1372. If two persons, A. and B., were organized exactly alike, educated precisely in the same way, and subjected to the same temptations or incentives, would they not act alike? Would not their acting differently prove that they were not alike in all respects?
1373. It may be said that they are free agents, being endowed with free-will; but if they be perfectly alike and similarly situated, (agreeably to the premises,) their free-will must be perfectly similar; and if not, let it be allowed to be, through God’s will, perfectly similar. Is it in their power to alter the nature of their will, any more than “the colour of their hair.”
1374. If any other being act differently from these, does it not follow that he is differently organized, educated, or situated from them; and that the diversity in one or all of these respects must be proportionable to the degree in which his actions and morals differ from those of A. and B.
1375. But it may be inquired, where is the merit of virtue, or the demerit of vice, if they be the consequences of causes over which we have no control? The reply is, that virtue is an endowment due to the will of Deity, just as the difference between the different races of mankind and the various genera of animals, or between individuals of the same species, must be due to that volition. An analogous idea of the necessity of God’s help to virtue is insisted upon by some of our most respectable and numerous Christian sects. It places virtue in man, so far as it may exist, upon the same basis as in God. It has always been held by all Christians that God can do no wrong; that vice is inconsistent with his nature. The more, then, a man is by nature and education incapable of being vicious, the greater his natural aptitude for virtue, the more he approaches its most perfect exemplification.
1376. But how can the punishment of the wicked be justified under this view of their case? I answer, that it can only be justified in self-defence, for the reformation of the offender, or to prevent the repetition of injury where no other means can be employed, just as killing wild beasts, noxious insects, or our enemies in warfare is justified.
1377. Punishment, unless with a view to prevention or reformation, seems to me diabolic. It seems irreconcilable with the injunction to return good for evil, that the Deity from whom it proceeds should return evil for evil, in excess; that he should, for finite and transient sins, award eternal punishment.
1378. The inference that omniscience and omnipotence could create myriads of beings, foreseeing that they must be subjected to extreme misery for an unlimited time, is irreconcilable with all goodness and omniscience. But it may be demanded, does not the fear of future punishment make mankind more virtuous? The man who avoids a felony solely through fear of future punishment is not the less wicked; he is only a more prudent, or a more cowardly villain. That piety to God and philanthropy are virtues, is most evident; but then these incentives must be disinterested. If Abraham could believe that shedding his son’s blood upon the altar would gratify the Deity, in order to make it a pious or virtuous act, it should have been unaccompanied by any expectation of benefit to himself. He must have had a conception of the Deity fully as bad as that of any heathen, to suppose that the sacrifice would be agreeable to him.
1379. There is, moreover, much reason to infer that a man who could pass his wife as his sister, and send her to a palace in order to gain influence with a king, did not lose sight of himself when he contemplated killing his son to propitiate the King of kings. But no human testimony should induce us to credit such imputations against Jehovah. Nothing is more probable than that priests should invent this absurd fable, and nothing more improbable than that an omniscient God, who could read Abraham’s inmost thoughts, should have found it necessary to ask such a barbarous sacrifice, in order to determine the extent and sincerity of that devotion of which he must have already known the precise limits.