could be done; and, after all, every private Christian would be entitled to judge for himself, and to be directed by his own judgment, unless it be maintained that where Scripture has affirmed the existence of equality, this is to be counteracted and set at nought by the testimonies and assertions of a set of writers, who, although honoured with the name of fathers, are very far, indeed, from being infallible, and who have, in fact, often delivered sentiments which even they who, upon a particular emergency, cling to them, must confess to be directly at variance with all that is sound in reason, or venerable and sublime in religion. It also follows, from the Scriptural identity of bishops and presbyters, that no church in which this identity is preserved, can on that account be considered as having departed from the apostolic model, or its ministers be viewed, at least with any good reason, as having less ground to hope for the blessing of God upon their spiritual labours; because if we admit the contrary, we must also admit that the inspired writers, instead of properly regulating the church, betrayed it into error, by omitting to make a distinction closely allied with the essence of religion. What is this but to say that it is safer to follow the erring direction of frail mortals, than to follow the admonitions of those who, it is universally allowed, were inspired by the Holy Spirit, or commissioned by him to be the instructers of the world?

It is to be observed, however, that although bishops and presbyters were the same when the epistles of the New Testament were written, it would be going too far to contend that no departure from this should ever take place; because, to justify such a position, it would be requisite that a positive injunction should have been given that equality must at all times be carefully preserved. There is, however, no such injunction. Unlike the Old Testament, which specified every thing, even the most minute, in relation to the priesthood, the New only alludes in general terms, and very seldom, to the ministry; and the reason probably is, that, being intended for all nations, it left Christians at liberty to make such modifications in the ecclesiastical constitution as in their peculiar situation appeared best adapted for religious edification. The simple test to be applied to the varying or varied forms of church government is that indicated by our Lord himself: By their fruits ye shall know them.” Wherever the regulations respecting the ministry are such as to divert it from the purposes for which it was destined, to separate those who form it from the flock of Christ, to relax their diligence in teaching, and to destroy the connection between them and their people, so as to render their exertions of little or of no use, there we find a church not apostolical. But wherever the blessed fruits of Gospel teaching are in abundance produced, where the people and the ministers are cordially united, and where every regulation is calculated to give efficacy to the labours of those who have entered into the vineyard, we have an apostolical church, or, to speak more properly, a church of Christ, built upon a rock, because devoted to the beneficent objects for which our Saviour came into the world.

The form of church government among the Scotch Presbyterians is as follows:--The kirk session, consisting of the minister and lay elders of the congregation, is the lowest ecclesiastical judicature. The next is the presbytery, which consists of all the pastors within a certain district, and one ruling elder from each parish. The provincial synods, of which there are fifteen, meet twice in the year, and are composed of the members of the several presbyteries within the respective provinces. From the kirk sessions appeal lies to the presbyteries, from these to the synods, and from them to the general assembly, which meets annually, and is the highest ecclesiastical authority in the kingdom. This is composed of delegates from each presbytery, from every royal borough, and from each of the Scotch universities; and the king presides by a commission of his own appointment. The Scotch ordain by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery,” before which persons may be licensed to preach as probationers, but cannot administer the sacraments. The clergy are maintained by the state, and nominated to livings by patrons, as in other establishments. Those properly called the English Presbyterians, have no connection with the Scotch kirk. They are now indeed broken into separate churches, and follow the same form of church government as the Congregationalists or Independents. The name Presbyterian, therefore, is now inapplicable to them although retained. So Dr. Doddridge: Those who hold every pastor to be so a bishop or overseer of his own congregation, as that no other person or body of men have, by divine institution, a power to exercise any superior or pastoral office in it, may, properly speaking, be called, so far at least, congregational; and it is by a vulgar mistake that any such are called Presbyterians.” See [Episcopalians].

PRESCIENCE, or foreknowledge, an attribute of God. (See [Omniscience].) On this subject three leading theories have been resorted to, in order to evade the difficulties which are supposed to be involved in the opinion commonly received. The Chevalier Ramsay, among his other speculations, holds it a matter of choice in God, to think of finite ideas; and similar opinions, though variously worded, have been occasionally adopted. In substance these opinions are, that though the knowledge of God be infinite as his power is infinite, there is no more reason to conclude, that his knowledge should be always exerted to the full extent of its capacity, than that his power should be employed to the extent of his omnipotence; and that if we suppose him to choose not to know some contingencies, the infiniteness of his knowledge is not thereby impugned. To this it may be answered, that the infinite power of God is in Scripture represented, as in the nature of things it must be, as an infinite capacity, and not as infinite in act; but that the knowledge of God is on the contrary never represented there to us as a capacity to acquire knowledge, but as actually comprehending all things that are, and all things that can be. 2. That the notion of God’s choosing to know some things, and not to know others, supposes a reason why he refuses to know any class of things or events; which reason, it would seem, can only arise out of their nature and circumstances, and therefore supposes at least a partial knowledge of them, from which the reason for his not choosing to know them arises. The doctrine is therefore somewhat contradictory. But, 3. It is fatal to this opinion that it does not at all meet the difficulty arising out of the question of the consistency of divine prescience, and the free actions of men; since some contingent actions, for which men have been made accountable, we are sure, have been foreknown by God, because by his Spirit in the prophets they were foretold; and if the freedom of man can in these cases be reconciled to the prescience of God, there is no greater difficulty in any other case which can possibly occur.

A second theory is, that the foreknowledge of contingent events, being in its own nature impossible, because it implies a contradiction, it does no dishonour to the divine Being to affirm, that of such events he has, and can have, no prescience whatever; and thus the prescience of God, as to moral actions, being wholly denied, the difficulty in question is got rid of. To this the same answer must be given as to the former. It does not meet the case, so long as the Scriptures are allowed to contain prophecies of rewardable and punishable actions. The great fallacy in the argument, that the certain prescience of a moral action destroys its contingent nature, lies in supposing that contingency and certainty are the opposites of each other. It is, perhaps, unfortunate, that a word which is of figurative etymology, and which consequently can only have an ideal application to such subjects, should have grown into common use in this discussion, because it is more liable, on that account, to present itself to different minds under different shades of meaning. If, however, the term contingent in this controversy has any definite meaning at all, as applied to the moral actions of men, it must mean their freedom, and stands opposed, not to certainty, but to necessity. A free action is a voluntary one; and an action which results from the choice of the agent, is distinguished from a necessary one in this, that it might not have been, or have been otherwise, according to the self-determining power of the agent. It is with reference to this specific quality of a free action, that the term contingency is used; it might have been otherwise, in other words, it was not necessitated. Contingency in moral actions is, therefore, their freedom, and is opposed, not to certainty, but to constraint. The very nature of this controversy fixes this as the precise meaning of the term. The question is not, in point of fact, about the certainty of moral actions, that is, whether they will happen or not; but about the nature of them, whether free or constrained, whether they must happen or not. Those who advocate this theory care not about the certainty of actions, simply considered, that is, whether they will take place or not; the reason why they object to a certain prescience of moral actions, is this,--they conclude, that such a prescience renders them necessary. It is the quality of the action for which they contend, not whether it will happen or not. If contingency meant uncertainty, the sense in which such theorists take it, the dispute would be at an end. But though an uncertain action cannot be foreseen as certain, a free, unnecessitated action may; for there is nothing in the knowledge of the action, in the least, to affect its nature. Simple knowledge is, in no sense, a cause of action, nor can it be conceived to be causal, unconnected with exerted power: for mere knowledge, therefore, an action remains free or necessitated as the case may be. A necessitated action is not made a voluntary one by its being foreknown; a free action is not made a necessary one. Free actions foreknown will not, therefore, cease to be contingent. But how stands the case as to their certainty? Precisely on the same ground. The certainty of a necessary action foreknown, does not result from the knowledge of the action, but from the operation of the necessitating cause; and, in like manner, the certainty of a free action does not result from the knowledge of it, which is no cause at all, but from the voluntary cause, that is, the determination of the will. It alters not the case in the least, to say that the voluntary action might have been otherwise. Had it been otherwise, the knowledge of it would have been otherwise; but as the will which gives birth to the action, is not dependent upon the previous knowledge of God, but the knowledge of the action upon foresight of the choice of the will, neither the will nor the act is controlled by the knowledge; and the action, though foreseen, is still free or contingent. The foreknowledge of God has then no influence upon either the freedom or the certainty of actions, for this plain reason, that it is knowledge, and not influence; and actions may be certainly foreknown, without their being rendered necessary by that foreknowledge. But here it is said, If the result of an absolute contingency be certainly foreknown, it can have no other result, it cannot happen otherwise.” This is not the true inference. It will not happen otherwise; but it may be asked, Why can it not happen otherwise? Can is an expression of potentiality, it denotes power or possibility. The objection is, that it is not possible that the action should otherwise happen. But why not? What deprives it of that power? If a necessary action were in question, it could not otherwise happen than as the necessitating cause shall compel; but then that would arise from the necessitating cause solely, and not from the prescience of the action which is not causal. But if the action be free, and it enter into the very nature of a voluntary action to be unconstrained, then it might have happened in a thousand other ways, or not have happened at all; the foreknowledge of it no more affects its nature in this case than in the other. All its potentiality, so to speak, still remains, independent of foreknowledge, which neither adds to its power of happening otherwise, nor diminishes it. But then we are told, that the prescience of it, in that case, must be uncertain.” Not unless any person can prove, that the divine prescience is unable to dart through all the workings of the human mind, all its comparison of things in the judgment, all the influences of motives on the affections, all the hesitances and haltings of the will, to its final choice. Such knowledge is too wonderful for us,” but it is the knowledge of Him who understandeth the thoughts of man afar off.” “But if a contingency will have a given result, to that result it must be determined.” Not in the least. We have seen that it cannot be determined to a given result by mere precognition; for we have evidence in our own minds that mere knowledge is not causal to the actions of another. It is determined to its result by the will of the agent; but even in that case, it cannot be said, that it must be determined to that result, because it is of the nature of freedom to be unconstrained: so that here we have an instance in the case of a free agent that he will act in some particular manner; but it by no means follows from what will be, whether foreseen or not, that it must be.

The third theory amounts, in brief, to this, that the foreknowledge of God must be supposed to differ so much from any thing of the kind which we perceive in ourselves, and from any ideas which we can possibly form of that property of the divine nature, that no argument respecting it can be grounded upon our imperfect notions; and that all controversy on subjects connected with it, is idle and fruitless. But though foreknowledge in God should be admitted to be something of a very different nature” to the same quality in man, yet as it is represented as something equivalent to foreknowledge, whatever that something may be, since in consequence of it, prophecies have actually been uttered and fulfilled, and of such a kind, too, as relate to actions for which men have in fact been held accountable; all the original difficulty of reconciling contingent events to this something, of which human foreknowledge is a kind of shadow,” as a map of China is to China itself,” remains in full force. The difficulty is shifted, but not removed. It may, therefore, be certainly concluded, if at least the Holy Scriptures are to be our guide, that the omniscience of God comprehends his certain prescience of all events however contingent; and if any thing more were necessary to strengthen the argument above given, it might be drawn from the irrational, and, above all, the unscriptural consequences, which would follow from the denial of this doctrine. These are forcibly stated by President Edwards:--“It would follow from this notion, (namely, that the Almighty doth not foreknow what will be the result of future contingencies,) that as God is liable to be continually repenting what he has done; so he must be exposed to be constantly changing his mind and intentions as to his future conduct; altering his measures, relinquishing his old designs, and forming new schemes and projections. For his purposes, even as to the main parts of his scheme, namely, such as belong to the state of his moral kingdom, must be always liable to be broken, through want of foresight; and he must be continually putting his system to rights, as it gets out of order, through the contingence of the actions of moral agents: he must be a Being who, instead of being absolutely immutable, must necessarily be the subject of infinitely the most numerous acts of repentance, and changes of intention, of any being whatsoever; for this plain reason, that his vastly extensive charge comprehends an infinitely greater number of those things which are to him contingent and uncertain. In such a situation he must have little else to do, but to mend broken links as well as he can, and be rectifying his disjointed frame and disordered movements, in the best manner the case will allow. The supreme Lord of all things must needs be under great and miserable disadvantages, in governing the world which he has made, and has the care of, through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief importance, which hereafter shall befall his system; which, if he did but know, he might make seasonable provision for. In many cases, there may be very great necessity that he should make provision, in the manner of his ordering and disposing things, for some great events which are to happen, of vast and extensive influence, and endless consequence to the universe; which he may see afterward, when it is too late, and may wish in vain that he had known beforehand, that he might have ordered his affairs accordingly. And it is in the power of man, on these principles, by his devices, purposes, and actions, thus to disappoint God, break his measures, make him continually to change his mind, subject him to vexation, and bring him into confusion.”

Socinus and his early followers would not allow that God possesses any knowledge of future contingencies. The schoolmen, in reference to this species of knowledge in God, invented that called scientia media, and which they define as that by which God knows sub conditione, what men or angels will do according to the liberty which they have, when they are placed in these or those circumstances, or in this or in that order of things.” When Gomarus, the opponent of Arminius, found that his opinion concerning the object of reprobation was clogged with this absurdity--that it made God to be the author of Adam’s sin, he very astutely took refuge in this conditionate foreknowledge, and, in his corrected theses on predestination, published after the death of Arminius, he describes it as that by which God, through the infinite light of his own knowledge, foreknows some future things, not absolutely, but as placed under a certain condition.” Walæus, the celebrated antagonist of Episcopius, had recourse to the same expedient. This distinction has been adopted by very few of those who espouse the doctrines of general redemption; and who believe that every event, how contingent soever to the creature, is, with respect to God, certainly foreknown. An old English divine thinks, that, “in the sacred Scriptures certain not obscure vestiges are apparent of this kind of knowledge, of things that will happen thus or otherwise, on the supposition of the occurrence of this or that circumstance. Omitting the well known example of David in Keilah, 1 Sam. xxii, 12, and of Chorazin and Bethsaida, Matt. xi, 21; Luke x, 13, consult, among other sayings of the same description, the answer of our Saviour to the chief priests and scribes, who had asked, ‘Art thou the Christ? Tell us.’ And he said unto them, ‘If I tell you, ye will not believe.’ In the subsequent verse he adds, ‘If I also ask you, ye will not answer me, nor let me go,’ Luke xxii, 67, 68. You have here three events specified, which yet will not occur even on the supposition of Christ our Lord himself.” This kind of knowledge might very well be included in that of scientia visionis, because the latter ought to include, not what God will do and what his creatures will do under his appointment, but what they will do by his permission as free agents, and what he will do, as a consequence of this, in his character of Governor and Lord. But since the predestinarians had confounded scientia visionis with a predestinating decree, the scientia media well expressed what they had left quite unaccounted for, and which they had assumed did not really exist,--the actions of creatures endowed with free will, and the acts of Deity which from eternity were consequent upon them. If such actions do not take place, then men are not free; and if the rectoral acts of God are not consequent upon the actions of the creature in the order of the divine intention, and the conduct of the creature is consequent upon the foreordained rectoral acts of God, then we reach a necessitating eternal decree, which in fact, the predestinarian contends for; but it unfortunately brings after it consequences which no subtleties have ever been able to shake off,--that the only actor in the universe is God himself; and that the only distinction among events is, that one class is brought to pass by God directly, and the other indirectly, not by the agency, but by the mere instrumentality, of his creatures.

PRIEST, a general name for the minister of religion. The priest under the law was, among the Hebrews, a person consecrated and ordained of God to offer up sacrifices for his own sins and those of the people, Lev. iv, 5, 6. The priesthood was not annexed to a certain family till after the promulgation of the law of Moses. Before that time the first-born of every family, the fathers, the princes, the kings were priests. Cain and Abel, Noah, Abraham, Job, Abimelech and Laban, Isaac and Jacob, offered themselves their own sacrifices. In the solemnity of the covenant that the Lord made with his people at the foot of Mount Sinai, Moses performed the office of mediator, Exod. xxiv, 5, 6; and young men were chosen from among the children of Israel to perform the office of priests. But after the Lord had chosen the tribe of Levi to serve him in his tabernacle, and the priesthood was annexed to the family of Aaron, then the right of offering sacrifices to God was reserved to the priests alone of this family. The Lord ordained, Num. xvi, 40, that no stranger, which was not of the seed of Aaron, should come near to offer incense unto the Lord, that he might not be as Korah and his company. The punishment of Uzziah is well known, 2 Chron. xxvi, 19, who, having presumed to offer incense to the Lord, was suddenly smitten with a leprosy, put out of his palace, and excluded from the administration of affairs to the day of his death. However, it seems that, on certain occasions, the judges and the kings of the Hebrews offered sacrifices unto the Lord, especially before a constant place of worship was fixed at Jerusalem; for in 1 Sam. vii, 8, we are told that Samuel, who was no priest, offered a lamb for a burnt-sacrifice to the Lord; and in 1 Sam. ix, 13, it is said that this prophet was to bless the offering of the people, which should seem to be a function appropriated to the priests; lastly, 1 Sam. xvi, 5, he goes to Bethlehem, where he offers a sacrifice at the inauguration or anointing of David. Saul himself offered a burnt-offering to the Lord, perhaps as being king of Israel, 1 Sam. xiii, 9, 10. Elijah also offered a burnt-offering upon Mount Carmel, 1 Kings xviii, 33. David himself sacrificed, (at least the text expresses it so,) at the ceremony of bringing the ark to Jerusalem, and at the floor of Araunah, 2 Sam. vi, 13. Solomon went up to the brazen altar that was at Gibeon, and there offered sacrifices, 2 Chron. i, 5. It is true the above passages are commonly explained by supposing that these princes offered their sacrifices by the hands of the priests; but the sacred text will by no means favour such explanations; and it is very natural to imagine, that in the quality of kings and heads of the people, they had the privilege of performing some sacerdotal functions, upon some extraordinary occasions; thus we see David clothed with the priestly ephod, and consulting the Lord; and upon another occasion we find David and Solomon pronounce solemn benedictions on the people, 2 Sam. vi, 18; 1 Kings viii, 55. God having reserved to himself the first-born of all Israel, because he had preserved them from the hand of the destroying angel in Egypt, by way of exchange or compensation accepted of the tribe of Levi for the service of the tabernacle, Numbers iii, 41. Of the three sons of Levi, Gershon, Kohath, and Merari, the Lord chose the family of Kohath, and out of this the house of Aaron, to exercise the functions of the priesthood. All the rest of the family of Kohath, even the children of Moses and their descendants, remained of the order of mere Levites. See [Levites].