Neutral Rights and Obligations in the Anglo-Boer War

by Robert Granville Campbell

In the end diplomatic relations were resumed between the two Governments. Holland, after an investigation of the charges against her consul, acquiesced in the action of the Lisbon Government. But the incident served to demonstrate the fact that the Government at Lisbon was aware of the inefficient manner in which the duties of neutrality had been enforced at Lorenzo Marques by the port administration.

From this time on to the close of the war the Portuguese Government displayed greater care in asserting the neutral character of the port. By placing the town under military supervision this purpose was more surely attained, and the only other charge made against Portugal for the failure to perform a neutral duty came from the Transvaal Government, an allegation of a more serious character than any that had been advanced by the English Government. The grounds upon which Portugal granted a privilege of war to one of the belligerents under protest from the other have not been made so clear as the reasons which led to her apparent dereliction of duty at Lorenzo Marques. This incident placed the Portuguese Government in an unfavorable light with regard to its duty in the full and impartial performance of the obligation of neutrality. British troops were allowed to pass across Portuguese territory in order to reach belligerent British territory commanding the Transvaal position on the north. From Rhodesia, the nominal objective point in this movement of troops, the Transvaal might be conveniently invaded from the north, as it was already attacked on the south.

Early in the war the British South Africa Company, a chartered company which was responsible for the administration of the Rhodesian Government, became apprehensive as to the fate of this section of the country should the Boers decide to invade it. Troops had been raised in Rhodesia for the war but were employed outside the colony. It was asserted that this fact had left the province in such an unprotected state that, aside from the fear of a Boer invasion, a Kaffir uprising was imminent.

Mr. Chamberlain had refused to send forces into Rhodesia in December upon the ground that troops could not be spared. But it was finally arranged to send five thousand mounted men, some of them to be enlisted in Rhodesia and all of them to be furnished outside of England. Before the end of January, 1899, a commander had been appointed from the English army, and it was expected that the forces would be upon the borders of Bechuanaland by the end of May.

Difficulty at once arose with reference to the right of passage of these troops, military stores, and in fact a full equipment for warlike purposes. There was not much choice of routes. Those through the Transvaal and through Bechuanaland were closed. The only route left was through the port of Beira. This course necessitated the passage of belligerent troops across two hundred miles of neutral territory controlled by Portugal as territorial sovereign. Beira, situated about four hundred and fifty miles north of Lorenzo Marques, bears nearly the same relation topographically to British Mashonaland and to British Rhodesia that Delagoa Bay does to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. A railway nearing completion formed an almost continuous route from Beira to Salisbury in Rhodesia, and once in the latter province troops would be in a position to invade the Transvaal.

Under ordinary circumstances it would have been a distinct breach of neutrality on the part of Portugal to allow the passage across her territory of the troops of one of the belligerents, since the obvious destination could only be the country of the other belligerent, with whom she was on friendly terms. Portugal had granted to England in 1896 the right of passage for a field force to be used against the natives in Mashonaland.[13] But that was a case of warfare against a savage tribe, and was not to be considered as a reliable precedent for similar action against a civilized State such as the South African Republic.

[Footnote 13: Times Military History of the War in South Africa, Vol. IV p. 365]

The principles of the international law of modern times leave little or no doubt as to the proper course for a neutral to follow in such a case. Oppenheim says: "In contradistinction to the practice of the eighteenth century, it is now generally recognized that a violation of the duty of impartiality is involved when a neutral allows a belligerent the passage of troops or the transport of war material over his territory. And it matters not whether a neutral give such permission to one of the belligerents only, or to both alike."[14] And Lawrence points out that "It is now acknowledged almost universally that a neutral state which permits the passage of any part of a belligerent army through its territory is acting in such a partial manner as to draw down upon itself just reprobation." The permission given of necessity "to further a warlike end" is "therefore inconsistent with the fundamental principle of state neutrality." "These considerations," he says, "have influenced practice during the present century, and the weight of modern precedent is against the grant of passage in any case."[15]

[Footnote 14: International Law (1906), Vol. II, p. 345]

[Footnote 15: Principles of International Law, p. 526. The older writers differed from this view. Grotius maintained the right of passage, even by force; Vattel practically agreed with Grotius that it might be taken by force, but contended that it should be asked and force used only under extreme necessity, or when the refusal was unjust; Wheaton denied that the right of passage was a "perfect right" and consequently could not be enforced against the will of the neutral; Hall, International Law (1880), §219, points out that more recent writers take an opposite view, namely, that a grant of passage is incapable of impartial distribution. See also Wheaton, International Law, §427; Vattel, Droit des gens, III, §110; Calvo, Droit international, 3d Ed., III, §§2344-2347.]