Having drawn together a well armed force of seven hundred men, 370 of whom were cavalry, 170 musqueteers, and 160 armed with pikes, Vaca de Castro appointed captain Francisco de Carvajal serjeant major[10] of his army; the same person who was afterwards maestre de campo general under Gonzalo Pizarro. Carvajal was an officer of great experience, having served above forty years in the army, and was bred in the wars of Italy under the great captain, having risen in that service from the ranks to a lieutenancy. By him all the movements of the army were directed.
[10] The rank of serjeant major in the Spanish service appears to answer to our adjutant, as applied to a battalion: On the present occasion Carvajal may be considered as adjutant general under Vaca de Castro. Maestre de Campo seems equivalent to Major-General.--E.
About this time a message was received by Vaca de Castro from Gonzalo Pizarro, who had just returned to Quito from his disastrous expedition to Los Canelos, formerly related. Gonzalo made offer to the governor to march to his assistance with all the troops he could raise; but de Castro, in answer, after thanking him for his good will, desired him to remain at Quito and on no account to come to the army, as he had hope of bringing Don Diego to terms of accommodation, being only desirous of restoring the country to peace. In this procedure, the governor meant in some measure to mortify the pride of Gonzalo Pizarro; and besides, he feared lest his natural desire of taking revenge for the murder of his brother might prove an invincible obstacle against Don Diego agreeing to any accommodation, who would never venture to submit to any one who was accompanied by Gonzalo Pizarro, whose friends in the royal army were very numerous. Some persons allege that Vaca de Castro was afraid of permitting Gonzalo to join the army, lest they might elect him as their general, as he was greatly beloved by the soldiers. At this time likewise, Vaca de Castro sent orders to those persons who had the charge of the children of the late marquis in San Miguel and Truxillo, to remain with them there till farther orders, and on no account to carry them to Lima; alleging, as a specious pretext, that they were safer there than at Lima.
All his military preparations being completed, Vaca de Castro left Jauja with his army in excellent order, taking the route for Guamanga, as he was informed that Don Diego was in full march to take possession of that city, or to take post at a very important passage of a river in that neighbourhood, which would give great advantage in the future operations of the war to either party which might obtain possession of that post, as Guamanga was surrounded by precipitous rocks and deep vallies, serving as natural fortifications of extremely difficult access. Captain Diego de Royas, who has been formerly mentioned as commanding the advanced guard of the royal army, had already occupied the city of Guamanga; and on receiving intelligence of the rapid march of Don Diego to that place, had fortified himself there as strongly as possible, that he might be able to defend it till the arrival of the army under Vaca de Castro. The governor, therefore, marched with as much celerity as possible, sending on Captain de Castro with his company of musqueteers to take post on a craggy hill of difficult ascent near Guamanga, called Farcu by the Peruvians and Parcos by the Spaniards. Vaca de Castro, on his arrival one evening within two leagues of Guamanga, received information that Don Diego was already in possession of that city, which disappointed him greatly, more especially as the whole of his own troops were not yet come up. Alonso de Alvarado was sent back therefore, to expedite their march, and to bring them on in good order, as the enemy was so near. Some of the rear-guard of the army marched that day above five long leagues, which was a most fatiguing exertion, as the road was full of rocks and steep passes, and they were under the necessity of carrying their arms and accoutrements. Having passed the city, the whole army stood to their arms all night, not having any accurate intelligence of the enemy, who was believed to be nigh. Next day, however, learning by their scouts, who had been above six leagues in advance, that the enemy was still at a considerable distance, the royalists encamped to take some rest.
Receiving more certain information of the situation of the enemy, who were still at the distance of nine leagues from his camp, Vaca de Castro sent a letter to Don Diego by Francisco Ydiaquez, commanding him in his majesty's name to dismiss his army, and to repair to the royal standard, on doing which he should be pardoned for all that was past: But, if he refused, he might expect to be proceeded against with the utmost severity, as a rebel against the king. The governor sent likewise a private soldier who was well acquainted with the country, diguised as an Indian, carrying letters for several gentlemen in the rebel army, offering them an amnesty and large rewards if they would abandon Don Diego. Though this man took every precaution to prevent discovery, his track was noticed in some places in the snow, and he was followed and carried prisoner to Don Diego, who ordered him to be hanged. Don Diego complained loudly of Vaca de Castro for sending spies to corrupt his followers while making offers of accommodation; and drawing out his army in complete order before the governors messengers, he ordered all his officers to prepare for battle, promising that whoever killed any of the hostile inhabitants of the country, should be rewarded with the wife, lands, Indians, and wealth of the slain. He then gave an answer to the governors message, that he would never acknowledge or obey him so long as he was associated with his enemies, Pedro Alvarez Holguin, Alonso de Alvarado, Gomez de Tordoya, Juan de Saavedra, Garcilasso de la Vega, Yllen Suarez de Carvajal, Gomez de Alvarado, and others of that party. That he would never disband his army, unless he received a formal amnesty under the royal sign manual; as he could not give faith to one signed by the Cardinal de Loaysa. That de Castro was much mistaken in supposing any of his army would abandon him, and might therefore prepare for battle, as he was determined to defend the country to his last breath.
On receiving this resolute answer, Vaca de Castro marched his army to a small distance from Guamanga, where the ground was too rough and uneven for his cavalry, and took up a position in a smooth plain named Chupaz, where he remained three days, during all which time it never ceased raining, as it was then the middle of winter, yet the troops were forced to be always under arms and ready for action, as the enemy was very near. He had resolved to give battle, us the enemy obstinately refused all accommodation; yet finding that several persons in his army seemed to hesitate on account of the disapprobation which his majesty had evinced respecting the former battle of Salinas, on which account Ferdinand Pizarro was detained in prison, he judged it proper to take some formal judicial steps, both for his own justification, and to satisfy the scruples of his troops. He pronounced therefore a formal sentence against Don Diego, whom he declared a traitor and rebel, condemning him and all his adherents to death and the confiscation of all their goods. After signing this judicial sentence in the presence of the whole army, he commanded the officers to give him asistance for carrying it into execution.
Next morning, being Saturday, the scouts brought intelligence after mass that the enemy, who had encamped for the night at two short leagues distance, was very near, and in full march towards the left of the royalist camp, advancing by some low hills to avoid a marsh which covered the front of the royalists. Don Diego wished to gain possession of Guamanga before giving battle, and entertained no doubt of being victorious, trusting to his great superiority in artillery over the royalist army. When the two armies were so near that the advanced guards were within musket shot, the governor detached Captain Castro with fifty musqueteers to skirmish with the enemy, while the rest of his troops marched up the slope of a hill on purpose to intercept the march of the rebels. This movement was liable to considerable danger, as Don Diego might have done the royalists much damage by means of his artillery if he had taken advantage of the nature of the ground in proper time; for during this conversion, the royalist infantry were often obliged to halt to recover their order, which was much deranged by the difficulty of the ground. When Carvajal the serjeant-major observed this circumstance, he ordered all the troops to gain the height as quickly as possible without preserving any precise order of march, and to form again when they were arrived at the summit. They accordingly got all up, while Captain Castro and his musqueteers were skirmishing with the troops of Don Diego; who likewise continued his march, and drew up in order of battle.
After the royal army had been marshalled in good order by the serjeant-major, the governor made them a speech, in which he exhorted them to recollect that they were loyal Spaniards who were fighting in the just cause of their sovereign. He told them that the fate of Peru was now in their hands and depended on their courage. If defeated he and they could only expect to be put to death; but if victorious, besides the important service to the king, which they were bound as good and loyal subjects to perform, they would thereby secure the possession of their estates and effects, and to such as had none he would provide amply in the name and by the authority of his majesty, who only desired to preserve the sovereignty of Peru, that he might divide it among those who served him faithfully. In conclusion, he said there needed not a long harangue to encourage gentlemen of honour and brave soldiers to do their duty, whose example he proposed to himself to follow, not pretending to give them one; yet, as a proof that he meant to imitate their bravery, he intended to march at their head and should be among the first to break a lance. They all declared that they would do their duty manfully, and would rather be cut to pieces than allow themselves to be defeated, as they all considered themselves interested in the success of the war on their own accounts, as well as from duty to the king. All the officers earnestly intreated Vaca de Castro not to hazard himself in the front of battle, insisting that he should take post in the rear with thirty horsemen, whence he might send succour to wherever it might be needed. He consented to this, and as the day drew towards a close, being within an hour and a half of sunset, he proposed to postpone the battle till next morning. But Alonso de Alvarado assured him that he would be defeated if he delayed, as the whole army seemed then animated by the best resolution, and it was impossible to say whether some might not change their sentiments during the night. The governor assented to this advice, only saying that he wished to have the power which had been given to Joshua, that he might stop the going down of the sun.
At this time the artillery belonging to Don Diego opened its fire upon the royalists; and as it was dangerous to descend the hill in front towards the enemy, on account of being too much exposed in that direction to their guns, the serjeant-major and Alonso Alvarado directed the army to move by the left, where there was a hollow which led towards the enemy, by which they were protected from the balls which all flew over their heads. The troops marched in the following order. Alonzo de Alvarado was on the right with his troops of horse, having the royal standard carried by Christoval de Barientos; on the left were the other four captains of horse, Pedro Holguin, Gomes Alvarado, Garcilasso de la Vega, and Pedro Anzurez, all at the head of their respective troops in excellent order. Between the two wings of cavalry, the Captains Pedro de Vergara and Juan Velez de Guevara marched with the infantry; and Nunno de Castro marched in front with his musqueteers to begin the battle, with orders to retire when pressed by the enemy under the protection of the main body. The governor, at the earnest entreaty of his officers, remained in the rear guard at the head of thirty horse, at some short distance from the main body, where he could see all that occurred, so as to send assistance where it was wanted, which he did with much judgment.
During the advance of the royalists, the enemy kept up a constant fire of their artillery, but altogether ineffectually, as all their balls flew too high. Don Diego observing this circumstance, suspected that Pedro de Candia the captain of his artillery was gained by the enemy and did this on purpose; for which reason he went to him in great rage and killed him with his own hand. After this he pointed and fired off one of the cannon against a squadron of the royalists, by which shot several of the troopers were killed. Seeing this, and considering that the artillery of the royal army was too insignificant to do much service, Carvajal determined to leave it behind that the army might advance more quickly. At this time Don Diego and his officers had arranged their army in order, the cavalry divided on the two wings, and the infantry in the centre, having their cannon in front, directly over against the only ground by which the royalists could advance to the attack. The rebels believed it would argue timidity in them thus to wait for the enemy, and that it was proper for them to advance and meet them half way. This movement was much against the opinion and advice of Pedro Suarez, serjeant-major to Don Diego, a brave and experienced officer; who remonstrated that, as the enemy had to advance over a plain of considerable extent, they would be greatly injured by the artillery before they could come to the charge, whereas by advancing the troops of Don Diego would shorten this dangerous way for their enemies, and would lose an excellent advantage now in their power. Nothwithstanding this judicious remonstrance the Almagrian army continued to advance, and took post near a rising ground over which the royalists had to march, and after which the rebel artillery could do them very little harm, and was unable to prevent them from charging, as the way between was very short. Suarez was so much dissatisfied at his advice being thus despised, that he set spurs to his horse and galloped over to the royalist army.