Corruption in American politics and life

by Robert C. Brooks

Four main lines of argument have been gathered from various sources as constituting the principal, if not the entire equipment of the advocatus diaboli to this end. These are, first, that political corruption makes business good; second, that it may be more than compensated for by the high efficiency otherwise of those who engage in it; third, that it saves us from mob rule; and fourth, that corruption is part of an evolutionary process the ends of which are presumed to be so beneficent as to more than outweigh existing evils.

I. Of these four arguments the first is most frequently presented. Few of our reputable business men would assent to it if stated baldly, or indeed in any form, but in certain lines of business the tacit acceptance of this doctrine would seem to be implied by the political attitude of those concerned. In slightly disguised form the same consideration appeals to the whole electorate, as shown by the potency of the “full dinner-pail” slogan, and the pause which is always given to reforms demanded in the name of justice when commercial depression occurs. But while we are often told that corruption makes business good, we are seldom informed in just what ways this desirable result is brought about. One quite astounding point occasionally brought up in this connection is the favour with which a portion of the mercantile community looks upon the illegal protection of vice and gambling. A police force must sternly repress major crimes and violence. Certain sections of the city must be kept free from offence. These things understood, a “wide-open” town is held to have the advantage over “slower” neighbouring places. A great city, we are told, is not a kindergarten. Its population is composed both of the just and the unjust, and this is equally true of the many who resort to it from the surrounding country for purposes of pleasure or profit. The slow city may still continue to hold and attract the better element which seeks only legitimate business and recreation, but the wide-open town will hold and attract both the better and the worse elements. Of course, individuals of the latter class may be somewhat mulcted in dives and gambling rooms, but they will still have considerable sums left to spend in thoroughly respectable stores, and such patronage is not to be sniffed at.[2]

Ordinarily this argument stops with the consideration of spending alone. It may be strengthened somewhat by bringing in the reaction of consumption upon production. A great city prides itself upon its ceaseless rush and gaiety, its bright lights and crowded streets, its numerous places of amusement and all the evidences of material prosperity and pleasure. These may be held to be enhanced when both licit and illicit pursuits and diversions are open to its people; and further, the people themselves, under the attraction of such varied allurements, may strive to produce more that they may enjoy more. In the Philippines, it is said that the only labourers who can be relied upon to stick to their work any considerable length of time are those who have caught the gambling and cock-fighting mania. Under tropical conditions a little intermittent labour easily supplies the few needs of others, whereas the devotee of chance, driven by a consuming passion, works steadily. In the present state of a fallen humanity there are presumably many persons of similar character living under our own higher civilisation.

Strong as is the hold which the foregoing considerations have obtained upon certain limited sections of the business community it is not difficult to criticise them upon purely economic grounds. Of two neighbouring towns, one “wide-open” and the other law-abiding, the former might, indeed, prove more successful in a business way. But we have to consider not simply the material advantage in the case of two rival cities. The material welfare of the state as a whole is of greater importance, and it would be impossible to show that this was enhanced by corruptly tolerating gambling and vice anywhere within its territory. On the contrary, economists have abundantly shown the harmful effects of such practices, even when no taint of illegality attaches to them. What the “wide-open” community gains over its rival is much more than offset by what the state as a whole loses. Moreover, it may well be doubted whether the purely economic advantage of the “wide-open” city is solid and permanent. Even those of its business men who are engaged in legitimate pursuits are constant sufferers from the general neglect of administrative duty, and sometimes even from the extortionate practices, of its corrupt government. They may consider it to their advantage to have gambling and vice tolerated, but only within limits. If such abuses become too open and rampant legitimate business is certain to suffer, both because of the losses and distractions suffered by the worse element in the community and because of the fear and avoidance which the prevalence of vicious conditions inspires in the better classes. Indeed cases are by no means uncommon where the better business element has risen in protest against lax and presumably corrupt police methods which permitted vice to flaunt itself so boldly on retail thoroughfares that respectable women became afraid to venture upon them. There remain, of course, the expedients of confining illicit practices to certain districts of the city, or of nicely restraining them so that, while permitting indulgence to those who desire it, they do not unduly offend the moral element in the community. But such delicate adjustments are difficult to maintain, since vice and gambling naturally seek to extend their field and their profits and, within pretty generous limits, can readily afford to make it worth while for a corrupt city administration to permit them to do so. And even if they are kept satisfactorily within bounds, the state as a whole, if not the particular community, must suffer from their pernicious economic consequences.

It has been thought worth while to go at some length into the criticism on purely economic grounds of the argument that corruption makes business good; first, because the argument itself is primarily economic in character, and secondly, because its tacit acceptance by certain hard-headed business men might lead to the belief that its refutation on material grounds was impossible. A broad view of the economic welfare of the state as a whole and business in all its forms leads, as we have seen, to the opposite conviction. And this conviction that corruption does not make business good in any solid and permanent way is greatly strengthened when moral and political, as well as financial, values are thrown into the scale. It is not necessary to recite in detail the ethical argument against gambling and vice in order to strengthen this point. The general duty of the state to protect the lives and health and morals of its people, even at great financial sacrifice if necessary, is beyond question. There is a possibility, as Professor Goodnow maintains,[3] that in the United States we have gone too far in attempting to suppress by police power things that are simply vicious, as distinguished from crimes; but however this may be, some regulation or repression of vice is always necessary. The real point here is that, having once drawn the line, the bribery of officials shall not be resorted to in order that vice may be permitted to flourish in certain localities. In such cases the state suffers not only from the effects of the vice but also from the disregard into which the whole fabric of law falls because of the failure to enforce it in part.

With regard to the particular plea that the life and animation and pleasures of a wide-open town stimulate its citizens to greater activity in producing wealth, it should be observed that this amounts virtually to the advocacy of the purchase of a dubious economic benefit at a high and certain moral cost. In the long run most, if not all, the vicious practices which thus find a quasi-justification directly cripple productive efficiency much more than they can possibly stimulate it indirectly. “A short life and a merry one” may serve well as a motto for a criminal career, but not as an economic maxim for a community of sane people. It may be admitted that the world is not to grow perfect in a day. Vice will persist, corruption will persist, although doubtless in less noxious forms, and business will persist with periods of greater or less prosperity under such conditions. It would be arrant folly, however, to expect business to reach its highest development with vice rampant under a corrupt police administration. A policy of repression, firmly enforced, will be best in the long run both for morals and for business. But even if honesty and prosperity were incompatible, it would still be true that it is a higher duty of the state to make men good than to make them rich. Ordinarily, however, both ends may be pursued at the same time and without conflict.

Up to this point the discussion of the argument that corruption makes business good has been confined to the forms of corruption under which vice is illegally tolerated. A dishonest government, however, is also frequently appealed to by businesses perfectly legitimate in their general character for concessions of one sort or another, ranging from the privilege to obstruct sidewalks by show windows up to the granting of public service franchises worth millions of dollars. With an open-handed distribution of such favours business is thought to flourish. Of course, all these concessions must be paid for, but only part of the money goes into the public purse, the rest falling into the hands of boodlers, contractors, and politicians. As the latter could not establish the most perfect title to the rights and franchises they sell they are often inclined to fix prices much below real values. Hence a chance for extraordinary profits to those less scrupulous business men who know the political ropes. A still more important feature of such a situation is that almost anything can be bought. In the lingo of those who are willing to engage in corrupt transactions, business men know “where they are at”; the politicians are men with whom “they can do business.” With reformers in power “favours” are not to be expected. Moreover reformers differ widely among themselves with regard to the proper method of dealing with public franchises and privileges of various sorts. Under “good government” these concessions may not be attainable at all, or, if so, only at such excessive prices and under such onerous conditions designed to safeguard the public interest, that the margin of profit left is extremely small. No wonder that contributions are made by certain kinds of business men to political organisations which the contributors well know to be corrupt, and refused by the same men to reform parties. The argument is, of course, that if the rascals win it is a good stroke of policy to secure their favour in advance, whereas if the reform party wins everybody will be treated alike anyway.

From a business point of view that considers immediate profits and nothing more, this reasoning is of great significance. Several deductions must be made from it, however, before the final balance is struck. It sometimes happens that corrupt organisations fix a regular tariff for privileges of all sorts. So long as the rates are low business appears to boom. But with the wide distribution of privileges the purchasers may lose any monopoly advantage which they enjoyed when the number of concessions was limited. Worse still, a corrupt gang that feels firmly entrenched in power is apt to develop a pretty fair sense of values itself, and to raise the rates for concessions to figures that prove well-nigh prohibitive. The very willingness of business interests to pay and keep quiet encourages the politicians to increase their demands and to devise new methods of levying tribute. In the end the gang may determine to assume the profits in certain lines by the formation of inside contracting rings which make all competition from the outside futile. Of course, while this process is going on the worst and most unscrupulous competitors in the businesses affected by it have a decided advantage over their fellows. Business men who complain of railroad rebates should certainly be able to recognise the destructive character of corrupt and unfair political conditions of the kind described above. Even those who most profit by alliance with the gang are apt to repent it in the end. They may have succeeded in securing all the favours which they need, and yet stand in constant terror of blackmail and strike legislation by their former political confederates or of exposure by reformers. Finally, although they may be so fortunate as to escape indictment for particular misdeeds, the general belief that a business has been corruptly managed is likely to bring about a demand for legislation affecting its conduct which, temporarily at least, may reduce its profits and the value of its securities very materially. The agitation for municipal ownership is a case in point. Quite apart from the logical weight of the arguments advanced in support of this policy, there can be no doubt that many people favour it largely because of the corrupt methods believed, although in most cases not legally proved, to have been practised by public service corporations.

II. The second argument to be considered is that corruption may be more than compensated for by the high efficiency otherwise of those who engage in it. Such a plea may be offered either for an individual or for an organisation, such as the machine. Many historical cases could be cited of statesmanlike ability of a high order and undoubted honesty on great issues coupled with a shrewd eye for the main chance whenever minor opportunities presented themselves. Even for men who are currently credited with having possessed a much larger share of guile than of ability, admiration is sometimes expressed. There are those who think that New York owes a statue to Tweed, and Pennsylvania already has a statue of Quay—if not a place for the statue.[4] The same manner of thinking prevails in other fields than politics, especially whenever graft can be made to appear as a sort of tribute levied upon a supposedly hostile social class. For example, a labour leader who extorted checks from employers by threatening and even calling strikes was defended by many of his followers on the ground that he had shown wonderful ability in organising the union and securing higher wage scales.[5]

The question is sometimes raised as to whether or not some purely personal moral obliquity should be held against a candidate for office whose qualifications otherwise are unimpeachable. A practical answer would, of course, depend largely upon the kind of evil charged against the man and the probability that it would interfere with the performance of his public duties. Even an extremist upon such an issue would have to admit that certain statesmen who have given most distinguished service to their countries have been, for example, intemperate in the use of liquor or unfaithful in the marriage relation. If in such cases we excuse and forget, why not also excuse and forget corrupt transactions that have been more than repaid by general brilliant conduct of affairs of state? No answer to this second question, however, can avoid the distinction that while certain kinds of personal immorality may affect the value of a man’s public service to an infinitesimal degree only, corruption in any part of his political career strikes directly at whatever efficiency he may possess as a public servant. In the former case his sins are in a different category from his virtues, whereas in the latter case they belong to the same category. Moreover a corrupt record even on a minor point in a man’s official career is apt to prove a great stumblingblock forever after. Usually designing persons can more readily employ their knowledge of it to force him to the commission of further and worse corrupt actions than they could hope to do had his earlier offences been of the same degree but of a purely personal character.