[3] See “Journal of Physiology” (1909), 38, 113-133; ibid. (1914), 47, 460-474; also Bayliss, W. M., “Principles of General Physiology,” 383-4; Starling, E. H., “Principles of Human Physiology,” 205-6.
[4] Mark carefully, that according to this, so-called “voluntary” movement (or will) is simply movement produced by one member of any pair of antagonistic muscles. This physical equipment is of paramount importance to the function of willing. Note also, that “free will” always did mean the choice of two alternatives!
[5] See Bayliss, op. cit., pp. 494-8; Starling, op. cit., pp. 335-6.
[6] This is especially observable in all free-hand or free-arm movements, as, for example, when one tries to throw missiles in quick succession at a target. In spite of one’s own verbal suggestions, both speed and accuracy vary with every shot. This peculiar property of muscle should henceforth factor into our definitions of chance and luck.
CHAPTER III
THE BIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICATION OF THE WORD “GOOD”
“... The majority attend to words rather than to things; and thus very frequently assent to terms without attaching to them any meaning, either because they think they once understood them, or imagine they received them from others by whom they were correctly understood.... Wherefore, if we would philosophize in earnest, and give ourselves to the search after all truths we are capable of knowing, we must, in the first place, lay aside our prejudices; in other words, we must take care scrupulously to withhold our assent from the opinions we have formerly admitted, until upon new examination we discover that they are true.” Descartes, “The Principles of Philosophy,” LXXIV, LXXV.
What do we mean by the word “good”? That is to say, how shall we describe the action-pattern which the stimulus of this word arouses in us? What does it mean when we use it, and what does it mean to us when others employ it in their speech? Before we can answer these questions, it is first essential to scan the list of things to which this word is applied, for only by so doing can we identify the term good with some specific function of the human organism.[7]
Although such a task is a difficult one, the difficulty does not appear to be insurmountable. In spite of the fact that nearly eighty significations are possessed by this word, they will, nevertheless, if pondered long enough, reveal some common core of meaning. And if we now bear in mind that every such synonym implies a motor mechanism that is developing a specific attitude toward the environment, we shall hope to find a true solution to the problem of the meaning of the concept “good”.
The term good is used as an adjective, noun, and adverb, and occasionally (Ex. 15) as a verb; in addition, it has sometimes an idiomatic significance, in which case its exact status as a part of speech is doubtful. These differences, however, need not concern us here. Good has originally an adjectival signification, and by derivation implies fitting or suitable. This is highly important, for since fitting and suitable exclusively describe things which help us realize our purposes, we may consider the relationship between good and human behavior to be inseparable. The type of action-pattern implied by this word may also be faintly foreseen.
We have now the canvas stretched on which our picture of good may be delineated. Let us proceed to sketch in the first faint lines of the picture. In the New Oxford Dictionary it is stated that good is the “most general adjective of commendation, implying the existence in a high, or at least satisfactory degree of characteristic qualities, which are either admirable in themselves [sic!] or useful for some purpose.” This definition succeeds far better in combining the theory of the Epicureans (good is what you like), of the Platonists (the good is the typical), and of the Benthamites (the good is the useful), than it succeeds in throwing a clear light upon the question we are here attempting to answer, namely, what sort of responses does the human organism make toward those objects and persons which it calls “good”? From Palmer’s definition of good as “good for” (“The Nature of Goodness,” p. 13), we are able to derive even less assistance, especially since it avoids the main issue in containing the very word to be defined.