I am positively informed that the Highland army did not consist of above seven thousand fighting men,[197] and that the Duke of Cumberland's must have been ten or twelve thousand. In the one army there were not above an hundred and fifty horse, of which one half was of the regiment of Fitz-James. In the other army they had eleven or twelve hundred.

When a misfortune happens people are apt to throw the blame upon persons or causes, which frequently are either [fol. 448.] the effect of malice or ignorance, without knowing the real springs and motives. Severals are of opinion that the night attack could have been made, but I am convinced of the contrary for the following reasons. The Highland army, when they halted near Culraick, were not above five thousand men. They had four miles to march, and part of them were obliged to have made a considerable circumference so that it would have been sun-rise before they could have made the attack. The ground about Nairn where the enemy lay encamped was a hard, dry soil, and plain muirs three miles round about except where the sea intervened; the nearest strong and uneven ground being the wood of Culraick. Let it be supposed the Highlanders had made an attack in the broad day-light upon an enemy double their number in their camp, who were well refreshed with a day and two nights' rest, with plenty of all kinds of provisions, with their canon pointed as they thought [fol. 449.] proper, their horse drawn up to their wish in a fine plain, what must the consequence have been? What would have been said of officers that led on men in such circumstances and such a situation? Would it not have been certain death and destruction of all those that made the attack? Would it not have been said and justly said, Why go you on in such a desperate attempt seeing it could not be done by surprize and undiscovered as projected? Why not try the chance of a fair battle by returning and being joined by the rest of the army as well as by those who had withdrawn the night before, and a great many others who were hourly expected; where also they might have canon and choice of the field of battle? By this means there was a fair chance, by others there was none.

As to the above-mentioned facts you may rely upon them. I saw the Duke of Perth, the Duke of Athol, Lord John Drummond, Lord George Murray, Lord Ogilvie, Colonel Stewart of Ardshiel, Colonel Roy Stewart, Lord Nairn, and several others, at Ruthven of Badenoch on the Friday two days [fol. 450.] after the battle, and they all agreed on the same things.

April.

One thing I must take notice of, that from the beginning of the whole affair there never had been the least dispute[198] or misunderstanding among the officers. Some find fault that the night march was undertaken seeing there was not a certainty of marching to Nairn time enough to make the attack before day-light, as also that they had too few men.

In answer to this. It was not doubted when the march was begun but that there would be abundance of time. Their greatest precaution was not to be discovered. The Highlanders had often made very quick marches in the night-time. The French piquets I believe were in the rear and were not so clever in marching, and the muir they went through was more splashy than they expected, and they were obliged to make some turns to shun houses, and there were two or three dykes that took [fol. 451.] up a good deal of time to pass. The guides though they knew the ground very well, yet were not judges to tell what time it would take to march the ten miles, as they were called, though by reason of the indirect road, must be more. Notwithstanding of all this I am persuaded most of the army (had not the van been frequently stopt and retarded by repeated orders and messages) would have been at Nairn by two o'clock in the morning. As for the number of men, though not half that of the enemy, they might very probably have succeeded in the attempt had they made the attack undiscovered. Nothing is more uncertain than the events of war. Night attacks are most subject to disappointments. This march and counter-march, to be sure, was, as things turned out, a great disadvantage. It fatigued the men much, and a council of war might have been obtained in which doubtless a resolution would have been taken to chuse a more advantagious field of [fol. 452.] battle and perhaps postpon'd fighting for a day till the succours that were coming up with the utmost expedition should join. Councils of war were seldom held and were out of request[199] from the time the army marched into England. I remember but of two that were held, the one at Brampton in regard of besieging Carlisle or going to attack General Wade. The other was at Carlisle, where it was resolved to march forwards. What happened at Derby was accidental by most of the officers being at the Prince's quarters, and taking into consideration their situation, they were all unanimous in advising the Prince to retreat. I think there was but one council of war called after they returned to Scotland, and that was near Crieff, the [fol. 453.] day after the retreat from Stirling, where there was some difference of opinion, but it was at last agreed to march for Inverness in two separate bodies, the one the Highland road, and the other by the coast, severals at first being for the army all going one road. The day of the battle of Falkirk the officers were called on the field where the army was drawn up betwixt Bannockburn and the Torwood, and all agreed immediately to march to the enemy; also the retreat from Stirling, it was advised by many of the principal officers, particularly the clans. They drew up the reasons and sign'd them at Falkirk three days before the retreat was made, the chief of which was that a vast number of men had gone off after the battle, and were not returned, and that the siege of Stirling Castle was not advancing; they did not think it advisable to fight in such circumstances.

[fol. 454.] This letter has been much longer than I intended. But before I conclude I must acquaint you that six weeks before the battle of Culloden some officers proposed sending up meal to several parts of the Highlands, and in particular to Badenoch, that in the event of the Duke of Cumberland's army marching towards Inverness before the army was gathered they might retreat for a few days till they could assemble; or if a misfortune should happen by a defeat there might be some provisions in these parts. But this was reckoned a timorous advice and rejected as such, though I have reason to believe that the opinion of mostly all the Highland officers was much the same. There was no doubt the Highlanders could have avoided fighting till they had found their advantages. In so doing they could have made a summer campaign without running the risque of any misfortune. They could have marched through the hills to places in Aberdeenshire, Banffshire, [fol. 455.] the Merns, Angus, Perthshire, or Argyleshire by ways that no regular troops could have followed them; and if the regular troops had continued among the mountains they must have been attended with great difficulties and expence. Their convoys might have been cut off, and opportunities offered to have attacked them with almost a certainty of success. And though the Highlanders had neither money nor magazines they could not have starved in that season of the year, so long as there were any sheep or cattle to be had. They could also have separated into two or three different bodies, got meal for some days' provision, met again at a place appointed, and have attacked the enemy where was least expected. They could have marched in three days what would have taken regular troops five. Nay, had these taken the high roads (as often they would have been obliged to do upon account of their [fol. 456.] carriages) it would have taken them ten or twelve. In short, they would have been so harrassed and fatigued, that they must have been in the greatest distress and difficulties; and at the long run probably been destroyed. At least, much might have been expected by gaining of time. Perhaps such succours might have come from France as would have made the Highlanders to have made an offensive instead of a defensive war. This I saw was the opinion of many of the officers who considered the consequences of losing a battle. They knew well that few of the Highlanders would join heartily against them, as long as they continued entire, but would upon a defeat. There was one great objection to this, that the Irish officers, who were all as brave men and zealous in the cause as possibly could be, and many of the low-country men, could not endure the fatigue of a Highland campaign. As to the common [fol. 457.] soldiers that came from France there were not four hundred of them remaining. They and their officers, even though a battle was lost, had but to surrender and be made prisoners of war. It was very different with the Scots, whose safety depended upon their not venturing a battle without great probability of success. But any proposition to postpone fighting was ill-received and was called discouraging the army.

I have nothing further to add, but am, etc.

Leith, Saturday, October 17th, 1747.