I may observe, in conclusion, that, as regards the effects of the depreciation of silver on a silver-using country, we have, in the case of Mexico, circumstances exactly parallel to those in India, and in the "Times" of October 21st, 1893, a most interesting analysis is given of the report of our consul at Mexico—Mr. Lionel Carden—as regards the effects on that country of a further serious depreciation of silver. Mr. Carden sums up his conclusions on the hypothesis that the present value of the dollar, which is 3s. 1d., falls to 2s. 6d., and proceeds then to examine into the effects of such a fall on the country considered as a whole. He estimates the losses to the Government and the railways which would arise from the sums they have to pay in gold, and then puts against them the advantages that the fall in silver would confer on miners, agriculturists, and manufacturers. His final conclusions are as follows:
"In striking a balance between the advantages and disadvantages arising to different interests in Mexico from a depreciation of silver, it must be borne in mind that the losses which would be sustained by the Government and the railway companies are essentially limited in their amount, whereas the benefits that would accrue to certain of the productive industries are susceptible of indefinite extension. Moreover, an increase in the productiveness of the country would make itself felt at once in an increase of the revenue of the Government, as well as of the railways. The only conclusion, then, at which it is possible to arrive is that a low price of silver, if permanent, would not only not be prejudicial to Mexico as a whole, but would conduce to its ultimate benefit by the stimulus it would afford to the development of its immense agricultural resources."
Yes. The losses from the payments that have to be made in gold are a comparatively speaking fixed quantity, while the gain to the people from cheap silver will yield wide-spreading consequential benefits far beyond the reach of calculation. This, too, is the case as regards India; we require for it a Government which can appreciate, and act up to, this view of the situation.
[61] "Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee appointed to inquire into the Indian Currency, 1893." "Report of Committee appointed to inquire into the Indian Currency, 1893." "Indian Currency Correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State, 1893." "Abstract of the Proceedings of the Council of the Governor-General of India, the Viceregal Lodge, Simla, Monday, June 26th, 1893."
[62] I may mention that formerly anyone could take bullion or ornaments in silver to the mints and change them for rupees.
[63] It is very difficult to form an accurate opinion on this point. Returns seem at first sight very conclusive, but you require a knowledge of facts which the returns do not disclose. For instance, in the Government return quoted in the "Economist" of September 30th, 1893, it would appear that, compared with 1873, there had been an enormous rise in the price of ragi—a millet which is the staple food of the people of Mysore. In the table, the prices of 1873 being taken as equal to 100, the rise from 1876 to 1880 is 209, from 1881 to 1885 the ratio falls to 103, and remains at that till 1890. Then, in 1891, it rises to 138, and in 1892 to 177. From this return the writer in the "Economist" concludes that the purchasing power of the rupee is now about 30 per cent. lower than it was in 1873. But to my mind the rupee price of ragi, judging by the returns and omitting periods of famine and scarcity, has probably only risen 3 per cent. The high price of the 1876-80 period was caused by the great famine, and the price in 1891 is to be accounted for by the partial failure of the ragi crop in that year—the country being on the brink of a famine—and this circumstance of course affected prices in the year following.
[64] The amount that the Government would save is about 1,570,000 Rs. x.
[65] The reader will see that, for the sake of making even figures, I have taken the value of the exports at upwards of eleven millions less than they really are. The return of the trade of British India for 1891-92 is as follows:
| Rs. x | |
|---|---|
| Private imports | 81,310,119 |
| Private exports | 111,179,196 |
| Government imports | 2,844,926 |
| Government exports | 281,082 |
| Total trade | Rs. x 195,615,323 |
The above figures show that—