They may, in some cases, have two more boats, total number, six; therefore, twelve boats on our part would be sufficient to attack an 80 gun ship[H]; particularly as all our boats would be built expressly for running, and our business is to run to harpoon and not to fight; for this purpose our six oarsmen, in each boat, never quit their oars, while our four marines keep up a running fire. The six or eight boats, if the enemy could put out so many, could not prevent our twelve boats closing on the ship. If our boats came into contact with the boats of the enemy, the contest would be reduced to boat fighting; the ship could not use her cannon or small arms against us without firing on her own boats. If we succeeded to drive the boats under the guns of the ship, we should follow so close, that her guns and small arms could not be used, for in the night and amidst a number of boats in confusion, they could not discriminate between friends and enemies. On this theory, if twenty ships of 80 guns, or a force to that amount, were to enter one of our ports, two hundred and forty boats, with two thousand, eight hundred and eighty men would be sufficient, and perhaps more than sufficient, for the attack; and the following view of chances exhibits a strong probability, that such a force of Torpedo boats and men would destroy the twenty ships of the line within one hour.
[H] While organizing a system of Torpedo attack against the Boulogne flotilla, during the administration of Mr. Pitt, it was determined that men should be taken from Lord Keath's blockading fleet to man the boats; but a difficulty occurred how to carry a sufficient number of good active boats. Finding that the ships of war could not take on board more than their usual number, without being encumbered, four ordnance vessels were to be prepared, with large hatchways, to receive a number of boats in the hole, and to carry Torpedoes. Lord Melville was impeached, Mr. Pitt died, and my system was opposed by Lords Grenville and Howic, and the new administration. I mention this, my experience, to shew that ships of war cannot carry a sufficient number of boats to contend with the boats which we could bring into action; they may, indeed, bring with them ordnance ships to carry boats; but, if they unman the ships to man the boats, the ship will be less formidable in her fire; and I believe it is self-evident, that they who have to cross three thousand miles of sea, cannot be so well furnished with boats as we who command the land.
Let the attack be in the night. The enemy must be at anchor; twenty vessels could not keep under way in narrow waters which could not be well known to their pilots. If they put out their boats, they could not bring into action more than six good boats from each ship, total, one hundred and twenty boats. Each ship would be a point from which their boats could depart, or to which they could retreat, total, twenty positions; in these twenty positions, twelve thousand men would be exposed to Torpedo explosion, which is the same, in effect, as a mine under a fortification. We, with two hundred and forty boats, exposing only two thousand, eight hundred and eighty men, would have the whole of our shores to depart from or retreat to; being the assailants, and having it in our power to approach in every direction, the enemy could not know a feint from a real attack, nor could they tell which ship we would attack first; they, consequently, could not concentrate their boats; each vessel would be necessitated to keep her own boats on the look-out, and to aid in protecting her; while we should have the power to divide our force, or concentre one hundred boats on one vessel, as circumstances might require; hence, every thing is in favour of the success of the Torpedo attack, while the greatest danger is to be apprehended for the ships.
Having given my experience and theory on anchored and harpoon Torpedoes: a system, which I hope will, by every friend to America and humanity, be considered of some interest to the United States. I am aware of the doubts which may arise, as to the success of harpooning, in the minds of men in general, and particularly of those who have no experience, who are so impressed with the imaginary tremendous fire of an 80 gun ship, or a ship of war, that the question has often been put to me, where will you find men who have courage to approach in boats within twenty feet of an 80 gun ship, to harpoon her? I answer, that the men in the boats, who are not more than three minutes within the line of the enemy's fire, are not so much in danger, nor does it require so much courage, as to lie yard-arm and yard-arm, as is usual in naval engagements, and receive broadsides, together with grape-shot and volleys of small arms, for forty or sixty minutes. It is not so great a risque, nor does it require so much courage, as to approach a vessel in boats, climb her sides, and take her by boarding, yet this has frequently been done. This risque is not so great, nor does it require so much courage, as to enter a breach which is defended by interior works and close ranges of cannon, flanked by howitzers or carronades loaded with cannister or grape-shot, and the parapet crowded with infantry; yet such breaches have been forced, and cities taken by assault, with numerous examples of this kind. I hope there can be no doubt of sufficient courage to make a Torpedo attack. In the instances of captain Siccombe and lieutenant Payne, before mentioned, they considered the risque of so little importance, that they went to the attack without any apparent concern; and the sailors, who were offered a few guineas for each gun of a vessel which they should destroy, used all their influence with the officers to be permitted to be of the party. But I will not propose a project so novel, and look to others to execute it. If Torpedoes be adopted as a part of our means of defence, with a reasonable number of men organized and practised to the use of them, if it be thought proper to put such men under my command, and an enemy should then enter our ports, I will be responsible to my fellow-citizens for the courage which should secure success. While I propose this, I wish it to be understood, that I do not desire any command or public employment. My private pursuits are the guarantee of an independence and freedom of action, which is always grateful to my feelings; they are useful and honourable amusements, and the most rational source of my happiness.
Estimate for an anchored Torpedo
| Thirty-two pounds of copper, at seventy-five cents a pound | $24.00 |
| A lock in a brass box, water-tight | 20.00 |
| One hundred pounds of powder, twenty cents a pound | 20.00 |
| Machinery to let it rise to the surface in a given time, rope, cork-box, anchor, and weights | 20.00 |
| Total | $84.00 |
In [page 22], I have given an estimate for a clockwork and harpooning Torpedo.
| The Torpedo will cost | $150.00 |
| Each boat, armed complete | 336.00 |
Estimate for an Establishment in our most important and vulnerable Ports.