At Peacock Point, a bomb had fallen near the shelter belonging to Barninger’s no. 2 gun crew, causing the entrance to be blocked and blowing the sides in. Fortunately, no one was hurt. “The bomb hitting the shelter,” Barninger wrote later, “was the only one close to the guns.” He and his men spent the rest of the day repairing the damaged shelter. Most of the Marines, though, began feeling that foxholes were better. “Although we didn’t lose a man,” Barninger commented, “it was a close thing and with the heavy caliber bombs the shelter is too light. For that reason we are all back in the foxholes.”
On the previous day, Major Devereux had ordered Marine Gunner McKinstry to keep the two guns of Battery F firing to divert the enemy’s attention from the only complete battery on the island, Battery E. On the 22d, McKinstry’s gunners put on a fine performance, despite having neither director nor heightfinder to help them. Firing by the expedient of “lead ’em a mile,” the two guns of Battery F kept the enemy guessing as to which group of guns was the greater threat.
Marine Corps Historical Collection
2dLt Carl R. Davidson (seen circa September 1941), VMF-211’s assistant gunnery officer, was awarded a Navy Cross posthumously for courageously and unhesitatingly attacking an overwhelming number of Kates on 21 December.
Nevertheless, all of the planes from Hiryu and Soryu returned undamaged to their decks. Then, Abe’s force steamed south to be in a position 200 miles from Wake the next day to provide an antisubmarine screen for Kajioka’s ships.
At Pearl Harbor, Vice Admiral Pye read with concern Cunningham’s dispatch reporting the raid by carrier planes. The Japanese had inserted a dangerous new factor into the equation. Pye deemed it essential “to insure [the] defense of the [Hawaiian] islands.” With the Army’s Hawaiian defense in shambles, and the battleship strength significantly reduced by the Japanese attack on 7 December, he believed that the Pacific Fleet’s three carriers constituted the best protection for Oahu. After he considered the evidence of increased Japanese air activity in the Marshalls, with one, or perhaps two, carrier groups in that vicinity, as well as “evidence of extensive offshore lookout and patrol,” he decided that a surprise raid on Jaluit could not be conducted successfully. Thus, Pye reluctantly abandoned the proposed carrier raid on the Marshalls.
While he allowed the efforts to relieve Wake to continue, Pye warned Fletcher not to get within 200 miles of the atoll, and directed Brown to move north with Task Force 11 to support Task Force 14. That decided, on the afternoon of 20 December, he radioed his decision to the Navy Department.
With efforts to relieve Wake progressing, CinCPac radioed Cunningham on the morning of the 22d (21st at Pearl Harbor) and asked him to report the condition of the aircraft runways. He also requested to be informed immediately of any significant developments.
At 0800 on 22 December, 39 planes from the Soryu and the Hiryu ascended and headed into the gray skies above the beleaguered atoll. Their pilots expected to meet American fighters.