70. Yet from subsequent language in the same paragraph, the idea is suggested of reducing planetary motions to one cause, gravitation! This will be perceived from his language, subjoined as follows:
71. “The best illustration of this is in the case of the doctrine of gravitation. We say that the general phenomena of the universe are explained by it, because it connects, under one head, the whole immense variety of astronomical facts, exhibiting the constant tendency of atoms toward each other in direct proportion to their masses, and in inverse proportion to the squares of their distance.”
72. How can the revolution of a single planet about the sun be explained without the centrifugal or tangential force due to momentum? Were not gravitation resisted by the projectile velocity constituted by motion and vis inertiæ, would not all the planets fall into their suns, respectively?
73. Are there not three essential elements in such orbitual movements,—vis inertiæ, motion, and gravitation? Are not these as necessary to an orbit as three sides are to a triangle? and is it not as great an error to suppose that such movements can continue by the agency of one of them, as to make one right line serve to enclose a superficies?
74. Between two philosophers, both equally learned with Comte, one may be, like him, an atheist, the other, like Newton, a believer in God; and yet, as respects the whole range of positive science, would there be any clashing? They would attribute every thing to the same laws, whether these should be ascribed to a deity or not. The origin of the laws recognised by both would, by one, be ascribed to an inscrutable God; by the other, to inscrutability without a God.
75. Because the movements of the heavenly bodies are ascribed to the three elements above mentioned,—an unknown source of projectile force, vis inertiæ, by which that force is perpetuated, and gravitation, by which it is modified into elliptical, orbitual revolution, operating as laws governing planetary movement,—it does not make the astronomer who adopts this conception less of a theologian; it only makes him a more enlightened theologian. We ascribe less to the special interference of the Creator in proportion as our knowledge enables us to perceive results attained by general laws. This, Comte conceives, causes theists to be less theological, and to lessen what he seems to view as the domain which theology is allowed to have. But is it not more correct to assume that it is only the domain of ignorance which grows less, while that of theology becomes simpler and more correct, but not less extensive? It is not that less is ascribed to God, but that the aggregate is more intelligently ascribed as the laws through which his agency is recognised are fewer.
76. Newton assumed inertia, gravitation, and motion as the foundation of his philosophy; but attributed these fundamental properties, or states of matter, to the will of that governing mind of which he held the existence to be as evident as that of the matter governed. Comte does not consider that there is any positive proof of the existence of such a ruling mind, and does not, therefore, find it necessary to admit the existence of a Deity. Thus, the states or properties above mentioned are, with Newton, proximate, with Comte, ultimate, causes. Hence, when we arrive at the foundation of the Newtonian doctrine, we cannot go deeper without admitting the existence of a God. Without this admission, we involve ourselves in the irremediable darkness of atheism.
77. In this respect, I have always been a follower of Newton. Evidently, both the governing reason and the creation which it rules must have existed from eternity; since, if nothing ever existed exclusively, it must have forever endured, and there never could have been any thing. So, if there ever had been no mind, there never could have been any mind.
78. The human mind, says Comte, by its nature employs, in its progress, three methods of philosophizing,—the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive, differing essentially from each other, and even radically opposed. Hence, he assumes the successive existence of three modes of contemplating the aggregate phenomena of the universe, any one of which excludes the others. The first, “is the point of departure of the human understanding; the third, its ultimate, fixed, definite state; the second, merely a state of transition from the first to the third.”
79. It seems to be assumed that the intellectual progress of the human mind must necessarily be through these three stages. Moreover, it is suggested that each individual, in reviewing the progression of his mind from childhood to mature age, will perceive that he was a theologian in his childhood, a metaphysician in his youth, and a natural philosopher in his manhood. If this did not come from a distinguished philosopher, I should pronounce it ridiculous. If allowed to be so egotistical, I must say that I am not aware that I went through these stages in the different periods of my life.