1548.
It was the spring of the following year when Gasca mustered his forces for the final march on Cuzco. He now had two thousand men, which, it must be remembered, was a larger number than any European force that had hitherto been assembled in arms in Peru. They were commanded by Hinojosa. The first obstacle of importance which that officer had to encounter was the passage of the river Apurimac, one of the most considerable tributaries of the Amazons, and the bridges over which had been destroyed by order of Pizarro. Gasca, however, being apprised of this, had sent forward to select a suitable spot from which to throw a bridge across the stream, which was found at Cotopampa, whilst materials for a like purpose were laid down at two other points with a view to misleading the enemy.
The officer sent on in advance to Cotopampa had received positive commands to delay the actual construction of the bridge until he should be in sufficient strength to carry it through forthwith to completion; but he was so zealous that he took it upon himself to disregard his orders and to set about the operation at once. The bridge itself was to be one of those structures common in the Northern Andes, formed of cables of osier, thrown from side to side of the bank, and across which planks are laid. As such a bridge is swayed to and fro or upwards and downwards by the tramp of men, by burdens being borne across it, or by the wind, it is apt to inspire a feeling of insecurity both on the part of the traveller and on that of the onlooker from the shore, but it is in reality quite as safe a means of transit as is many a more solid structure. Gasca having heard with alarm that the work was going on, hastened his march in order to support his officer; but ere he had reached the river, information was brought to him that the enemy had cut the cables on the opposite bank. Valdivia was accordingly sent forward with two hundred men, whilst the main body hurried its pace. That energetic officer, on reaching the stream, at once procured some native boats, by means of which he passed his men over to the other side. He being now in considerably greater force than Pizarro’s men, the latter retreated with all speed to Cuzco, to report the affair to their chief.
Pizarro meanwhile, like the typical soldier of fortune of that age, had been enjoying the hour of sunshine, forgetful of the past, and not too much troubled about the future. Although no one ever questioned his leadership, he was not a leader to dispense with counsel; and his two chief advisers were still Cepeda and Carbajal. The advice he had of late received from each seems to have been the reverse of that which they had respectively given him when it was a question of the terms in which he should reply to the letters of the Emperor and of Gasca. Whilst Carbajal on the one hand now advised him to abandon Cuzco and retreat to the mountains, leaving an impoverished city behind him, he was urged by Cepeda on the other hand to make terms with the President. But Pizarro rejected either advice. He was, in fact, determined to stand the hazard of the die. The fortune which had stood his friend under the desperate circumstances in which he had been deserted by Orellana on the Amazons, and which had lately come to his rescue against enormous odds in his late engagement, might still stand him in good stead.
But in fact his fortune in these later times was in the sagacious advice and experience of Carbajal. It was the forethought and skill of that veteran that had won the victory of Huarina, and had Pizarro now listened to his voice he might still have continued lord of Peru. When the tidings came that the enemy were across the stream, the veteran saw that the moment had arrived which was to decide the struggle. He felt that he was the man to profit by the opportunity, and he pleaded with his commander to be allowed to go forward to the scene of action. In an evil hour for himself Pizarro refused his request, saying that he could not spare him so far away. Meanwhile the work of the bridge was rapidly pushed forward, and long ere the young cavalier who had been put in the place of Carbajal had reached his destination, the President’s force was in a position to defy him.
There was now only a question of the choice of a spot on which the final battle was to be fought. Pizarro determined to abandon Cuzco and to await his opponents in a valley five leagues distant. Even at this moment the President, having crossed the Andes and the river Apurimac, and being in force greatly superior to that of his antagonist, showed his utter absence of personal ill-feeling towards the latter, and also perhaps his appreciation of the difficulties which had brought him into his present position, by giving him one last chance of safety. By an emissary of his own he renewed the assurance of pardon to Pizarro in case he should lay down his arms and submit. Such at least is the statement of two Spanish historians, and it is in accordance with the character of the President. At length, on the morning of the 8th of April, the two opposing forces came within sight of each other. The numbers on either side were the reverse of large according to our ideas of the present day; but numbers do not always denote the importance of a battle, and we should remember that a similarly small European force at Plassey decided the fate of Hindostan. It may be remarked that the native Peruvians, for the most part, espoused the cause of Pizarro.
The President wisely left the conduct of the battle to his military officers, who were perfectly competent for the purpose, and he showed his habitual good sense in withdrawing, with his priests and civilians, out of the immediate range of action. The commanders on his side, Hinojosa and Valdivia, were a match for the military skill of Carbajal; and Pizarro himself had more in him of the daring, dauntless cavalier than of the strategic leader. As he had faced the situation with all its consequences plainly set before him, resolving fully to abide them, we cannot bestow much sympathy upon him in his present plight, though we must admire his unshaken courage and constancy. At the decisive moment of his fate he had taken the advice of Cepeda in resisting, in opposition to that of Carbajal; and it was the wretch Cepeda who now betrayed him by galloping over to the enemy in the face of both armies. But this act, although it was contagious, perhaps did Pizarro no considerable harm, for his fate was already sealed.
The leaders on either side gave the word for the advance; but the humane President, anxious to spare the shedding of blood, ordered his men to halt, since the rebel host from its frequent desertions was evidently falling to pieces. The Spaniards on Pizarro’s side deserted him in various directions; some went to seek pardon from the President ere it should be too late; others made for the mountains. Pizarro himself, seeing that there was but one thing for him to do, gave up his sword to the first officer of rank whom he encountered, and by him he was conducted into the presence of the President. The latter, we are told, inquired severely why he had thrown the country into such confusion? why he had revolted? why he had slain the Viceroy? why he had usurped the government? and finally, why he had refused the repeated offers of grace? On his reply, in which he attempted to justify himself, he was ordered into close confinement. Thus terminated the culminating encounter between the royal forces and those of Pizarro, in which the latter on the plain of Xaquixaguana, like those of the Assyrian of old, though “unsmote by the sword,” yet “vanished like snow.”
Gasca, having sent an officer to Cuzco to restrain the excesses which were to be expected, had next to concern himself with the trial of Pizarro and of Carbajal. It was of course a mere form, since they were taken in the act of opposing the royal forces in arms; and there could be no question of mercy, since they had both failed to avail themselves of the offers of the royal clemency repeatedly made. They were accordingly executed; Carbajal, who is said to have been eighty-four years of age, receiving his fate with the utmost indifference, and Pizarro meeting death with the dignified courage which he had ever shown. The estates of both were confiscated. It is satisfactory to add that the traitor Cepeda, though his head was not placed upon the block, yet was not allowed to go free. The President was indeed urged to send him to execution, since it had been by his advice that Pizarro had first refused the offers of grace; but Gasca refrained from doing so on account of the service which Cepeda had rendered the royal cause by his opportune desertion. He was accordingly sent a prisoner to Spain, where he was tried for high treason: during the progress of his trial he died in prison. It may be of interest here to remark that the fate which attended so many of the conquerors of Peru, spared neither Centeno, Hinojosa, nor Valdivia, the three foremost leaders on the side of the President, all of whom were soon afterwards cut off. The President thought it sufficient, in the interests of justice and of example, to execute Acosta and three or four other cavaliers who had surrendered with Pizarro. He then broke up his camp and marched to Cuzco.
On his arrival at the late capital of the Incas, Gasca had before him the task of winding up the affairs incident to the rebellion. Some dozen cavaliers, having been tried and condemned, were executed, whilst others were sentenced to minor punishments; but on the whole, considering the dimensions of the rebellion and the obstinacy of the insurgents in refusing grace, the President certainly does not seem to have acted with undue severity: a stern example was needed. He had now to apportion the rewards that were due to his followers, who, as usually happens in such cases, were not bashful in claiming them. Retiring from Cuzco to a neighbouring valley, attended only by the Archbishop of Lima and by his secretary, Gasca now devoted three months to a patient examination of the respective claims laid before him, and to elaborating a fair scheme of compensation.