A General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels - Volume 18 / Historical Sketch of the Progress of Discovery, Navigation, and / Commerce, from the Earliest Records to the Beginning of the Nineteenth / Century, By William Stevenson

by Robert Kerr; William Stevenson

The war with Mithridates employed the attention and the resources of the Romans so completely, that the pirates again infested the Mediterranean seas without control. Their numbers and force were greatly augmented by the destruction of Carthage and Corinth; for the inhabitants of these cities, having neither a place of retreat, nor the means of subsistence, naturally turned their thoughts to piracy, having been accustomed to sea affairs, and to commerce. In this they were encouraged by Mithridates, and assisted by some persons of considerable rank and wealth. The inability of the Romans to attend to them, and the success and encouragement they obtained, induced them to conduct their piracies on a regular, systematic, and extensive plan. Their ships were constantly at sea: all commerce was interrupted; with their 1000 galleys--for so numerous were they--they exercised a complete sovereignty over all the coasts of the Mediterranean. They formed themselves into a kind of commonwealth, selected magistrates and officers, who appointed each fleet its respective station and object, and built watch-towers, arsenals, and magazines. They depended chiefly on Cilicia for the necessary supplies for their fleets. Emboldened by their success, and by the occupation afforded to the Romans by Mithridates, they ravaged the whole line of the Italian coast; sacked the towns and temples, from which they expected a considerable booty; plundered the country seats on the sea-shore; carried off the inhabitants for slaves; blocked up all the ports of the republic; ventured as far as the entrance of the Tiber; sunk part of the Roman fleet at Ostia, and even threatened Rome itself, which they more than once deprived of its ordinary and necessary subsistence. The scarcity of provisions was, indeed, not confined to Rome; but no vessel venturing to sea in the Mediterranean without being captured, it extended to those parts of Asia and Africa which lie on that sea. Their inveteracy, however, was principally directed against the Roman commerce, and the Romans themselves. If any of their captives declared himself to be a Roman, they threw themselves in derision at his feet, begging his pardon, and imploring his protection; but after they had insolently sported with their prisoner, they often dressed him in a toga, and then, casting out a ship's ladder, desired him to return home, and wished him a good journey. If he refused to leap into the sea, they threw him overboard, saying, "that they would not by any means keep a free-born Roman in captivity!"

In order to root out this dreadful evil, Gabinius, the tribune of the people, proposed a law, to form, what he called, the proconsulate of the seas. This law, though vigorously opposed at first, eventually was carried. The person to whom this new office was to be entrusted, was to have maritime power, without control or restriction, over all the seas, from the Pillars of Hercules to the Thracian Bosphorus, and the countries lying on these seas, for fifty miles inland: he was to be empowered to raise as many seamen and troops as he deemed necessary, and to take, out of the public treasury, money sufficient to pay the expence of paying them, equipping the ships, and executing the objects of the law. The proconsulate of the seas was to be vested in the same person for three years.

As Gabinius was the known friend of Pompey, all Pompey's enemies strenuously opposed this law, as evidently intended to confer authority on him; but the people not only passed it, but granted Pompey, who was chosen to fill the office, even more than Gabinius had desired, for they allowed him to equip 500 ships, to raise 120,000 foot, and to select out of the senate twenty senators to act as his lieutenants.

As soon as Pompey was vested with the authority conferred by this law, he put to sea; and, by his prudent and wise measures, not less than by his activity and vigour, within four months (instead of the three years which were allowed him) he freed the seas from pirates, having beaten their fleet in an engagement near the coast of Cilicia, and taken or sunk nearly 1000 vessels, and made himself master of 120 places on the coast, which they had fortified: in the whole of this expedition he did not lose a single ship. In order effectually to prevent the pirates from resuming their depredations, he sent them to people some deserted cities of Cilicia.

It might have been supposed that as the Romans had suffered so much from the pirates, and as Rome itself was dependent for subsistence on foreign supplies of corn, which could not be regularly obtained, while the pirates were masters of the seas, they would have directed their attention more than they did to maritime affairs and commerce, especially after the experience they had had of the public calamities which might thus be averted. This, however, was not the case, even after the war against the pirates, which was so successfully terminated by Pompey; for Pompey's son, who opposed the triumvirate, by leaguing with the pirates, (of what nation we are not informed,) repeatedly, during his warfare, reduced the city of Rome to great straits for want of corn.

As the operations by sea which he carried on, in conjunction with the pirates, are the last recorded in history, by means of which Rome was reduced to such straits, and as this repeated proof of the absolute necessity of rendering her independent of any maritime power for supplies of corn, seems to have been the chief inducement with Augustus to establish regular and powerful corn fleets, we shall notice them in this place, though rather posterior to the period of Roman history at which we have arrived.

The younger Pompey, it would appear, was sensible that his father's fame and fortune had been first established by his success at sea: this induced him to apply himself to maritime affairs, and, when he resolved to oppose the triumvirate, to trust principally to his experience and force by sea, to oblige them to comply with his terms. Accordingly, he built several ships, some of which are said to have been covered with leather: he associated himself with all the pirates he could meet with; and, when sufficiently powerful, he took possession of Sardinia, Sicily, and Corcyra, made himself master of the whole Mediterranean sea, and intercepted all the convoys which were carrying provisions and other necessaries to Rome. The occupation of Sicily enabled him to prevent any corn from being shipped from that island, and to intercept all that came from the eastern ports of the Mediterranean. His possession of Sardinia and Corcyra enabled him to intercept all that came from the west, while he captured all that came from Africa by his squadrons, which were constantly cruising in that direction.

It may easily be imagined, that when Rome was deprived of her supplies of corn from Sicily, Africa, and the Euxine, she could not long subsist, without being threatened with famine: this was actually the case, the inhabitants were near starving, and it became necessary for the triumvirate to relieve them, either by conquering Pompey, or coming to terms with him. But Rome alone did not suffer: the rest of Italy was also deprived, in a great measure, of provisions, and its coasts insulted and plundered. Octavianus, one of the triumvirate, at first resolved, with the advice of Anthony, to raise a naval force, and oppose Pompey; but when he attempted to lay a tax on the inhabitants of Rome and the rest of Italy, though it was to prevent them from starving, they resisted it with so much violence and determination, that he was obliged to abandon the measure.

As, however, the famine still continued, the triumvirate agreed to come to an accommodation with Pompey: the principal terms were, that the latter should retain possession of Sicily, Sardinia,. &c.; and that he should moreover receive Peloponnesus; that he might endeavour to obtain the consulate; that the dignity of Pontifex Maximus should be granted him; that he should be paid 70,000 great sesterces out of his father's confiscated estate; and that such of his companions as chose should be allowed to return. On his part, he promised, that he would no longer interrupt the Roman trade and navigation; that he would no longer build ships, nor make descents on the coasts of Italy, nor receive the slaves who fled to him; and that he would immediately send to Rome the corn he had detained, oblige the Sicilians to pay annually the tribute of corn due to Rome by that island, and clear the seas of all the pirates.

From these terms it may be seen how dependent Rome, even at this period, was on foreign supplies of corn, and how weak she was at sea. Pompey and the triumvirate seem neither to have been sincere in this treaty: the former, who still retained the title of governor of the maritime coasts, had derived too great advantage from his superiority at sea, and his connection with the pirates, easily to relinquish either; while, on the other hand, the triumvirate could not regard themselves as masters of the republic, so long as Pompey had it in his power to starve the city of Rome. They, therefore, soon quarrelled; upon which Pompey caused his old ships to be refitted, and new ones to be built; and, when he had got a sufficient force, he again blocked up the ports of Italy, and reduced the inhabitants of the capital to the utmost distress for want of provisions. Octavianus, (Augustus Cæsar,) to whom the protection of Italy was assigned, had neither the courage nor the means to oppose Pompey, who, probably, would speedily have forced the triumvirate, to grant him conditions still more favourable than the former ones, had it not been for the defection of one of his admirals. As he was an officer of great valour and experience in maritime affairs, and carried over with him the numerous fleet which he commanded, Augustus was emboldened and rendered better able to cope with Pompey by sea. The latter, rather enraged than intimidated by this defection, sent another of his admirals, who had always been jealous of the one who had gone over to Augustus, with a numerous fleet, to ravage the coasts of Italy. On his return, he fell in with a fleet of Augustus, on board of which was his rival. An obstinate battle ensued: at first Pompey's fleet was worsted; but in the issue it was victorious, and the greater number of Augustus' ships were sunk, captured, or driven on shore. As soon as Augustus learnt the issue of this battle, he resolved to sail from Tarentum, where he then was, pass the straits of Messina, and reinforce the shattered remains of his squadron; but, while he was in the straits, his ships were attacked by Pompey himself, and most of them sunk or dashed to pieces: with great difficulty he escaped. He was now in a dreadful situation; without ships or money; while the inhabitants of Rome were on the point of rising against his authority, for want of corn. In this extremity he applied to Anthony, who immediately came to his aid with 300 sail of ships. As Anthony needed land-forces, which, under the present circumstances, were of no use to Augustus, they agreed to an interchange: Augustus gave Anthony two legions; and Anthony, on his part, left with Augustus 100 armed galleys. In addition to these, Octavia obtained from her husband twenty small ships, as a reinforcement to her brother.