(4) Acts involving corrupt motives range in current social estimation all the way from heinous felonies to minor foibles. The view that there are only a few “corruptionists,” all of whom richly deserve criminal sentences and might receive them without unduly crowding our penitentiaries, is a grotesque misconception. Instead of this we must recognise frankly that self-interest and social interests are inextricably bound up as motive forces of our social machinery, often working in harmony and reinforcing each other, but sometimes colliding and presenting new questions for moral determination and social protective action.
(5) From among such cases of collision between social and self-interest we must endeavour to single out those most obviously harmful to society and the state, and, not content with branding them as morally bad, we must formulate legal prohibitions supported by penalties severe enough to check the evil. Particularly important in this field of work is a thorough solution of the whole problem of campaign contributions.
(6) Certain cases in which political action is determined by corrupt considerations may be more effectively combated with moral than with legal sanctions. These are cases which threaten no very serious consequences, cases in which the corrupt considerations are not directly material in character, cases in which personal advantage is not so much sought as the advantage of some social group, and all other cases of so subtle or undecided a character that definite legal action, at least under existing conditions, is impossible. In the presence of many such difficulties we can only plead for a clearer recognition by the individual of duty to the state and to society as a whole. On the other hand, society and the state as now constituted fall short of a full and humane ideal of justice and hence are partly responsible for existing corruption.
Finally it should be said that all effective work against corruption must be two-fold. On the one hand we must endeavour to raise moral and legal standards to a higher level. On the other hand we must unrelentingly prosecute actual offences to the full extent of existing law. Work of the first sort must be either impersonal or based upon well authenticated facts. Work of the second sort must above all things be subjected to a wise restraint; sweeping charges resting merely upon suspicion must be scrupulously avoided; direct and well-founded charges must be put into legal form and fought to the last resort. Reformers should learn to bring down all direct and personal accusations to the level of existing law, until they have succeeded in bringing the level of the law up to their ideal standard.
FOOTNOTES:
[15] Other illustrations of auto-corruption may be found in speculation by inside officials on the basis of crop reports not yet made public, and in real-estate deals based on a knowledge of projected public improvements.
[16] Misperformance and neglect of duty do not clearly include cases of usurpation with corrupt motives; hence the addition of this clause to the definition. Some usurpations may of course be defended as involving high and unselfish motives, and hence free from corruption.
[17] Mr. Seeley has shown, of course, that no actual despotism, so-called, really conforms to this conception, but for purposes of argument, at least, the assumption may be permitted to stand.
[18] Political Science Quarterly, vol. xix (1904), p. 673.
[19] Cf. C. Howard, “The Spirit of Graft,” Outlook, vol. lxxxi (1905), p. 365.