Another very curious case of corruption limited to certain spheres of government is furnished by Japan. In his authoritative work on that country,[36] Captain Brinkley expresses the opinion that the higher and lower official classes are free from corruption while the middle grade is more or less given over to it. The passage containing this statement is so germane to the present discussion that it may be quoted in full:
“There is an old and still undecided controversy among foreign observers as to bribery in Japan. Many Japanese romancists introduce the douceur in every drama of life, and historical annals show that from the seventeenth century downward Japanese rulers legislated against bribery with a degree of strenuous persistence which seems to imply conviction of its prevalence. Not only were recipients of bribes severely punished, but informers also received twice the amount in question. Japanese social relations, too, are maintained largely by the giving and taking of presents. Visits to make or renew an acquaintance are always accompanied by gifts; the four seasons of the year are similarly marked; even deaths call for a contribution to funeral expenses; nearly all services are ‘recognised,’ and guests carry back from their entertainer’s house a box of confectionery or other edibles in order that the households may not be entirely excluded from the feast. The uses of such a system evidently verge constantly on abuses, and prepare the observer to find that if the normal intercourse of life sanctions these material aids, abnormal occasions are likely to demand them in much greater profusion. All evidence thus far obtained goes to prove that Japanese officials of the highest and lowest classes are incorruptible, but that the middle ranks are unsound. A Japanese police constable will never take a bribe nor a Japanese railway employé a pour boire, and from Ministers of State to chiefs of departmental bureaux there is virtual freedom from corruption. But for the rest nothing can be claimed, and to the case of tradespeople, inferior agents, foremen of works, contractors, and so on, the Japanese proverb may probably be applied that ‘even hell’s penalties are a matter of money.’”
A third illustration of the uneven distribution of corruption throughout a political structure may be found in our own case. In the United States, as is well known, the general opinion of the honesty and efficiency of the federal government is extremely high; state government enjoys considerably less repute; and municipal government is pretty commonly and indiscriminately condemned. Even in the case of the latter, however, it is worth while to observe that in some cities otherwise considered almost hopelessly bad, certain departments, notably public schools and fire protection, are recognised as being managed on a much higher plane than other branches of the municipal service. In such cases public recognition of the importance of the departments concerned has led to an insistence on efficiency and honesty that has proven effective. The conclusion would seem to be well founded, therefore, that a proper recognition by our city population of the vital importance of other branches of the service, such as sanitation, refuse disposal, water supply, building and housing inspection, letting of contracts, and so on, would go far toward bringing about much needed improvements.
It would also appear that corruption may be omnipresent and yet not extremely harmful because of the moderation of its demands. A practical politician once remarked that “the people will never kick on a ten per cent rake off.” It is quite possible that the effort to wipe out so modest a tribute by a reform agitation opposed to the principle of the thing might cost more in effort or even in campaign expenses than would be represented by the saving to the municipal treasury or public. Obviously, however, the advisability of an effort for the establishment of honest government is not to be calculated in financial values only. The moral effect of a corrupt exaction of ten per cent which no one thinks it worth while to attack may be worse than the moral effect of a fifty per cent exaction which is vigorously condemned. A purely Machiavellian machine leader may also discern a degree of danger lurking in a government ten per cent corrupt due to the very fact that the electorate accepts it with quiescence. Under such conditions it is difficult to convince the more greedy minor politicians that while they can get ten per cent without a murmur they could not take twenty or even fifteen per cent without serious trouble. The great expenses of political management which the leaders are called upon to meet must also incline them at times to exactions beyond the verge of prudence.
From the point of view of an organisation politician, therefore, the determination of the limits within which corruption seems safe is a serious and ever present problem. Certain features of the situation may be noted as exerting an influence in favour of a moderate policy. One of these is the contractual nature of many corrupt practices that are alleged to be common. For example, franchises sought by dishonest means usually possess a value which is pretty exactly known to the intending purchasers. The amount which they are actually willing to pay may be determined only after close bargaining and the allowance of a large discount owing to the danger inseparable from this method of acquisition. Immunity to carry on businesses under the ban of the law is subject to the same rule.
The “Gambling Commission” which was said to exist in New York in 1900-’01, and to have been “composed of a Commissioner who is at the head of one of the city departments, two State Senators, and the dictator of the pool-room syndicate of this city,”[37] owed its partial exposure to a violation of this rule. The “Commission” was alleged to have established a regular tariff for the various forms of gambling as follows:—Pool Rooms, $300 per month; Crap Games, and Gambling Houses (small), $150 per month; Gambling Houses (large), $1000 per month; Envelope Games, $50 per month. These rates would seem sufficiently high to provoke complaint from those who had to pay them. Nevertheless the exposure, which came from the gamblers themselves, was not so much due to the size of the exactions as to the great increase in the number of the gambling houses which the “Commission” licensed in order to secure larger revenues. In the end, as one member of the sporting fraternity phrased it, “there were not enough suckers to go ’round.” The whole incident illustrates the principle, if the word can be used in such an unhallowed connection, that in order to enjoy any permanent success, corruption must by all means avoid extreme rapacity; it must endeavour to keep alive that which it feeds on. Castro, for example, was a highwayman rather than a grafter. He lacked the moderation, the fine sense of proportion, necessary to qualify one for success in the latter rôle. To paraphrase a familiar principle of taxation, a part of income may be taken but corrupt encroachments on capital sums are dangerous.
Prudential considerations restraining corruption are apt to be much more keenly felt by a thoroughly organised machine than in cases where corruption is practised by disorganised groups and individuals each seeking its or his own advantage regardless of any common interest. The “cohesive power of public plunder,” as President Cleveland ponderously phrased it, may thus come to operate as a moderating force. Notoriously corrupt city governments have not infrequently distinguished themselves by maintaining extremely low tax rates, or at least rates which appear to be low. Largely on this basis a quasi-philosophic defence of corrupt municipal rule was made several years ago by Daniel G. Thompson.[38] Arguing that some degree of corruption was inevitable in all political organisations, he held that they should be regarded by the voter in exactly the same light as bidders for a contract. Government should simply be handed over to the organisation making, all things considered, the lowest bid, which in New York city, Mr. Thompson thought, would usually be Tammany Hall. The argument is so thoroughly feudal in its conception of politics that one finds it difficult to believe in the author’s entire sincerity, although this is flatly asseverated throughout the book. Moral objections similar to those employed against the doctrine of the inviolability of a “ten per cent rake-off” thoroughly dispose of any rational claim it may make to attention. Political experience is also against it. Reform movements particularly in municipalities may be laughed at as “spasms,” but these movements, which are usually based largely on charges of corruption, occur so frequently as to discredit the belief that purely prudential considerations on the part of corruptionists will restrain effectively the excesses of their demands. Supine acceptance by the electorate of the “lowest bidder” theory would speedily result in the submission of none but extortionately high bids. In the long run “millions for defence but not one cent for tribute” is a sentiment quite as justifiable economically as ethically.
To recapitulate the preceding argument,—the structure of society, no matter how completely evolved and generally beneficial to the highest human interests, is nevertheless such that when brought into contact with natural human egoism it offers access at many points to the onslaughts of corruption. The evil consequences may be extreme, or only severe, or in time they may be completely overcome. History furnishes examples of all three eventualities. It also bears witness to the fact that many gross and threatening forms of corruption that were once prevalent have been eliminated from the life of civilised nations. Those which remain to afflict us are the object of vigorous corrective measures which are constantly being extended and strengthened. Corrupt practices are found to be limited in some cases to certain branches or spheres of government with consequences of varying degrees of danger to the national life. Or they may be limited in amount or percentage by various prudential considerations on the part of political leaders who, however, are far from being sufficiently restrained in this way as social welfare requires. While corruption thus appears to be a persistent problem of social and political life it is far from being a hopeless one. In the words of Professor Henry C. Adams,[39] its solution “is a continuous task, like the cleansing of the streets of a great city, or the renewing of a right purpose within the human heart.”
FOOTNOTES:
[24] It would, of course, be absurd to assume that every victor in such contests is free from all taint of corruption. A very large and powerful state may, although extremely corrupt, succeed in overcoming a small and weak state which is relatively free from corruption. Something akin to this occurred when Finnish autonomy was suppressed by Russia in 1902. On the other hand it is evident that in such a struggle the honesty of the small state would be in its favour while the corruption of the great state would be a source of weakness.