The Life and Reign of Edward I.

by Robert Benton Seeley

A fortnight after, a great council was held, at which the king openly received the archbishop to his favour, and nominated him one of the council of the young prince, to whom he then desired all present to take an oath of fidelity as the heir to the kingdom.

There is something in these proceedings which seems to require explanation. How could a warm‐hearted, impetuous ruler, in dealing with such opponents as Winchelsey, Bohun, and Bigod, so constantly avoid any actual collision, any resort to force on either side? We read, with some pain, the account of the scene at Salisbury, in which high words arose; but the circumstance stands alone. Edward, though irascible, “had the rule over his own spirit.” He was placed, for several weeks, in circumstances of great difficulty; but his skill, and judgment, and discretion carried him through them all. On the 10th of August the prelates made another attempt on his firmness. They requested his permission “to send to the pope for his license to grant the king an aid.” The king, however, was neither to be frightened nor persuaded into any step which would imply his assent to the papal claim. He refused to give any such permission, but he continued to treat the clergy with kindness; and shortly after took leave of the primate, and departed for Winchelsea, where his armament was now assembled.

At this place, in the middle of August, he received from the two earls and their adherents, a remonstrance, in which they alleged—“1. That they conceive that they ought not to be called upon to do service in Flanders (for the reasons which we have already described). 2. That they have been aggrieved and impoverished by the talliages, aids, and requisitions already levied. 3. That Magna Charta has not been properly observed. 4. That the Charter of Forests is also violated by the king’s officers. 5. That they are aggrieved by the tax on wool. And, lastly, desiring the honour and safety of our lord the king, it does not seem good unto them that he pass over into Flanders.”

This last clause explains the rest. What the actual feeling or opinion of the two earls really was—whether they were prepared to let France defraud England of her fairest foreign possession—we know not; but it is quite clear that, either on principle or from views of expediency, they disliked the war with France; and disliking the war, it was natural that they should still more dislike the heavy requisitions, aids, and talliages which that war rendered necessary. One main feature of the case, however, is the tolerant and reasonable nature of Edward’s government, which now, for the first time, allowed questions such as these to be discussed: first in parliament, and then by a public correspondence; for the king, receiving this public manifesto disapproving his policy, expressed no anger at it. On the contrary, he received and treated it with more tolerance than would be shown for a similar document in most European states in the present day. To the messengers who brought him the earls’ remonstrance, he answered with calmness, that he had not his council with him, and could not, in their absence, reply to matters of so great importance; that he should have been better pleased if the remonstrants had gone with him; but since they would not, he trusted that they would raise no disturbance in his absence. Before he embarked, however, he took care to reply to this document in the most public and emphatic manner. A royal declaration was drawn up, and sent to the sheriffs of all the counties for publication. In this document the king recounts the various steps of the disobedience of the two earls, and then repeats the apologies and assurances which he had made at Westminster Hall. He declares that “he grieves that he should so burden his people; and promises that, if he should return, he will amend all things as he ought; and if not, he will desire his heir to do so—for he knows well that no man is so much indebted to the people, or so much bound to love them as he himself. But there is great necessity for him to go to the assistance of his ally, the earl of Flanders; and his going over is of immediate consequence, by reason of the danger which his friends are in—whom, if he should lose, the kingdom might be in great jeopardy.” He ends with a desire that his people would pray that his voyage might be prosperous, and have a good result, to the honour of God and the good of the realm; and that a durable peace might follow.

A recent writer, who takes no very friendly view of Edward’s course, here remarks, that “The king’s greatness of nature carried him through every difficulty. He could demand confidence, for his people knew that he did everything for England; he inspired trust, for he never broke his word; and between a king risking captivity or death, and two nobles refusing the service which thousands of meaner men rendered, public opinion pronounced emphatically for the sovereign. He carried the nation with him.”[81]

Having issued this, his public reply to the objections of the two earls, the king, on the 22nd of August, sailed, carrying with him 500 ships, in which were 1,800 knights and a large force of infantry. But he could scarcely have landed in Flanders before great events occurred both in England and in Scotland—events which concurred with disappointments abroad to induce him speedily to prepare for his return home.

In the course of the summer, various rumours had reached England, of a spirit of insurrection which had shown itself in Scotland, and of various successes in partizan warfare which had been gained by a leader named Walays or Waleis. Twice or thrice had Edward written to Scotland, to desire his representatives there to suppress these disorders without delay. Had it not been for his engagements with the earl of Flanders, there can be no doubt that he would himself have returned into the north, and have stopped the progress of these troubles in the summer of 1297. But his engagements bound him to appear in Flanders; and he was obliged, therefore, to neglect the warnings of the two earls, who told him that the Scotch, having begun to rebel, would do so with the more hardihood when they heard of his departure.

The English must have disembarked in Flanders at the end of August or beginning of September; and it was in the early part of the latter month that the folly of Cressingham, the treasurer of Scotland, gave Walays the victory of Stirling, and thus nearly destroyed, in one hour, all the great results of Edward’s campaign of the preceding year. The news must have reached London by the middle of September; and the young prince found it necessary immediately to summon a parliament, to consider what steps it would be expedient to take.

Norfolk and Hereford now saw an opportunity offered them of a more favourable kind than they could have anticipated. The peril of England was manifest, and all men would feel that union—the union of all her leading men—was so desirable, that no slight difficulty could be allowed to stand in the way. The two earls attended the parliament, having first demanded some guarantees of safety. Their claims were not exorbitant; and we are not entitled to lay to their charge more factious purposes or conduct than has often been seen in opposition‐leaders in modern times. The chief grievance which they desired to have redressed was the practice to which Edward had latterly been obliged to resort, of levying aids or talliages without consent of parliament. This, however, was no new claim set up by the crown. Mr. Hallam remarks, that “hitherto the king’s prerogative of levying money, by name of talliage or prise, from his towns or tenants in demesne, had passed unquestioned.” Edward, then, in his hour of need, had merely resorted to an old prerogative of the crown; and the earls, in demanding the surrender of this prerogative, were claiming a large and important concession from the sovereign to the people.