On the ensuing morning we had to sustain a fresh attack, as had regularly been the case during the four days we remained in Xochimilco, but which we now determined to quit. Before commencing our march, Cortes drew up the army in an open place a little way out of the town, in which the markets were held, where he made us a speech, in which he expatiated on the dangers we had to encounter in our march, and the strong bodies of the enemy we might expect to oppose our retreat, and then warmly urged us to leave all our plunder and luggage, that we might not be exposed to danger in its defence. We remonstrated, however, that it would be a cowardly act to abandon what we had so hardly won, declaring that we felt confident of being able to defend our persons and property against all assailants. He gave way, therefore, to our wishes, and arranged the order of our march, placing the baggage in the centre, and dividing the cavalry and crossbows between the van and rear guards, as our musketry was now useless for want of powder. The enemy harassed us by continual assaults all the way from Xochimilco to Cuyocan, or Cojohuacan, a city on the borders of the lake, near one of the causeways leading to Mexico, which we found abandoned, and where we took up our quarters for two days, taking care of our wounds, and making arrows for our crossbows. The enemy which had especially obstructed us on this march, consisted of the inhabitants of Xochimilco, Cuyocan, Huitzilopochco, Iztapalapa, Mizquic, and five other towns, all of considerable size, and built on the edge of the lake, near one another, and not far from Mexico. On the third morning we marched for Tlacopan or Tacuba, harassed as usual by the enemy, but our cavalry soon forced them to retire to their canals and ditches. During this march, Cortes attempted to lay an ambush for the enemy, for which purpose he set out with ten horsemen and four servants, but had nearly fallen into a snare himself. Having encountered a party a Mexicans who fled before him, he pursued them too far, and was suddenly surrounded by a large body of warriors, who started out from an ambuscade, and wounded all the horses in the first attack, carrying off two of the attendants of Cortes to be sacrificed at Mexico, the rest of the party escaping with considerable difficulty. Our main body reached Tacuba in safety, with all the baggage; but as Cortes and his party did not appear, we began to entertain suspicions of some misfortune having befallen him. On this account, Alvarado, De Oli, Tapia, and I, with some others, went to look for him in the direction in which we had last seen him. We soon met two of his servants, who informed us of what had happened, and were shortly afterwards joined by Cortes, who appeared extremely sad, and even shed tears.
When we arrived at our quarters in Tacuba, which were in some large enclosed courts, it rained very heavily, and we were obliged to remain exposed for about two hours. On the weather clearing up, the general and his officers, with many of the men who were off duty, went up to the top of the great temple of Tacuba, whence we had a most delightful prospect of the lake, with all its numerous cities and towns, rising as it were out of the water. Innumerable canoes were seen in all directions, some employed in fishing, and others passing with provisions or merchandize of all kinds. We all gave praise to God, who had been pleased to render us the instruments for bringing the numerous inhabitants of so fine a country to the knowledge of his holy name; yet the bloody scenes which we had already experienced in Mexico, filled us with melancholy for the past, and even with some apprehension for the future. These recollections made Cortes exceedingly sad, regretting the many valiant soldiers he had already lost, and the brave men whom he might still expect to fall before he could be able to reduce the great, strong, and populous city of Mexico to submission[11]. Our reverend Father Olmedo, endeavoured to console him, and one of our soldiers observed, that such was the fortune of war, and that our general was in a very different situation from Nero, when he contemplated his capital on fire. Cortes replied, that he felt melancholy while reflecting on the fatigues and dangers we should still have to pass through; but that he should soon take effectual measures for bringing the great object in view to a speedy conclusion. Having no particular purpose to serve by remaining in Tacuba, some of our officers and soldiers proposed to take a view of the causeway where we had suffered so severely on the fatal night of our flight from Mexico; but this was considered dangerous and imprudent. We accordingly proceeded on our march by Escapozalco, which was abandoned by the enemy on our approach, to Terajoccan, which was also deserted, and thence to Coatitlan or Guatitlan, where we arrived excessively fatigued, as it never ceased raining during the whole of that day. We took up our quarters in that place for the night, which was excessively rainy; and, though the enemy gave us some alarms during the night, I can testify that no proper watch was kept, owing to the inclemency of the weather, as my post was not visited either by rounds or corporal. From Coatitlan, we continued our march by a deep miry road, through four or five other towns, all abandoned, and arrived in two days at Aculman or Oculman, in the territory of Tezcuco, where we received the pleasing intelligence that a reinforcement had arrived to us from Spain. Next day we proceeded to Tezcuco, where we arrived worn out with wounds and fatigue, and even diminished in our numbers.
[11] Diaz mentions a poem circulated at the time, as beginning in reference to the melancholy of Cortes on this occasion, somewhat in the following strain:
In Tacuba was Cortes, with many a gallant chief; He thought upon his losses, and bow'd his head with grief.
Soon after our return to Tezcuco, a conspiracy was formed for the assassination of our general, at the head of which was one Antonio de Villafana, an adherent of Velasquez, and some of the other soldiers who had come over with Narvaez, but whose names I do not choose to mention, and the conspirators had even communicated their plan to two principal officers, whom I will not name, one of whom was to have been appointed captain-general on the death of Cortes. They had even arranged matters for the appointment of alguazil-major, alcaldes, regidor, contador, treasurer, veedor, and others of that kind, and of captains and standard-bearer to the army, all from among the soldiers of Narvaez. All the principal adherents of Cortes were to have been put to death, and the conspirators were to have divided our properties, arms, and horses, among themselves. This business was revealed to Cortes, only two days after our return to Tezcuco, by the repentance of one of the conspirators, whom he amply rewarded. The general immediately communicated the intelligence to Alvarado, De Oli, Sandoval, Tapia, Luis Marin, and Pedro de Ircio, who were the two alcaldes for the time, also to me, and to all in whom he reposed confidence. We all accompanied Cortes, well armed, to the quarters of Villafana, where he found him and many others of the conspirators, and took him immediately into custody. The others endeavoured to escape, but were all detained and sent to prison. Cortes took a paper from the bosom of Villafana, having the signatures of all his accomplices; but which he afterwards pretended that Villafana had swallowed, to set the minds of the conspirators at rest, as they were too numerous to be all punished in the present weak state of our army. Villafana was immediately tried, and made a full confession; and his guilt being likewise clearly established by many witnesses, the judges, who were Cortes, the two alcaldes, and De Oli, condemned him to die. Having confessed himself to the reverend Juan Diaz, he was hanged from a window of the apartment. No more of the conspirators were proceeded against; but Cortes thought it prudent to appoint a body guard for his future security, selected from among those who had been with him from the first, of which Antonio de Quinones was made captain.
At this period an order was issued for bringing in all our prisoners to be marked, being the third time since we came to the country. If that operation were unjustly conducted the first time, it was worse the second, and this time worse than ever; for besides the two fifths for the king and Cortes, no less than thirty draughts were made for the captains; besides which, all the handsome females we had given in to be marked, were stolen away, and concealed till it became convenient to produce them.
As the brigantines were entirely finished, and the canal for their passage into the lake was now sufficiently wide and deep for that purpose, Cortes issued orders to all the districts in our alliance, near Tezcuco, to send him, in the course of ten days, 8000 arrow-shafts from each district, made of a particular wood, and as many copper heads. Within the appointed time, the whole number required was brought to head-quarters, all executed better than even the patterns. Captain Pedro Barba, who commanded the crossbows, ordered each of his soldiers to provide two cords and nuts, and to try the range of their bows. Cortes ordered all the cavalry to have their lances new-headed, and to exercise their horses daily. He sent likewise an express to the elder Xicotencatl at Tlascala, otherwise called Don Lorenzo de Vargas, to send 20,000 of the warriors of Tlascala, Huixotzinco and Cholula; and he sent similar orders to Chalco and Tlalmanalco; ordering all our allies to rendezvous at Tezcuco on the day after the festival of the Holy Ghost, 28th April 1521. And on that day, Don Hernandez Ixtlilxochitl of Tezcuco, was to join us with all his forces. Some considerable reinforcements of soldiers, horses, arms, and ammunition had arrived from Spain and other places, so that when mustered mustered on the before-mentioned day by Cortes, in the large enclosures of Tezcuco, our Spanish force amounted to the following number: 84 cavalry, 650 infantry, armed with sword and buckler, or pikes, and 194 musketeers and crossbow-men, in all 928 Spaniards. From this number he selected 12 musketeers or crossbow-men, and 12 of the other infantry, for rowers to each of the vessels, in all 312 men, appointing a captain to each vessel; and he distributed 20 cannoneers through the fleet, which he armed with such guns as we had that were fit for this service. Many of our men had been formerly sailors, yet all were extremely averse from acting as rowers on the present occasion; for which reason the general made inquiry as to those who were natives of sea-ports, or who had formerly been fishers or seafaring men, all of whom he ordered to the oars; and though some of them pled their gentility as an exemption, he would hear of no excuse. By these means he obtained 150 men for this service, who were in fact in a much better situation than we who bore the brunt and danger of the war on land, as will appear in the sequel. When all this was arranged, and the crews embarked along with their commanders, each brigantine hoisted a royal standard, and every one a distinguishing flag. Cortes likewise gave the captains written instructions for their guidance, dividing them into squadrons, each of which was to co-operate with a particular leader of the land forces.
Cortes now issued the following general orders to the army: 1. No person to blaspheme the Lord Jesus, his Virgin Mother, the Holy Apostles, or any of the Saints, under heavy penalties. 2. No soldier to maltreat any of our allies in their persons or properties. 3. No soldier to be absent from quarters on any pretence. 4. Every soldier to keep his arms, both offensive and defensive, in the best order. 5. No soldier to stake his horse or arms in gaming. 6. No soldier to sleep out of his armour, or without his arms beside him, except when disabled by wounds or sickness. Lastly, the penalty of death was denounced for sleeping on guard, for a sentinel quitting his post, for absence from quarters without leave, for quitting the ranks in the field, or for flight in battle.
At this time our allies of Tlascala arrived under the command of Xicotencatl the younger, who was accompanied by his two brothers. Some of the warriors of Huexotzinco and Cholula came along with the Tlascalans, but not in any great numbers[12], yet the alacrity of our allies was such that they joined us a day previous to that which was appointed by Cortes. They marched in with great military parade, each of the chiefs carrying a standard with their national device, a white spread eagle, and they were all in high spirits, shouting out, Castilla! Castilla! Tlascala! Tlascala! From the arrival of their van, till the rear came in, took up three hours. Cortes received them with great courtesy, promising to make them all rich on their return to their native country, and dismissed them with many compliments to their respective quarters.
[12] Clavigero, II. 159, carries the number of allies which joined Cortes on this occasion, to more than 200,000 men. In his enumeration of the several divisions of the army appointed for the investment of Mexico, Diaz makes the Indian allies very little more than 24,000 warriors.--E.
Cortes made the following arrangement of our land army for the investment of Mexico, distributing our forces in three separate divisions, under the respective commands of Alvarado, De Oli, and Sandoval, reserving to himself to act where his presence might be most necessary, and taking in the mean time the command of the fleet. Pedro de Alvarado, under whom I served, had 150 infantry, 30 cavalry, 18 musketeers and crossbow-men, and 8000 Tlascalans, and was ordered to take post at Tacuba, having three captains under his command, his brother Jorge de Alvarado, Pedro Guttierrez, and Andres de Monjara, having each a company of 50 infantry, with a third of the musketeers and crossbow-men, the cavalry being commanded by Alvarado in person.--Christoval de Oli commanded the second division, having under him Andres de Tapia, Francisco Verdugo, and Francisco de Lugo, with 175 infantry, 30 cavalry, 20 musketeers and crossbows, and 8000 of our Indian allies. This division was ordered to take post at Cuyoacan or Cojohuacan.--The third division, under the command of Gonzalo de Sandoval, who had under him captains Luis Marin and Pedro de Ircio, consisted of 150 infantry, 24 cavalry, 14 musketeers and crossbows, and above 8000 Indian warriors, was to take post at Iztapalapa. The division of Alvarado and De Oli were ordered to march from Tezcuco by the right, going round the northern side of the lake, and the third, under Sandoval, by the left, to the south end of the lake; and his march being much shorter, he was ordered to remain in Tezcuco until Cortes should sail out with the fleet[13].