Spanish and Portuguese South America during the Colonial Period; Vol. 2 of 2

by Robert Grant Watson

Copy of Letter from Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, to the Right Honourable William Windham, dated July 10th, 1807.—Private.

Buenos Ayres, July 10th, 1807.

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you, that immediately after my arrival at Monte Video, on the 10th of May, I began to make every possible preparation for the attack of this place, as the first and most essential step towards the reduction of the province. For this purpose sloops of war and other light vessels were sent to reconnoitre the southern bank of the river, in order to fix upon the precise point of debarkation. It was found that the water was too shallow to admit of a landing, under cover of the ships of war, anywhere to the westward of the town of Buenos Ayres, nor nearer to it on the eastward than the Enseñada of Barragon. This bay was, therefore, fixed upon as the point of debarkation, and every arrangement that could previously be made was pressed forward with expedition, whilst I waited anxiously for the arrival of Brigadier-General Craufurd’s corps, and the fleet with which I had sailed from England.

On the 27th of May, Rear-Admiral Murray and Brigadier-General Craufurd arrived at the mouth of the river; but owing to a prevalence of contrary winds, the expedition did not reach Monte Video until the 14th of June. I immediately determined not to wait the arrival of the convoy from England, as by the general voice of the inhabitants, and of those officers who had passed the winter in the province, the months of July and August were represented as most unfavourable to military operations, on account of the heavy and continual rains which prevail at that season. Having fixed upon Colonia as the place of assembly from which the expedition was to proceed, I sent the troops upwards, in small divisions, on account of the intricate navigation, leaving at Monte Video the 47th regiment, the detachments of the 20th and 21st light dragoons, two companies of the 38th regiment, and a corps of militia, formed by the British merchants, in all composing a garrison of about 1300 men, under the command of Colonel Browne, of the 40th regiment; and after much delay, caused by contrary winds, Rear-Admiral Murray and myself arrived opposite the point of debarkation on the 28th ultimo.

In the morning the fleet stood into the bay, and before night the whole army, consisting as per margin,[16] was landed, without opposition, on the enemy’s coast. The greater part of the next day was occupied in landing artillery, horses, and stores. Immediately on the landing of Brigadier-General Craufurd’s brigade, and the 38th and 87th regiments, I detached Major-General L. Gower with this force and two 3-pounders, to occupy the heights in my front, about five miles distant; and the next morning I proceeded to join him with the rest of the army, four 6-pounders, and two 3-pounders, the remainder of the artillery not being landed. The same day I directed Major-General L. Gower to precede my march with his advanced corps, substituting the 36th and 88th regiments, under Brigadier-General Lumley, for the 38th and 87th regiments; and I left Colonel Mahon, with four troops of the 17th light dragoons, and the 40th regiment, to protect the guns when they should come up, and cover the rear of the army, being principally induced to break my force into these divisions, for the purpose of more readily procuring cover and fuel. On the 1st of July the advanced corps drove a small party of the enemy from the village of Reduction, and took post about two miles beyond it, whilst I occupied the village with the main body. I was now distant about nine miles from the bridge over the Rio Chuello, on the opposite bank of which I understood the enemy had constructed batteries, and intended to make a stand. I determined, therefore, instead of forcing the bridge, to turn the enemy’s line of defence, by marching from our left, and crossing the river in two columns higher up, where it was represented fordable, and continuing to march until I should have got completely to the westward and northward of the town, appuyed my left on the river La Plata, and opened a communication with the fleet. On the 2nd instant, at nine o’clock, Major-General L. Gower marched with his corps, which should now be considered as the right column, and I marched myself at ten, with the intention of uniting our forces that evening in the suburbs of the town. Major-General L. Gower having crossed the river, his leading brigade fell in with a considerable corps of the enemy, under General Liniers himself, which he attacked with great vivacity, completely overthrew it, taking ten pieces of cannon and some prisoners. The Major-General halted on the ground from which he had driven the enemy, waiting my arrival, and sending, at the same time, a summons to General Liniers (No. 1), which was refused on this occasion, as well as the following day, when I sent to him myself (as per No. 2). Owing to the ignorance of my guide, who conducted me by a considerable detour, I did not reach the Major-General until the next day, when I formed my line by placing one of my brigades under Sir Samuel Achmuty, on the left of Brigadier-General Lumley’s, extending it towards the convent of the Recolleta, distant about two miles; and another under Lieutenant-Colonel Guard, on the right, towards the Residencia, whilst Brigadier-General Craufurd’s brigade occupied the central and principal avenues into the town, being distant about three miles from the great square and the fort of Buenos Ayres. In pursuance of my original design, I intended to march the next morning by my left to the convent of Recolleta, which standing on high ground immediately over the river, I could have communicated with the fleet, and landed heavy guns for a vigorous attack of the town, should General Liniers obstinately refuse to surrender it. Upon consulting, however, with Major-General L. Gower, he submitted to me another plan of attack, which as it promised a more expeditious issue, inasmuch as it obviated the necessity of marching to the left, and the delay which would be occasioned by landing heavy guns and erecting batteries, a delay which I the more dreaded on account of the rains having, to all appearance, set in, and the men being in a great degree exposed to the severity of the weather, from the impossibility of conveying camp equipage. I consented, for these reasons, to change my plan, and adopt what seemed to be generally approved by the general officers under me. Besides, the measure of bombardment, or any other measure which might occasion an indiscriminate loss of life, ruin the town, and irritate the people, appeared to me, upon reflection, contrary both to the letter and spirit of my instructions. I hoped also, by this plan, to be able to dislodge those who opposed the progress of his Majesty’s arms, and by driving them to the bottom of the town, there make a number of prisoners, which might be, in our hands, so many pledges for the return of the 71st regiment and the other troops captured with Brigadier-General Beresford, whilst the peaceable inhabitants, and those best disposed towards us, by remaining quietly in their houses, might escape the danger of the attack. The nature of this attack can be best explained by annexing the General Order (No. 3). The result was successful in the principal points, as I obtained possession of the Plaza de Tauros, a strong post on the enemy’s right flank, 32 pieces of ordnance, and a large depôt of ammunition and provisions, as well as the Residencia, another strong post on the enemy’s left, and four pieces of cannon which defended it. But these conquests were purchased with the loss of 2500 men killed, wounded, and prisoners, and amongst the latter Brigadier-General Craufurd and other officers of rank. The conduct of both officers and men in this action has been gallant in the highest degree, and the severity of the loss occasioned solely by the obstinacy of the defence. The enemy had dug ditches across the principal streets, and placed cannon within them: he occupied the flat roofs of all the houses in commanding situations, and from thence, and the windows, poured a destructive fire of musketry, hand-grenades, fire-pots, &c. upon the columns as they advanced; having likewise had the precaution to barricade the doors in so strong a manner as to render them very difficult to force, though the troops had been provided with instruments for that purpose. Every householder, with his negroes, defended his dwelling; and it is, perhaps, not too much to say, that the whole male population of Buenos Ayres was employed in its defence, which very population in the field would probably not have withstood the attack of two British regiments.

On the morning succeeding the attack I received a letter from General Liniers, offering to give up all prisoners taken in the late affair, as well as those taken with Major-General Beresford, if I condescend to relinquish the attack, and withdraw his Majesty’s forces from the province. A correspondence upon this took place, which ended in the treaty I have the honour to transmit.

My reasons for acceding to this negotiation were briefly these:—I had lost in the preceding attack —— men, although I had gained a strong post on the enemy’s right flank, from which I communicated with the fleet, and from which it might be possible to fire heavy cannon on the town, and otherwise annoy it. Yet the enemy’s chief defences were too remote from this point, and too much covered by houses to allow me to hope that I could, in any given time, destroy them by cannon alone, even if the nature of my instructions had not militated against such a measure. General Liniers had likewise acquainted me in his letter, that he could not answer for the lives of his prisoners, if the attack was persisted in; and from everything I have since heard from the officers themselves, I have reason to believe they would all have been sacrificed to the fury of an exasperated rabble. Nothing, therefore, remained to be done offensively, but another attack on the town, conducted in a manner similar to the last; the event of which must have been doubtful, as my force, when collected, did not reach 5000 men; and, if even successful, my loss would probably have rendered that force insufficient to keep the place when taken. If it was deemed fruitless to attempt another attack, there yet remained two modes of retreat, either by treaty, or re-embarking in the face of the enemy. The latter measure would certainly have been attended with additional loss, and the wounded and prisoners of the late affair, as well as the 71st regiment, in all 4000 men, lost for ever to Great Britain. In return for which I should have possessed but a nominal command at Monte Video, a post which can never be considered of any advantage whilst the capital of the province and the great entrepôt of commerce remained in the hands of the enemy.

I determined, therefore, to accede to this treaty, by which I shall be enabled to bring off my own army almost entire, and recover the 71st regiment, a point which my instructions has taught me to consider as of the first importance; and I shall evacuate a province which the force I was authorised to calculate upon could never maintain, and which, from the very hostile disposition of its inhabitants, was in truth not worth maintaining.

I shall dispose of the army in the manner pointed out in my instructions, the particulars of which I shall detail to you from Monte Video, by another man-of-war that will sail from thence with duplicates of these despatches. Trusting that the conduct I have pursued in this difficult situation may meet with the gracious approval of his Majesty,—I have the honour to be, &c.