As Gonzalo Pizarro was informed that the viceroy augmented his army from time to time, more especially after this successful enterprize, he resolved to march against him without delay; as hardly a day passed in which the viceroy was not joined by soldiers, horses, and arms from Spain, or some of the American colonies, all of which were landed at the port of Tumbez. He was likewise in dread lest some dispatch might arrive from the emperor, favourable to the viceroy, by which his own adherents might be intimidated, and numbers might be induced to change sides. With this view he assembled his army, determined to march in person against the viceroy, and if possible to bring him to action. He issued therefore the proper orders to all his officers, reviewed and mustered his troops, advanced them the necessary funds for taking the field, and sent off the baggage, artillery, ammunition and provisions, with the main body of the army towards Truxillo, remaining behind at Lima with some of his principal officers, to follow in proper time. About this time a vessel arrived from Arequipa with a very seasonable supply of 100,000 crowns; and another vessel from Tierra Firma, belonging to Gonzalo Martel, sent by his wife to enable him to return home. The arrival of these two vessels was very opportune for Gonzalo Pizarro, as they served to transport great quantities of musquets, pikes, ammunition, and other implements of war, together with a guard of an hundred and fifty men, and greatly facilitated the intended expedition against the viceroy.
On quitting Lima, Gonzalo Pizarro thought proper to take the oydor Cepeda and Juan de Caceres the accountant-general along with him, both to give the more eclat and appearance of legal authority to his measures, and on purpose to break up the court of royal audience, as Ortiz de Zarate would then be the only judge remaining at Lima, who was not thought of much importance, as he was in bad health. Besides, Blas de Soto, his brother, had married the daughter of that judge; and although that marriage had been effected contrary to the wish of Ortiz, it was considered as some tie upon his conduct. For greater security, however, Gonzalo used the precaution of carrying the royal seal along with him. Gonzalo Pizarro chose to go by sea; and on leaving Lima, he appointed Lorenzo de Aldana as lieutenant-governor of that city, with a garrison of eighty soldiers, to preserve tranquillity during his absence. This small number was considered sufficient to prevent any attempt towards a revolutionary movement, as most of the inhabitants of Lima accompanied the expedition. Gonzalo embarked in March 1545, and landed at the port of Santa, fifteen leagues south from Truxillo, at which city he arrived on Palm Sunday. He remained at this place for some time, waiting the junction of his troops, sending messages in various directions to expedite their march. After some time, he marched from Truxillo into the province of Collique, where the whole of his army assembled. At this place he reviewed his army, which amounted to above six hundred horse and foot. The troops under the viceroy were nearly as numerous; but those under Gonzalo were much better armed, and better supplied with every thing requisite for war, as well as being all veteran soldiers, accustomed to war and discipline, and well acquainted with all the difficult passes of the country. The troops of the viceroy on the contrary, had for the most part come recently from Spain, were quite unaccustomed to war, and ill armed; besides which their powder was bad in quality.
Gonzalo used every effort to collect provisions and all kinds of necessaries for his army, more especially as he had to pass through a desert country which intervened between the province of Motupe[15] and the city of San Miguel, a distance of twenty-two leagues without any inhabitants, and entirely destitute of water or other means of refreshment, consisting every where of burning sands without shelter from the heat of the sun and almost under the equinoctial line. As this march was necessarily attended with much inconvenience and difficulty, Gonzalo used every proper precaution that his troops might be supplied abundantly with water and other necessaries. For this purpose all the neighbouring Indians were ordered to bring a prodigious quantity of jars and other vessels calculated to contain water. The soldiers were ordered to leave at Motupe all their clothes and baggage of which they were not in immediate want, which were to be brought forward by the Indians. Above all things, it was taken care that a sufficiency of water should accompany the army, both for the troops, and for the horses and other animals. Every thing being in readiness, Gonzalo sent forwards a party of twenty-five horsemen by the ordinary road through the desert, that they might be observed by the scouts belonging to the viceroy, and that he might be led to believe the army came in that direction. He then took a different route through the same desert with the army, marching as expeditiously as possible, every soldier being ordered to carry his provisions along with him on his horse. By these precautions, and the rapidity of the march, the viceroy was not informed of the approach of Gonzalo and his army, till they were very near San Miguel. Immediately on learning their approach, he sounded the alarm, giving out that he intended to meet and give battle to the insurgents; but as soon as his army was drawn out from the city, he took a quite opposite course, directing his march with all possible expedition towards the mountain of Caxas.
[Footnote 15: Named Morrope in modern maps. The desert in the text is of great extent, reaching from the river Leche to the Piura, a distance of above eighty English miles.]
Gonzalo Pizarro got notice of the retreat of the viceroy about four hours afterwards, in consequence of which he made no halt at San Miguel, except to procure guides to direct him in the road which the viceroy had taken. In the first night of this pursuit, the army of Gonzalo marched eight Spanish leagues, or near thirty English miles, and several of the royalists who had lagged behind the rest, together with the whole baggage belonging to the retreating army fell into his hands. Gonzalo hanged such of his prisoners as were most obnoxious to him, and continued the pursuit of the flying royalists with the utmost diligence, through difficult and almost impracticable roads, where no provisions could be procured, always coming up with some of the hindmost of the enemy. Gonzalo likewise sent on several Indians with letters to the principal officers who served under the viceroy, urging them to put him to death, and offering them their pardons for the past and to give them high rewards. He continued the pursuit above fifty leagues or two hundred miles, till at length the horses were no longer able to carry their riders, and the men were incapable of proceeding, both from excessive fatigue and by the failure of provisions. The insurgent army at length arrived at Ayabaca[16], where the hot pursuit of the viceroy was discontinued, and the troops of Gonzalo halted for rest and refreshment. Besides the difficulty of overtaking the royalists, Gonzalo had received assurances from some of the principal followers of the viceroy that they would either put him to death, or deliver him up as a prisoner; and, as this came afterwards to the knowledge of the viceroy, he put several of these officers and gentlemen of his army to death. After Gonzalo had supplied his army with such provisions as could be furnished at Ayabaca, he resumed the pursuit, but with less rapidity than before, and keeping his army always in compact order; yet at this time some of his troops remained behind, partly owing to extreme fatigue, and partly from discontent. Leaving the viceroy to continue his retreat to Quito, and Gonzalo in pursuit, it is proper to mention some events that occurred at this time in other parts of Peru.
[Footnote 16: Notwithstanding the distance mentioned in the text, Ayabaca is only about 60 miles, or fifteen Spanish leagues in a straight line N.N.E. from San Miguel.--E.]
In this march, Gonzalo did not think proper to carry along with his army any of the soldiers belonging to the viceroy whom he had taken during the pursuit, both because he could not confide in them, because he had already a sufficient force in proportion to the enemy, and because provisions were very difficult to be procured, as the viceroy had stripped every place through which he passed as much as possible. For this reason, Gonzalo Pizarro sent back all his prisoners to Truxillo, Lima, or such other places as they thought proper, having in the first place put to death such of their chiefs as he considered most strongly attached to the viceroy. As these soldiers were dispersed over several parts of the country, they began to declaim in favour of the viceroy and against the tyrannical conduct of Gonzalo, and found many persons abundantly disposed to listen to their harangues; both because what they alleged was true in itself, and because most of the Spanish inhabitants of Peru were much inclined to revolution and change of party, especially the soldiery and those who were lazy and unoccupied. The real settlers and principal inhabitants of the cities were quite of an opposite description, being friends of peace and order, as most conducive to their interest and happiness, and necessary to the preservation of their properties, and being more exposed in time of civil war than even the soldiers to be harassed and tormented in many ways, as the ruling party was apt on the slightest pretexts to put them to death on purpose to seize their effects, with which to gratify and reward the partizans of their tyranny and injustice. These seditious discourses were so openly indulged in, that they reached the knowledge of the lieutenants of Gonzalo; who, each in his peculiar jurisdiction, punished the authors as they deemed right. At Lima, to which most of these prisoners had gone, Pedro Martin de Cecilia the provost marshal was a violent partizan of Gonzalo, and caused several of these malecontents to be hanged. Lorenzo de Aldana, who had been left by Gonzalo as lieutenant-governor of Lima, was a prudent man, and conducted himself in a quite different manner, being disinclined from acting with such violence as might occasion displeasure to either party in the sequel; for which reason he used all his influence to prevent putting any one to death, or from injuring any person in any manner. Although he held his office from Gonzalo, he never exerted himself zealously in his service, so that the partizans of that usurper considered him as secretly gained by the other party, more especially as he always behaved well to the known friends of the viceroy. On this account, all these men flocked to Lima, where they believed themselves in greater security than anywhere else. The partizans of Gonzalo, on the other hand, made loud complaints against the favourable behaviour of Aldana to the royalists; and in particular one of the alcaldes of Lima, named Christopher de Burgos, spoke of it so openly that Aldana thought it necessary to give him a public reprimand, and even committed him to prison for some time. Several even went so far as to communicate their suspicions of the fidelity of Aldana to Gonzalo Pizarro by letters, and even persuaded him of the truth of their allegations: But he refrained from manifesting his want of confidence in the lieutenant-governor, considering it dangerous to deprive him of his office while the army was at so great a distance, more especially as Aldana had a respectable military force, and was much esteemed by the citizens of Lima.
We have formerly mentioned that several inhabitants of the city of La Plata in the province of Las Charcas, on receiving orders to that effect from the viceroy, had set out from that city on purpose to offer him their services against Gonzalo; but having learnt his imprisonment while on their way to Lima, they returned to their habitations. Gonzalo Pizarro was particularly displeased with these men, as he expected to have been especially favoured by the inhabitants of his own peculiar district, and sent therefore a person named Francisco de Almendras as lieutenant-governor to La Plata, a coarse brutal fellow without feeling or humanity, and one of the most cruel satellites of his tyrannical usurpation; whom he instructed to be peculiarly watchful of the behaviour of those who had shewn an intention of joining the viceroy, and to make them feel on every opportunity how much he was dissatisfied with their conduct on that occasion. In pursuance of his instructions, Almendras deprived the principal persons among these loyalists of their lands and Indians, and exacted heavy contributions from them towards defraying the expences of the war. He likewise affronted and used them ill on all occasions, and even on very frivolous pretences. One Don Gomez de Luna, a principal person among the loyalists of La Plata, happened one day to observe in conversation at his own house, that the emperor Don Carlos must assuredly at length recover the command over Peru. This loyal sentiment was reported to Almendras, who immediately ordered De Luna to be arrested and thrown into the common prison. The magistrates of the city went in a body to supplicate Almendras either to liberate De Luna, or at least to confine him in a place more conformable to his rank; and as Almendras refused to give a satisfactory answer to their representation, one of the magistrates declared publicly, that, if he would not liberate de Luna, they would do so in spite of him. Almendras dissembled his sentiments at the time, but went next night to the prison, whence he caused De Luna to be taken out to the public square and beheaded.
The inhabitants of the city were exceedingly disgusted by this cruel act of tyranny, which they considered as an outrage against the whole community; and particularly one Diego Centeno was most sensibly affected, as he and De Luna had been extremely intimate. At the commencement of the troubles respecting the obnoxious regulations, Centeno had attached himself to Gonzalo Pizarro, whom he had accompanied to Cuzco, in the capacity of procurator from the province of Las Charcas, being one of the principal persons of his party. Having noticed the bad intentions of Pizarro, and that he did not limit his designs to those objects which he at first proposed, Centeno abandoned the party of Gonzalo and returned to his own house. He now determined to use his utmost endeavours to revenge the cruel death of his friend De Luna, that he might save himself and others from the tyrannous rule of Almendras, and on purpose to restore the country to obedience to its legitimate sovereign. With this view, he communicated his sentiments to some of the principal settlers, among whom were Lopez de Mendoza, Alfonso Perez de Esquivel, Alfonzo de Camargo, Fernando Nunnez de Segura, Lopez de Mendiera, Juan Ortiz de Zarate, and several others whom he believed to have loyal intentions, all of whom he found disposed to second him in executing the enterprize which he had in view. In the prosecution of this purpose, they all assembled one Sunday morning, according to custom, at the house of Almendras, under pretence of accompanying him to church. When all were assembled, although Almendras had a considerable guard, Ceuteno went up to him as if to converse on some affair of moment, and stabbed him repeatedly with his dagger. The conspirators then dragged him out to the public square and cut off his head, declaring him a traitor, and proclaiming that they had done so for the service of the king.
Considering that Almendras was universally detested, the conspirators had not thought it necessary to use any precautions for conciliating the people; yet all the inhabitants declared for the king, and took immediate measures to support his authority and to defend themselves against the resentment of Gonzalo and the insurgents. For this purpose, they elected Centeno as commander in chief of the province; in which capacity he appointed proper persons to be captains of cavalry and infantry under his authority, and used every effort to inlist a body of troops, which he paid out of his own funds, being one of the richest men in the country; but in this he was assisted by the other inhabitants of the province, who contributed towards the expence. Centeno was of an honourable family, being descended from Hernan Centeno who had made himself illustrious in the wars of Castillo. He was about thirty-five years of age, of very agreeable manners, of a liberal disposition, personally brave, of an excellent character and universally respected. At this time he enjoyed a revenue exceeding 80,000 crowns; but about two years afterwards, on the discovery of the famous mines of Potosi, he became possessed of above 100,000 crowns of annual rent by means of his Indians, as his estate lay very near these mines.