The “matters of import” which Edward propounded to this meeting, concerned a plan, the best which human skill could have devised, for restoring and securing the tranquillity of Scotland. The young prince of Wales was now in his sixth year—the maiden of Norway was of nearly the same age. If these two children were betrothed to each other, the kingdom of Scotland would at once be placed under the joint protection of England and Norway. Thus all would be security and order; and, in course of time, on the succession of the young prince to the throne of England, the unity and harmony of the two kingdoms, under one head, would be secured in the best and most unobjectionable manner. Even the Scottish historians, with one consent, admit the wisdom and prudence of this plan, which Hume himself describes as “favourable to the happiness and grandeur of both kingdoms.”
They also concede, that the negociation was conducted with the greatest fairness and liberality on Edward’s part. Appealed to on all sides, he could not question his own position, as, practically, the superior lord. The king of Norway had instructed his ambassadors to treat with the Scottish commissioners “only in the presence of the king of England.” And, referring to a claim which he had upon the Scots for a sum of about 3,000 marks, he requests the king “to issue his commands to the guardians of Scotland” to pay him the money. The young queen, also, while she was the daughter of the king of Norway, was also the daughter of Edward’s niece. In every way, therefore, the interposition of these two kings was the reverse of officiousness or assumption.
Nevertheless, Edward, with his usual liberality of feeling and practical wisdom, allowed the Scottish commissioners to make almost their own terms. He treated with them, says one Scottish writer, “quite on a footing of equality.” “The terms agreed upon,” says another, “were strictly honourable to the weaker party.” And thus was framed and completed, so far as human beings could accomplish it, “a project,” which Hume describes as “so happily formed and so amicably conducted.”
But everything human is uncertain, and this wise and prudent plan was wholly subverted in a few short months by the death of the young queen on her voyage from Norway in the autumn of 1290. “This fatal event,” says Mr. Tytler, “which may justly be called a great national calamity, struck sorrow and despair into the heart of the kingdom.” Obviously, that state of anarchy and civil war which had recently called for the interposition of the two kings, might now be expected to return. The pretensions of the rival candidates so nearly resembled each other, and the difference between them was so slight, that neither could be expected to give way; and a bloody, and perhaps a long‐protracted strife, seemed almost inevitable.
It is abundantly clear that the arbitration of some eminent and powerful personage was the only conceivable way by which the Scottish nation could escape from this fearful peril. And to whom, but to Edward, should they appeal in this emergency? To him they had already gone, more than once or twice, in their recent troubles. Bruce, one of the claimants, had been so far connected with Edward in times past, that had any other referee been named, he would probably have refused to acquiesce. But to an appeal to the king of England no objection seems to have been made in any quarter.
The bishop of St. Andrew’s, whose name has just been given, as the first on the list of the “guardians of the realm,” and the first of the commissioners sent to Salisbury, wrote to Edward on the 7th of October, 1290, “entreating him to approach the border, to give consolation to the people of Scotland, to prevent the effusion of blood, and to enable the faithful men of the realm to preserve their oath, by choosing him for their king, who by right ought to be so.[43]” For so calling upon Edward, the bishop is severely handled by many Scottish historians. But surely, with a civil war impending, the bishop deserves little blame; especially when we see that the prince to whom he thus applied was afterwards accepted as the arbitrator by all the competitors, and by the assembled nobles of Scotland.
On the fact, that Edward was called upon by the chief men in Scotland at this juncture, there is no dispute, even among the Scottish historians themselves. Dr. Henry says, “The regents, the states, and even the competitors, agreed to refer this great controversy to the king of England;” and “the bishop of St. Andrew’s was sent into England to inform Edward of this reference, and to entreat him to take upon him the office.”[44] And Mr. Tytler adds, that “there is also reason to suspect, from documents recently discovered, that Bruce and his adherents had not only claimed his (Edward’s) protection at this moment, but secretly offered to acknowledge his right of superiority.”[45]
Thus invoked by the leading men in Scotland, who wrote to him—“We shall be involved in blood, unless the Most High provide a remedy by your interposition”—Edward, so soon as he had recovered from the depression occasioned by the loss of his queen, wrote to the chief men in that country, desiring them to meet him at Norham, on the English side of the Tweed, on the 10th of May, 1291. Hume adds that the king, “carrying with him a great army, advanced to the frontiers.” But this statement is shown by the existing records to be utterly untrue. Edward, knowing that he was about to meet all the nobles and chiefs of Scotland, who, in the existing state of things, would assuredly come armed and well attended, issued writs to about fifty‐eight of his military tenants in the northern counties, desiring them to meet him at Norham in the beginning of June. This was obviously a measure of precaution. He went to the place of meeting with the Scottish chiefs, attended by his ordinary retinue. But, foreseeing that some troubles might arise, and that it would be most inexpedient that the umpire or superior lord should be powerless in the presence of the Scottish barons, he took measures to have in attendance, in about three weeks after the commencement of the proceedings, a few thousand men, being merely such a force as two or three counties could easily raise. Hume again speaks of Edward’s “powerful army,” and represents the Scottish barons as having been “betrayed into a situation, in which it was impossible for them to make any defence.” But, of any “powerful army” there is not the slightest trace in history; and if Hume had consulted Rymer, he would have seen, that among the fifty‐eight military tenants who were summoned to meet in June, there appeared the names of John Baliol, Alexander Baliol, John Comyn, and Robert Bruce, all of whom held lands of Edward, as English barons. Thus the Scottish leaders, so far from any “betrayal,” were fully apprised several weeks before of Edward’s plans, and were quite at liberty, if they thought fit, to adopt measures for resistance.[46]
We reach now, then, the 10th of May, 1291. The military retainers whom the king had summoned to meet in June were scarcely yet assembling at their homes. Edward stood, surrounded by his nobles and lawyers, without any other than his usual retinue. He began, therefore, without any thought of force, by proceeding to explain in what capacity he came among them.
Scotchmen now often strive to assume that he had been invited,—had been selected, merely as an umpire, to decide upon a single point, by agreement of all parties. In such arbitrations, however, we generally hear of some document, some contract or treaty; as when Louis of France arbitrated between Henry and his barons in 1264. But of such an agreement or contract there is no trace in the present instance. The lords and great men of Scotland had begged his interposition, and they now simply “appeared,”—as men are usually wont to appear when any court sits in which they have a question depending.