They were now confined to the fort of St. Luiz; whilst the island, outside the fort, was held by the Portuguese. On one occasion the garrison sallied out with the hope of surprising the Portuguese whilst dispersed at their harvest operations. In this they were successful; but they were in the end utterly defeated. Of all who had quitted St. Luiz, ten French mercenaries alone re-entered, and these were hanged as traitors. After a time Teixeira was about to be reinforced by the arrival from Portugal of one hundred men with stores, under Pedro de Albuquerque, who was appointed governor of Maranham. Albuquerque, however, not knowing the state of things on the island, and having no pilot on board, fired his guns off to announce his presence. His signals not being answered, he proceeded to Pará, where the ship struck on a sandbank, the greater part of those on board being lost, including Luiz Figueira, the Jesuit, with eight of his brethren. Notwithstanding the loss of this expected succour, Teixeira held his own in Maranham so effectually that the Dutch found it necessary to evacuate St. Luiz by sea. Including their native allies, they had still nearly five hundred men. They made for the island of St. Christopher.
1644.
The latter period of Count Nassau’s eight years’ residence in Brazil was clouded by misfortunes, the direct result of the treacherous policy which he had been instructed to pursue on the acceptance of the ten years’ truce. The Dutch had not only been driven out of Maranham, but had further been cut off in Ceará, where the natives had risen as one man against them, surprising them at their different posts. The fort of Ceará was now again in the hands of the Portuguese. At St. Thomas too the people were in arms, the Dutch being confined to the citadel. It was at this time that Nassau again sought his recall, which was now granted. He made over the military command to Henrik Haus, and the civil government to the Great Council, with much apprehension for the future which awaited the transatlantic dominions of Holland. For the guidance of his successors he left elaborate and judicious instructions; but, so confident did the Dutch in general appear to be in the continuance of the truce which they themselves had so wantonly violated, that the fleet which bore Nassau to Europe took likewise away no fewer than fourteen hundred of his countrymen.
CHAPTER III.
BRAZIL; THE DUTCH WAR; RISING OF THE PORTUGUESE.
1644-1645.
It is satisfactory to know that the treacherous policy which the Dutch had thought themselves strong enough to pursue toward Portugal in her hour of weakness, was followed with the worst possible results to themselves. They had at no time been so completely masters of Pernambuco as to be able to supply Recife with provisions for the country; and, when an honestly-observed truce might have enabled them to consolidate their conquests, they set the Portuguese an example of practices which speedily recoiled on their own head. The pecuniary resources of the Company were exhausted by the various expeditions to Seregipe, Maranham, Angola, and Chili. Money became scarce at Recife. Hitherto all transactions had been carried on on credit; but now credit was stopped, and money had to be borrowed at the ruinous rate of 3 or 4 per cent. interest per month. Many of the planters were ruined by the floods and the subsequent ravages of the worm; whilst the small-pox committed great havoc amongst the valuable negroes imported from Angola. So great was the pecuniary distress that the most desperate measures were resorted to, and which only made matters worse. Some creditors endeavoured to procure payment of their debts by means of large abatements; others threw their debtors into prison; whilst the government felt itself compelled to exact its dues by seizing the sugar produce at harvest time. Thus a conflict arose between the government and the public as to the priority of their respective claims, and the result was embarrassing and ruinous.
In this state of things it was suggested that the Company should contract with the owners of the sugar-works for a certain number of years, receiving the whole products of the works and satisfying the demands on the estate. The plan was approved by the Home Government; but it only proved a partial remedy to the disorder. Many of the Portuguese in Pernambuco, being now deeply indebted to the Dutch, had a greater interest than ever in inciting insurrection. They had further cause of complaint in the insolence and brutality of their conquerors. An edict was passed inviting slaves by the promise of reward to give notice if any of their Portuguese masters should have concealed arms. This measure, as may be believed, led to intolerable abuses, certain Dutchmen going to the length of tampering with slaves to hide arms, in order to have their masters condemned. On one occasion two Dutchmen were informed upon by a slave upon whom they had thus practised, and having confessed their guilt, were deservedly put to death.
The departure of Count Maurice of Nassau was a real loss as well to the Portuguese as to his own countrymen. He had systematically endeavoured to repress the excesses of the latter, and had so far won the affections of the former that they looked upon him as their special protector. They respected his high birth and his princely manner of life, which stood out in contrast to that of his countrymen about him. His successors sent deputies to Bahia to compliment the new governor on his arrival. They were charged, ostensibly, with certain proposals respecting extradition, and, secretly, with instructions to espy the condition of the Portuguese at that place. They learned that the number of troops at and near San Salvador was about two thousand five hundred. A new system had been adopted of sending out men-of-war from Portugal to convoy the Brazilian merchantmen home; and the deputies concluded that the price of Portuguese imports into Europe would be thereby so increased that Holland could undersell them.
This report of their deputies had the effect of making the Dutch more suspicious than before of the Pernambucans, and, as it shortly proved, not without reason. They were not fortunate, however, in the measures they adopted to allay discontent. The Portuguese inhabitants of Pernambuco had petitioned for the intercession of the King of Portugal towards securing them freedom of religious worship. This step was so highly resented by their Dutch governors that the public funds which had hitherto been appropriated to religious purposes were now declared government property, to be applied to the support of schools, churches, and hospitals. All priests were imprisoned who entered the conquered provinces without a safe-conduct; and such of them as chose to reside there were required to take the oath of fidelity, and were prohibited from receiving ordination from the bishop of Bahia. It was discovered that some of the priests with the Dutch and French Catholics had refused to give these absolution whilst serving against Christians, that is to say, Portuguese; and, in retaliation, the Dutch now ordered all priests and monks to quit their dominions within a month. They were shipped from the island of Itamaraca and landed on the Spanish Main.
We now come to a remarkable epoch in the history of Brazil. Joam Fernandes Vieira has already been mentioned as having distinguished himself in the defence of Fort St. George after the loss of Olinda. He was a native of Funchal in Madeira, and at a very early age sought his fortune in Brazil. He was found to be so able and honest that he was soon put in the way of setting up in trade for himself. In the course of some years he became one of the wealthiest men in the country; and, as he had so much to lose in case of troubles, the Dutch looked upon his fidelity as assured. He was noted for his liberality and his fair dealings. Whether his patriotism alone would have led him to risk all his worldly possessions by taking the lead in a revolt can only be conjectured; but the main principle of his life was devotion to the Catholic faith, and his main object was to do what he could towards the suppression of heresy.
So long as Count Maurice of Nassau remained in South America Joam Fernandes took no step which could place him in danger; but the vexatious system of government which ensued ripened his designs. Taking counsel with Vidal, who had been appointed to the captaincy of Maranham, he addressed a memorial to the Governor of Brazil, pointing out that the Dutch were weak and were off their guard, that the fortifications were neglected, and that many of the best officers had departed with Nassau. He did not ask for advice, for the die he said was cast; he merely prayed the governor for assistance. The grievances and outrages which he and his compatriots had to endure were such as to force them to take up arms in self-defence, despite of any truce or treaty. Open assistance the governor could not, of course, give; but he now took advantage of the lesson which the Dutch had taught him. Sixty chosen men were placed under the orders of Antonio Cardozo, who was to act under the instructions of Fernandes. In order to avoid suspicion they made their way, unarmed, and in small parties, to Recife, near which place they were quartered in the woods, on the estates of Fernandes, and supplied with arms and food. At the same time the native chief, Camaram, and Henrique Diaz, the two partisan chiefs, set out by land to join in the enterprise.