[3] The whole of this topographical account of Mexico and its approaches is added by the editor, and has been placed in the text, distinguished by inverted commas, as too long for a note. A plan is added, constructed from a comparison of the maps in Diaz and Clavigero, both evidently drawn without any actual survey, and corrected by means of the excellent map of the vale of Mexico given by Humboldt. By means of a great drain, made considerably posterior to the conquest, the lake has been greatly diminished in magnitude, insomuch that the city is now above three miles from the lake; so that the accurate map of Humboldt does not now serve for the ancient topography of Mexico and its near environs.--E.
When Cortes brought out his fleet of brigantines upon the lake, he went in the first place to attack an insular rock close beside Mexico, on which a vast number of the inhabitants of that city and other places in the neighbourhood had taken shelter. Immediately on perceiving his intentions, their whole force collected from every part of the lake, and proceeded against him in not less than 4000 large canoes full of warriors. On perceiving this immense number of boats coming to attack him, Cortes withdrew with his brigantines into an open part of the lake, ordering his captains to wait patiently for a breeze of wind which then began to blow. As the enemy supposed that this movement proceeded from fear, they immediately closed up around the flotilla with shouts of triumph. The wind now sprung up, and the whole fleet made sail through the throng of canoes, plying their oars at the same time, and run down and overset great numbers of the Mexican canoes, compelling all the rest to fly for shelter to the recesses and shallows on the borders of the lake. After this, Cortes made sail to Cojohuacan[4], where he was again attacked by the Mexicans, both by means of their canoes on the water, and from their temples on the land: But Cortes brought four guns to bear upon them, by which he did considerable execution. During this action his powder magazine blew up, owing to some mismanagement of the gunners, by which many of his people were wounded. This unfortunate accident obliged him to detach his smallest brigantine to Sandoval for a supply of ammunition. He remained at Cojohuacan for two days with the flotilla, repairing the injury his ship had sustained from the explosion.
[4] It is hard to guess which way the brigantines could get there, as by the maps both of Diaz and Clavigero, the great double causeway of Xoloc or Iztapalapa, ought to have completely prevented his penetrating to that part of the lake. It was probably Xoloc against which this attack was made, and Diaz may have mistaken the name after an interval of fifty-one years; for so long intervened between the siege of Mexico in 1521, and 1572, when he informs us his history was concluded.--E.
When we were assured that the flotilla was out upon the lake, Alvarado marched out with our division to the causeway of Tacuba, as far as the bridge, in which we were constantly engaged with the enemy to very little purpose, except that we repaired the passes in our rear as we advanced, and did not now suffer the cavalry to come upon the causeway, as we had found by experience that they were of very little service, and besides that their horses were exposed to much danger. Finding that he could not sufficiently annoy the enemy in his present post at Iztapalapa, where the Mexicans had possession of the houses which were built in the water, Sandoval advanced by a causeway to a more commanding situation[5]. When this was noticed from Mexico, a large detachment of warriors came over in canoes, with orders to cut the causeway in the rear of our troops. Cortes observed this, and immediately made sail with his vessels to the relief of Sandoval, giving orders at the same time to De Oli to march a body of troops by the causeway for the same purpose. Having relieved Sandoval by these means, Cortes ordered him to remove with his division from Iztapalapa to Tepeaquilla or Tepejacac, where the church of our Lady of Guadalupe now stands, in which many wonderful miracles have been performed.
[5] Perhaps along the mound or causeway of Mexicaltzinco; by which he approached towards the great causeway of Xoloc, and the position of De Oli at Cojohuacan.--E.
As it was impossible for our troops to advance on the causeways, unless their flanks were secured from attacks by water, the flotilla was appointed to this service in three divisions, one of which was attached to each of the three detachments of our land force: Four brigantines being allotted to Alvarado, six to De Oli, and two to Sandoval[6]; twelve in all, the thirteenth having been found too small for service, and was therefore laid up, and her crew distributed to the rest, as twenty men had been already severely wounded in the several vessels. Alvarado now led our division to attack the causeway of Tacuba, placing two brigantines on each flank for our protection. We drove the enemy before us from several of their bridges and barricades; but after fighting the whole day, we were obliged to retreat to our quarters at night, almost all of us wounded by the incessant showers of stones and arrows of the enemy. We were continually assailed on the causeway, by fresh troops of warriors, carrying different banners or devices; and our brigantines were excessively annoyed from the terraces of the houses which stood in the water; and as we could not leave a party to keep possession of what we had acquired during the day, the enemy repossessed themselves of the bridges at night, and repaired and strengthened their parapets and other defences. In some places they deepened the water, digging pits in the shallow places, and placing the canoes in ambush, which they secured against the approach of our brigantines by means of pallisades under water. Every day we were employed in the same manner, driving the enemy before us, and every night we returned to our quarters to bind up our wounds. The cavalry were of no service, on account of the barricades defended by long lances; and the soldiers even did not choose to risk their horses, as their price at this time was from eight hundred to a thousand crowns. One Juan, a soldier from Catalonia, used to heal our wounds by charms and prayers, which by the mercy of God recovered us very fast; and this being observed by our allies, all their wounded men applied to Juan, who had more business on his hands than he was able for. But whether whole or wounded, we were obliged to go out daily against the enemy, as otherwise our companies would have been reduced to less than half their strength. Our ensign was disabled almost every day, as he could not at the same time carry his colours and defend himself from the enemy. We were abundantly supplied with corn, but were much in want of refreshments for the wounded men; our chief resource being tunas or Indian figs, cherries while in season, and a plant called quilities by the natives. The situation of the other two attacks was precisely similar to ours. Every day, when we marched to the attack, a signal was made from the great temple of Tlaltelolco, the great division of Mexico nearest Tacuba, on which the enemy rushed out against us, and were continually relieved by fresh troops, marching out in succession. Finding that we gained nothing by these daily attacks, we changed our plan of operations. On our causeway there was a small open space, on which stood some buildings for religious worship, where we formed a lodgment, and established a post, leaving our cavalry and allies to secure our rear in Tacuba, whence we were supplied with provisions. Though very badly lodged in this place, as every shower of rain came in upon us, we maintained this post and advanced a little towards the city every day, filling up the trenches which intersected the causeway, and pulling down the houses on each side, and using their materials to strengthen our defences. We found it extremely difficult to set the houses on fire, nor could the flames communicate from house to house, as all the houses were separated by canals and ditches. During this operation we were subjected to great danger, as the enemy destroyed us from their terraces when we endeavoured to swim over from the causeway to these detached houses.
[6] Though not mentioned by Diaz, this necessarily implies that one of the bridges of each causeway must have been taken possession of by the Spaniards, to allow the brigantines to get through into those parts of the lake which were intersected by the causeways.--E.
In this manner we gained some ground every day, which we secured by parapets and other defences, and preserved during the night. Every evening at sunset, the company which was first for duty, was entrusted with the advanced post, to which they sent forty men; the second company sent an equal number at midnight, and the relieved guard did not quit their post, but had to remain sleeping on the ground; the third company did the same the same two hours before day-break, and the second now lay down to sleep, so that we now had 120 men on guard. Sometimes our whole detachment had to remain under arms the whole night, especially on the following occasion: We learnt from some of our prisoners, that the Mexicans intended to force our post by a great effort, which would have frustrated the other two attacks. For this purpose, all the warriors of nine towns around the lake, including those of Tacuba, Izcapuzalco, and Tenajocan, were by a joint attack upon our rear to carry off our baggage and destroy our bakery in Tacuba, while the Mexicans were to assail us in front on the causeway. We immediately communicated this intelligence to our cavalry and allies at headquarters, warning them to keep on the alert. In pursuance of this plan, we were attacked both in front and rear for several successive nights, from midnight to day-break. Sometimes the enemy came on with a prodigious noise of shouting and military instruments, and at other times stole upon us in profound silence; but their night attacks were never made with so much resolution as those during the day. Yet we were harassed to death with continual watching, fatigue, and wounds, and constantly exposed to cold winds and almost incessant rain. Our post was reduced to a mere splash of mud and water, and our only food was maize and miserable herbs. When we complained, the only comfort given us by our officers, was that such is the fortune of war. Yet all our efforts, fatigues, and privations, were of little avail; as the parapets we destroyed and the ditches we filled up during the day, were uniformly replaced next night by the enemy.
The destruction of the aqueduct of Chapoltepec, from which so much had been expected, by cutting off the water which supplied the city of Mexico, was unavailing, neither could we starve them into a surrender, as they were regularly supplied with every thing they wanted by means of their canoes from the towns around the lake. In order to prevent this, two of our brigantines were ordered to cruize every night on the lake, to intercept these supplies. This measure answered the purpose in some degree, but not effectually, as some of the canoes escaped into the city every night. At this time the Mexicans laid a plan to surprise our two cruizing brigantines. Having concealed thirty of their largest piraguas among some tall reeds on the borders of the lake, they sent several canoes, as if carrying provisions, to decoy our vessels into the snare, and even fixed a number of large wooden piles under water at the place to which our vessels were to be inveigled. On the appearance of the decoy-canoes, our two vessels made immediately towards them, the canoes rowing away towards the ambush followed by our brigantines. As soon as they arrived at the place, the thirty piraguas immediately surrounded them, and wounded every officer, soldier, and mariner on board, by their first flight of arrows. Our vessels could not move on account of the piles, and the enemy continued the assault with the utmost vigour. One of the captains, named Portilla, was slain, and Captain Pedro Barba, the commander of our crossbows, died of his wounds. This ambush completely succeeded, as the two brigantines fell into the hands of the enemy. They belonged to the principal division of our flotilla, which was commanded by Cortes in person, who was much exasperated by the loss; but he soon repayed the enemy in their own way. He constantly sent out some vessels every night to scour the lake, and on one occasion they brought in some prisoners of consequence, from whom he learnt that the enemy had formed another ambuscade of forty large piraguas and as many canoes. He now laid a plan to turn their schemes against themselves; for which purpose he sent six vessels one night with muffled oars, to conceal themselves in a water-cut at the edge of the lake, covered with bushes and tall reeds, about a quarter of a league from the ambushment of the enemy. A single brigantine was then sent out early in the morning, as if in search of the canoes which carried provisions to Mexico, and having the prisoners on board to point out the place where the enemies fleet lay concealed. The enemy sent as before some loaded canoes to decoy the brigantine towards the ambush, and our vessel pursued them until near the place, where it lay-to, as if fearful to approach. The Mexican fleet now sallied out upon them, and our brigantine rowed away towards the place where the six others were concealed, closely followed up by the enemy. When arrived near enough, the brigantine fired two shots as a signal, on which the other vessels pushed out against the enemy, running down many of their vessels, dispersing all the rest, and making a great number of prisoners. This sickened them at ambushments, and from henceforwards they did not attempt to cross the lake in their canoes so openly.
Our three divisions of the land army continued to pursue their plan for gradually advancing along the causeways. Always as we gained ground, we pulled down the houses on each side, filling up the ditches or canals which intersected the causeways, and strengthening our posts; in which, and in all the operations of the war, we were excellently seconded by our brave Tlascalan allies. On our attack, the Mexicans broke down one of the bridges in the rear of their own barricades and parapets, leaving one narrow passage at a place where the water was very deep as a decoy, and even dug trenches and pitfalls where the water was more shallow, placing pallisades in the deep water to prevent the approach of our vessels, and constructing parapets on both sides of the breach. They had also a number of canoes in readiness to sally out upon us on a concerted signal. When all these preparations were in readiness, they made a combined attack upon us in three several directions. One body advanced towards our rear from the side of Tacuba, a second directly on our front along the causeway from the city, and the third by the ruins of the houses which we had destroyed. We repulsed the enemy on all sides; and one party of us, having forced them from the works at the broken bridge, crossed the water up to our necks at the place they had left open for us, and rashly pushed on to an open place where there were some large temples and towers. We were here assailed on all sides by fresh troops from the houses and terraces, and those whom we pursued faced about and fought us in front. We now found it necessary to retreat, which we did with the utmost order till we came to the pass at the broken bridge, which was occupied by the enemy in canoes; and as the others pressed upon our rear, we were forced to throw ourselves into the lake and to get over any way we could. Those who could not swim got entangled among the concealed ditches and pits in the shallow water, where the enemy closed in upon us, wounding the whole party, and even taking five of our soldiers alive. The vessels which came to our relief were unable to approach, on account of the pallisades, and they lost two of their soldiers on this occasion. It was wonderful we were not all destroyed at this dangerous pass. At one time I was laid hold of by a number of the enemy; but God gave me strength to disengage my arm, and with the assistance of my good sword, I extricated myself from their grasp. Though wounded, I escaped to the dry ground, where I fainted and remained for some time insensible, owing to my great exertions and the loss of blood. When the enemy had me in their clutches, I recommended myself to the aid of God and his blessed Mother, and they heard my prayer: Glory be to them for all their mercies! From the time that we had cleared the flanks of our post by the destruction of the houses, Alvarado had brought a part of his cavalry thither; and one of them, who had crossed along with us at the broken bridge, lost both his horse and his own life. Fortunately all the rest were then with Alvarado in Tacuba; for if they had been with us they must have all been destroyed from the tops of the houses and temples, as the action took place almost within the city of Mexico. The enemy was much elated by the success of this day, and continued to assail our posts day and night. Cortes was much displeased at the defeat we had sustained, which he attributed to our having neglected his orders; which were always to fill up the cuts in the causeway as we advanced, by means of timber and rubbish.