[B] Note—Men who had been paid large bounties during the draft period to take the place of men who were long on money, but were short on gall—and who had no stomach for a fight of any kind.
All this applied to Lawton, who, although he was not a graduate of West Point, had had the same campaign and battle experience as the writer—and as Lieut. Colonel Commanding the 30th Indian Volunteer Infantry had developed in him all of the necessary elements at Chickamauga—Missionary Ridge—Dalton—Resaca—Kenesaw Mountain and in his march with Sherman "from Atlanta to the sea"—which, as essential factors would fit into our problem—and which, many years later, he fully exemplified in the Philippines by his push, energy, iron will, resourcefulness, well-balanced judgment and quick, decisive action which strongly marked every movement in his campaigns, and characterized him as the personification of an ever ready and perfectly trained—although not intensively trained—soldier—the magnificent soldier without frills, furbelows, fuss or feathers—that he was—
Training of the "Rough Riders"
Too much stress has been given to a long, intensive training as absolutely necessary to fit men to become good, reliable battle-service soldiers, or to enable them to tackle either purely military problems, or such problems as confronted us in our long, exhaustive pursuit of those deserters. Perfection of drill and military training is one thing through a continuous and harassing barrack or field training. To fit men to become alert, resourceful, obedient soldiers for quick and ready service through discipline and a minimum of tactical drill is altogether another thing when a war is fully on. Theodore Roosevelt in his Autobiography (p. 250) says: "The reason why it takes so long to turn the average citizen, etc., into a good infantryman or cavalryman is because it takes a long while to teach the average untrained man how to shoot, to march, to take care of himself in the open, to be alert, resourceful, cool, daring and resolute, and to fit himself to act on his own responsibility (individual initiative). If he already possesses these qualities there is very little difficulty in making him a good soldier (nor should it take a long time). All the drill necessary to enable him to march and to fight is of a simple character. Parade ground and barrack square maneuvers are of no earthly consequence in real war. When men can readily change from line to column, and column to line, can form front in any direction, and assemble and scatter (deploy), and can do other things with speed and precision they have got a fairly good grasp on the essentials."
No amount of long drawn out drill will give him battle instinct or battle sense; not until he goes in under fire and faces up to what he sooner or later has got to encounter,—drill or no drill—does he acquire it.
Leaving out the non-essentials and endless repetitions of drill during a war crisis (and by the non-essentials the writer means a cut and dried program from 5.00 A. M. to 10 P. M., with "manual of arms by the count"—all dress parades, reviews and other ceremonies, marching or "hiking" with a full infantry pack in a temperature of 109° in the shade, to see how men can intensively endure such heat, or, in other words, a persistent effort to break these men down and determine whether they have any courage, endurance or guts)—it should take less than three months to make an alert, steadfast, reliable and efficient battle soldier in time of war, and not more than six months in time of peace if more perfection is arrived at, unless it is desired to specialize in artillery, engineering and the Scientific Corps. Much less time was taken during the Civil War. Most of these intensive training sharps and cranks harp incessantly about the absolute necessity for a long period of "discipline". The writer is nearly a crank on that subject, for discipline is the real, true and vital basis on which to build for a battle soldier. Then employ most of the few weeks, taken as a limit for training, in discipline alone—making that the one objective upon which to concentrate the intensive effort, devoting the balance of the time to sufficient tactical drill to readily handle them under fire, and no more, or until the first deployment and the shrapnel or machine gun fire of battle demonstrates the fact that any and all tactical formations whether perfect or more loosely co-ordinated are soon broken up. Any more tactical drill than is sufficient for such a purpose in time of war—when all preparation must necessarily be hastened—is simply a mere repetition looking to more perfect formations and movements and therefore a sheer waste of time and effort.
Both Theodore Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood were then right in their grasp of the situation and summing up of five weeks of training and battle activities of the "Rough Riders". Neither had had any military training, either theoretical or practical—one having been a college student, writer, ranchman, police commissioner, Secretary of the Navy, etc., while the other had been a medical officer. Both, however, had been out in the open under the stars, were alert, self-reliant, versatile, many-sided, broad-guaged, tense, strenuous, level-headed, far-sighted, sagacious, but withal, endowed with a large stock of good judgment and plenty of good, sound horse sense. Neither had drilled a troop of cavalry—much less a regiment—but they had had some good regular officers and old non-commissioned officers assigned to start them off, and furthermore, in the face of a war, then on, and quick preparation for immediate battle service absolutely necessary, both saw at a glance what every good soldier—whether theoretical or otherwise—should see, that there was no time to waste in the mere niceties of a perfect tactical drill; that all of the non-essentials would have to be cut out—and the one essential, which they kept steadily in view, in dealing with and licking into shape such a body of men as the "Rough Riders" were, and which they were so suddenly called upon to organize and put into battle—was discipline, more discipline, and then some; to control the unruly elements, eliminate the really vicious, and administer the severest punishment, tempered with justice and mercy, for any and every infraction of the disciplinary laws governing any large bodies of men trying to adjust themselves to the novelty of control by superior authority appointed by the Government to hold them in check, and to give them just sufficient tactical drill to get them into and out of a battle mess, in a fairly orderly fashion. The "Rough Riders" had been gathered from the "four corners of the earth." What good could six months or a year, or even longer, of hard drill or long drawn out intensive training have done these men with war already on? They would soon have "bucked"—grown disgusted—gone stale—lost their spirit and enthusiasm—their morale and force, and given their officers no end of trouble by their restlessness and eagerness to try out their mettle and "get in". They needed plenty of hard discipline and proper guidance daily, and Theodore Roosevelt says they got it. They already possessed most of the other qualifications which he so clearly enumerates. They needed to be taught prompt obedience to lawful authority, and they soon found that out and who were their leaders. What more did they need to fit them for battle than what he so concisely states in the way of tactical drill, to enable them to get on and off a battle-field, and the courage-born stimulus of good competent officers and non-commissioned officers? Most of them already knew the use of arms, and nobody ever stands up on a battle line and exercises in the manual of arms, either "by the count" or "at will". There was no time to put them into large cantonments with other troops and intensively train them according to a War College prescribed schedule. Everything had to be sacrificed to time.
The late Col. Arthur Wagner, U. S. Army, is reported to have said shortly after the Spanish-American war, when asked what his experience had been at Santiago—"There was nothing I saw there that fitted into my text books in any way."
No cut and dried plans such as might be worked out in a Staff War College to fit into every program could be used, unless, perchance, the conditions which we were constantly meeting fitted into such plans—which they seldom do—and we could not afford to fall back on any "perchances", necessitating, as they would, the rapid changing of such plans, in the face of a situation or crisis which might and did demand immediate and decisive action.
The query then naturally arises—of what vital or practical use is much of these enforced student theoretical courses at Leavenworth and the Staff War College, especially in feeding up officers—who have no special aptitude for the profession—on sham battles and sham war maneuvers, if, after stacking up hundreds of these worked out war problems, such as four or five different plans for the invasion of Mexico, and the same number for the invasion of Canada, it shall be found that just at that particular time the conditions bear no relation whatever to, or fit into these carefully worked out and elaborate plans, all of which may, and probably will have to be hurriedly changed, when there is little or no time to do so, just as the crisis of a sudden campaign is forced upon us or is quickly culminating. Any commanding officer of our army who cannot then quickly change that cut and dried plan thrust into his hands by the War Department, and in the face of sudden and almost insurmountable obstacles, and all of these conditions entirely foreign to such plans, to work out in front of an enemy already mobilized for battle—why—his name is—MUD!!