The Dutch general, Haus, having ascertained the locality where Fernandes and his men were concealed, now advanced against them. They removed to the Monte das Tabocas, about nine leagues to the westward of Recife. The Dutch commander had with him fifteen hundred well-armed European troops; he had likewise a considerable native force. An engagement was soon brought on. Failing to surprise the enemy, Haus, in his disappointment, set fire to a sugar-factory, the smoke of which gave Fernandes the alarm. The Portuguese outposts were soon in conflict with their opponents, and, by their knowledge of the country, were able to hold their own, notwithstanding their inferior numbers. Cardozo had cut three openings in the cane-wood which surrounded the position on the Monte, and when the outposts were driven in a number of his men were posted in ambush hard by. Fagundes and his followers were ordered to dispute the passage of the Tapicura, a small stream which the Dutch must pass; and when he could no longer withstand them, he was to fall back in such a manner as to decoy them towards the ambuscades.
Before commencing the passage of the Tapicura, Haus directed a heavy fire into the wood on the further side, and then immediately advanced under cover of the smoke. As was foreseen, the Dutch were led on, step by step, into the cane-wood. They were received at the first ambush with a discharge, every shot of which took effect. They pushed on to the second; but at the third their loss was so great that they were compelled to fall back. They were not, however, disheartened, and, having reformed into three bodies, they again advanced through the canes. They were visibly gaining ground, when, in a panic caused by the fear of another ambuscade, they were a second time repulsed.
The engagement now lasted for several hours; but the Dutch had not yet brought their entire force into action. After a short breathing-time they returned with fresh troops to the attack. It was now that the exhausted Portuguese were indebted to the priests amongst them for enthusiasm which supplied the place of strength. They were exhorted not to give way to heretics; and many were the vows offered to Christ and the Virgin by those who besought their help in this their hour of need. Fernandes in particular promised a church to the latter; whilst he appealed to his slaves to distinguish themselves, by the promise of immediate freedom. His guard rushed down the hill, blowing their horns, and charged the heretics with such spirit that the latter were driven back through the canes. Haus made one more attack; but this, too, was in vain, and the Portuguese remained masters of the field.
1645.
The fight had lasted the entire day [August 3rd]. On the stormy night which followed, the Dutch, under cover of darkness, recrossed the Tapicura. The Portuguese passed the night in preparations for a renewal of the attack on the morrow; but daylight showed them the extent of their victory. A messenger arrived from Haus, requesting quarter for the wounded, when Fernandes, according to his promise, immediately emancipated fifty slaves. Three hundred and seventy Dutch were found dead upon the field; whilst about four hundred wounded had been carried away. Of the Portuguese the loss is said to have been under forty, not, however, including the negroes or natives. So important a success, and one obtained at so small a cost, was, of course, ascribed to supernatural assistance; many persons affirmed, and perhaps believed, that in the hottest hour of the battle a woman and a venerable man were seen amongst the combatants distributing powder and bullets, and dazzling the eyes of the heretics. These were the Mother of Mercies, whom they had invoked, and the good St. Anthony, the hermit, the favourite protector of the Portuguese.
CHAPTER IV.
BRAZIL; CONCLUSION OF THE DUTCH WAR.
1646-1661.
Haus, with the wreck of his army, continued his retreat throughout the night, never halting until seven leagues’ distance lay between him and the scene of his defeat. He then awaited his wounded and stragglers, whilst he sent to Recife for immediate assistance. Succours reached him the same day, sufficient to secure his further retreat, but not to enable him to resume offensive operations. The Council now distinctly perceived their danger; and they had reasons to distrust the professions of the governor of Bahia. Three weeks before the battle Hogstraten and another deputy had been sent to Bahia to express the belief of the Dutch Government that Camaram and Diaz were not authorized in their proceedings by the Portuguese governor, and to request that they might be recalled, or, in the event of their disobedience, be declared enemies of the Portuguese Crown. Telles persevered in his previous line of conduct, putting off the Dutch with vague professions. He taunted them in turn with their acts of aggression at Angola, at St. Thomas, and at Maranham. He further indicated that Camaran and Diaz were not men to be restrained by any words of his; and he pleaded that the Portuguese had been driven into insurrection by false accusations on the part of untrustworthy persons. Finally, he offered to act as mediator.
Hogstraten now repeated his offer to deliver Nazareth into the power of the governor, a proposal which he said he had already imparted to Joam Fernandes. His offer was accepted; and as he was somewhat afraid lest his conference with the Portuguese authorities might excite suspicion in the breast of his fellow-deputy, he had the audacity to tell him that they were tampering with him for the betrayal of his fort, and that he pretended to listen to them in order the better to thwart them. On his return to Recife he repeated the same tale, adding that the governor merely awaited some ships from Rio de Janeiro before attacking the Dutch possessions. Two regiments were now embarked at Bahia, and were to be landed at Tamandare. They were to be escorted by the homeward-bound fleet of thirty-seven ships.
It was arranged that, on the two regiments being landed at Tamandare, their commander, Payva, should proceed to Recife with letters for the Council, in which the Governor-General should state that he had sent two officers to remonstrate with the insurgents, and that, should remonstrances fail, he would compel them to return to their duty. Whilst this farce was being enacted, the Dutch commandant at Serinhaem had received instructions to disarm the Portuguese in that district. The Portuguese, however, declined to be disarmed, and the fort being surrounded and its water cut off, was compelled to surrender, the Indian allies of the Dutch being given up to the Portuguese.
Joam Fernandes had remained for seven days upon the scene of his victory at the Monte das Tabocas, when he was informed of the arrival of the troops from Bahia. Camaran and Diaz, the two partisan leaders, likewise reached the Monte das Tabocas about the same time. On meeting the troops from Bahia, after some formal words, Fernandes was joined by the whole Portuguese force; after which his first act was to send a detachment to reduce the fort of Nazareth.