The Order of the Jesuits was at this time all-powerful in Brazil, where they had indeed rendered great services to the crown as well as to the Church; and a fresh accession to their strength was despatched with the new governor, Luiz de Vasconcellos, who, in 1570, was appointed to relieve Mem de Sa. The reinforcement which he brought with him was headed by Azevedo, who was appointed Provincial. Nine and thirty brethren embarked with Azevedo in the “St. Iago,” half of which vessel was freighted for them, the other half bearing cargo for the island of Palma in the Canaries. The vessel had halted at Madeira, and as the passage to Palma was considered to be dangerous on account of French pirates, Azevedo was entreated not to expose himself unnecessarily. For himself he declined to take the advice given him, but he permitted his comrades to exchange into another vessel. Only four novices, whose places were quickly supplied by others, thought fit to do so; for the rest, the near probability of the crown of martyrdom had an irresistible charm. On the day after their departure five French ships appeared. Vasconcellos at once put to sea; but the Frenchmen declined action, and stood off towards the Canaries. The squadron was from La Rochelle, and was commanded by a Huguenot. After seven days, Azevedo reached the island of Palma, at three leagues’ distance from the town, to which he was urged to proceed by land. The advice was disregarded, with the result that, when he and his friends were off Palma, the French appeared in sight. The Portuguese mariners made unavailing resistance, and one alone of the Jesuits, being in lay costume, escaped the death which for them had not only no terror, but seemed to be an object of desire.

This catastrophe has been quoted with unlimited admiration, and the martyrs have received all due posthumous honour; but if we look at the circumstances from any point of view save that of a fanatic, our admiration must be considerably qualified. Azevedo and his companions were doubtless brave men; but they had been educated and sent out from their country with the express purpose of converting the heathen; and it was surely not their duty in any sense wantonly and recklessly to go out of their way to seek premature death. If the crown of martyrdom was so dear to them—if, in the language of certain writers, they were swallowed up by other-worldliness—the prize might surely have been gained more honourably amongst the savages of Brazil than at the hands of French corsairs. Of the eight-and-thirty foolhardy men whose blood so uselessly stained the waters of Palma, one might have proved a second Nobrega. To an unprejudiced person it seems that, so far from acting for “the greater glory of God” by provoking wholesale massacre, they were deliberately doing the contrary, since they were thus cutting themselves off from a sphere of vast usefulness. Nor can we greatly blame the commander of the French squadron for his conduct on the occasion. It was but one scene in a fierce religious war, in which the priests, not the Huguenots, were the aggressors.

Vasconcellos set sail with the remainder of his fleet. When, after a long and miserable voyage, he sighted the coast of Brazil, his vessels were driven far to the north and were dispersed. At length his followers were so reduced in numbers that one vessel might contain them all; yet not even this one vessel was destined to reach its destination in safety. It was attacked by a French squadron, and, after a hopeless resistance, the governor fell; whilst fourteen remaining Jesuits shared the fate of the martyrs of Palma. Of sixty-nine Jesuit missionaries who had set out with Azevedo, one alone reached Brazil.

CHAPTER X.
PERU; SUPREMACY OF GONZALO PIZARRO.
1542-1545.

1541.

The conspirators who had assassinated Pizarro succeeded in securing possession of Lima, and their next step was at once to send to the different cities proclaiming the revolution and claiming the recognition of the son of Almagro as governor of Peru. At Truxillo and Arequipa, where it was emphasized by the presence of a military force, the summons was obeyed; but in other cities it was received with merely nominal assent, whilst in some it was disregarded. At Cuzco, where the Almagro faction prevailed, the dissenting magistrates were summarily ejected from office; but they were soon after reinstated by means of a neighbouring military force commanded by one of Pizarro’s captains. The conspirators had most to dread from the Licentiate Vaca de Castro, whose commission to assume the post of governor in case of the death of Pizarro had now come into force. De Castro was still in the north, but on being advised of Pizarro’s death he quickened his steps southwards. He was in a difficult position, having a very imperfect acquaintance with the political state of the country, and he was neither a soldier himself nor supported by a military force. He was, however, a man of courage, and had confidence in his own resources, besides relying on the habitual loyalty of Spaniards to the crown.

Without delay, therefore, he pursued his march towards Quito, where he was well received by the officer who had charge of that place during the absence of Gonzalo Pizarro on the Amazons. At Quito he displayed the royal commission empowering him to assume the government, and thence he sent emissaries to the principal places requiring obedience to himself as the representative of the crown. But meanwhile the faction of the young Almagro was gaining strength at Lima. His forces were commanded by Rada, who obtained the necessary funds for preparing his soldiers for service. Such of Pizarro’s followers as declined to be reconciled to the ruling faction were permitted to depart from Lima, amongst these being the Bishop Valverde, who, however, almost immediately afterwards fell into the hands of the hostile natives of Puná, from whom he received the violent death which was in harmony with the lawless scenes in which he had taken part. As the young Almagro’s power was founded solely on usurpation, it was of course a mere trial of strength between his rebel bands and such loyal forces as might rally round the governor. His policy was to defeat these in detail before they had time to effect a junction under De Castro. He, however, sustained a severe loss in the death from fever of his Lieutenant, Rada, which occasioned an ill-timed jealousy between his next principal officers, and which thwarted his well-conceived plans. The result was that the two chief bodies of the opposite faction succeeded in effecting a junction, and he was compelled to fall back on Cuzco, in which city he found no opposition.

At Cuzco, however, the rivalry of his two chief officers again broke out, with the result that they were each in turn assassinated. Almagro then lost no time in providing for his men against the inevitable approaching campaign; in which effort he was aided by the Inca Manco, whose friendship was probably heightened by the circumstance that Almagro’s mother was a Peruvian princess. The Inca likewise promised to support him with a detachment of native troops. Before the final appeal to arms, however, each side was willing to try the effect of negotiation, each being aware that the result of the struggle was doubtful. The governor was prepared to grant Almagro pardon, in consideration of his youth and inexperience, provided that he should give up the leaders of the conspiracy who had taken part in the death of Pizarro. To this proposition Almagro could not with honour assent, and nothing was left but to await the ordeal of battle. Meanwhile De Castro continued to advance southwards, and was well received at S. Miguel and Truxillo. It was not till the early part of 1542 that he reached the scene where the contest was to be decided, and where he showed remarkable skill in asserting his own supreme authority, notwithstanding the pretensions of the two ambitious officers who commanded the royal troops, and each of whom aspired to the chief military authority. Having entered Lima, he was received with demonstrations of joy, and obtained the necessary funds for the prosecution of his enterprise.

The contest was decided on the plains of Xauxa, where the governor’s forces amounted to no more than seven hundred men, being more or less equally matched by those of the enemy. It was late in the afternoon of the 16th September when the hostile forces met. The combat was terrible, for quarter was neither asked for nor given. Night had fallen on the combatants long before the struggle was decided; but the victory at length declared itself in favour of the royalists. From three to five hundred—an enormous proportion—are said to have fallen on either side, and at least one-half of the survivors of Almagro’s party were made prisoners. Their young commander, who had performed prodigies of valour, escaped unhurt to Cuzco, where, however, he was at once arrested, and where, having been tried by a council of war, he soon shared the fate which had befallen his father, meeting his death with the utmost courage.

The governor’s next care was called for by the proceedings of Gonzalo Pizarro, who had arrived at Lima, where he loudly complained that the government of the country had not been placed in his hands on his brother’s death. It was reported that he now meditated seizing the capital; but against this De Castro took the prudent precaution of detaching a force in that direction, whilst at the same time he required Pizarro’s presence at Cuzco. Such was his tact and conciliatory demeanour that the aggrieved chief found no opportunity for quarrelling, and he thought it prudent to comply with the governor’s advice that he should retire to his possessions in La Plata, where he occupied himself to some purpose in working its mines of silver.