Having brought this contrivance to a favourable issue, Verdugo made an agreement with the master and pilot of the vessel, and had every thing that could be useful or necessary carried on board. He then carried all his prisoners in irons in carts or waggons to the shore, and embarked with about twenty soldiers, and a considerable sum of money, partly exacted from the inhabitant, partly from the royal funds belonging to the city, and partly, from his own extensive revenues. Leaving his prisoners still in fetters on the carriages, to be liberated as they best might, he set sail along the coast to the northwards. In the course of his voyage he fell in with and captured a vessel belonging to Bachicao, containing a great deal of valuable articles which that officer had acquired by plunder in Tierra Firma, all of which Verdugo divided among his soldiers. He at first inclined to have landed at Buenaventura, on purpose to join the viceroy; but considering the small amount of his force, and the danger of falling in with the fleet of Gonzalo Pizarro, he directed his course for the province of Nicaragua, where he landed and applied to the principal persons there for assistance against the usurper. Finding small encouragement in that quarter, he addressed himself to the royal audience, which was established on the frontiers of Nicaragua, who promised him protection and aid, and sent for that purpose one of their number, the oydor Ramirez de Alarcon to Nicaragua, with orders to the inhabitants of that city to hold themselves in readiness to march with their arms and horses.
Intelligence was soon received at Panama of the exploit of Verdugo at Truxillo, and his having gone to Nicaragua; and as Hinojosa suspected he might increase his force in that province so as to be enabled to disturb him in the possession of the Tierra Firma, he sent Alfonso Palamino with two ships and an hundred and eighty musqueteers to endeavour to dislodge Verdugo. Palamino easily took possession of the ship belonging to Verdugo; but as the inhabitants of Grenada and Leon, the two principal cities in the province of Nicaragua assembled in arms, under Verdugo and the licentiate Ramirez, to oppose his landing, and were much superior in number to his troops and provided with cavalry, he found himself unable to land with any prospect of success. After waiting some time in vain, he was obliged to sail back to Panama, taking several vessels along with him which he had captured on the coast, and burning several others which he could not carry away.
On the departure of Palomino, Verdugo levied about an hundred well armed men, with whom he resolved to give as much interruption as possible to the schemes of the insurgents in the Tierra Firma. With this view he determined to make an attempt on Nombre de Dios, which he learnt was occupied only by a small detachment, which had no suspicion of being attacked. For this purpose, he fitted out three or four small vessels, in which he embarked his troops on the lake of Nicaragua, whence he descended into the gulf of Mexico by the river Chagre, which discharges the waters of that lake into the Atlantic. Finding some trading vessels at the mouth of that river, he received accurate information from their commanders of the state of affairs in Nombre de Dios, the number of the soldiers which occupied that place, and the different quarters in which they were lodged. Taking some of these mariners along with him as guides, he contrived to arrive at Nombre de Dios undiscovered about midnight, and went immediately to the house of Juan de Zabala, in which the captains Pedro de Cabrera and Hernan Mexia were quartered with some soldiers; who, roused by the noise, put themselves in a state of defence. Verdugo and his people set the house on fire, so that Mexia and his soldiers, who defended the staircase, were constrained to rush from the house to save themselves from the flames; and as the night was exceedingly dark, they escaped unseen, and saved themselves in the woods near Nombre de Dios, whence they escaped across the isthmus to Panama.
Hinojosa was much chagrined at this exploit, and determined on revenge; but as he wished to give his conduct on the occasion some appearance of justice, he directed some of the inhabitants of Nombre de Dios to enter a regular accusation before the Doctor Ribera, the governor of that place, giving an exaggerated account of the insolent invasion of his government by Verdugo, who without any just pretence, had levied contributions, imprisoned the magistrates, and invaded the town of Nombre de Dios on his own private authority. They were likewise instructed to request Ribera to march in person to chastise the insolence of Verdugo, and Hinojosa offered to accompany him on this expedition with his troops. Ribera, who appears to have been then resident in Panama, agreed to all that was desired, and, accepted the proffered military aid to drive Verdugo from his government; on which Hinojosa and his officers swore to obey his orders as their commander on this expedition, and the troops were put in motion to march across the isthmus. On receiving notice of the approach of Hinojosa, Verdugo disposed his troops to defend the place, and caused the inhabitants of Nombre de Dios to take up arms, in addition to his own men. But as it was obvious that the inhabitants shewed no inclination for fighting, Verdugo suspected they might abandon him while engaged, and came therefore to the resolution of abandoning the town, and took post on the shore near his small barks. He waited for Hinojosa in that situation, having some boats in his rear, which he had seized to enable him to secure his retreat in case of necessity. Immediately on his arrival, Hinojosa attacked Verdugo, and several persons were killed at the first brunt. As the inhabitants of Nombre de Dios who were along with Verdugo, observed their governor acting as commander of the adverse party, they withdrew on one side from the engagement into an adjoining wood; by which the soldiers belonging to Verdugo were thrown into disorder, and they were forced to take to their boats and retreat on board their barks.
After this repulse, Verdugo took possession of several ships that lay at anchor near Nombre de Dios, the largest of which he armed with some pieces of artillery and endeavoured to cannonade the town. But finding that he could do very little injury to the place, which was situated in a bottom, and as he was in want of provisions, and most of his soldiers had been left on shore, he retired with his small vessels and the ship he had seized to Carthagena, to await a more favourable opportunity of annoying the insurgents. Having restored Nombre de Dios to order, Ribera and Hinojosa left a sufficient garrison in the place, under the command of Don Pedro de Cabrera and Hernan Mexia, and returned to Panama, where they proposed to wait for such orders as might be sent from Spain respecting the troubles in Peru.
On arriving at Popayan, as formerly related, the viceroy collected all the iron which could be procured in the province, erected forges, and procured workmen, so that in a short time he got two hundred musquets constructed, besides other arms both offensive and defensive, and provided every other species of warlike stores. Learning that the governor, Benalcazar, had detached a brave and experienced officer, named Juan Cabrera, to reduce some refractory Indians, with an hundred and fifty soldiers; the viceroy wrote a letter to Cabrera, in which he gave a detailed account of the insurrection and usurpation of Gonzalo Pizarro, and of his own determination to restore the kingdom of Peru to allegiance whenever he could collect a sufficient number of troops for that purpose. He earnestly intreated therefore, that Cabrera would immediately join him at Popayan with all his men, that they might commence their march together for Quito, to punish the rebellious usurper. To induce compliance, he represented in strong colours to Cabrera, the great and signal service which he had in his power to perform for the sovereign on this occasion; which likewise would be far more advantageous to his own personal interests, than any which could accrue from the expedition in which he was now engaged; as, on the defeat of Pizarro, he would be entitled to partake in the distribution of the lands belonging to Gonzalo and his partizans, and he might depend on being gratified with ample possessions for himself and his followers in the best districts of Peru. Farther to encourage Cabrera, the viceroy informed him of the events which had lately occurred in the south of Peru, where Centeno had erected the royal standard at the head of a respectable force; so that the present conjuncture was extremely favourable for an attack on Gonzalo, who could hardly resist when pressed from both extremities of the kingdom at once; and besides, that the inhabitants of Peru were now quite weary of the tyrannical violence and extortion of Gonzalo, and would doubtless revolt against him on the first favourable opportunity. As an additional inducement to Cabrera to join him, the viceroy sent him an order by which he was authorized to take from the royal coffers at Carthagena, Encelme, Cali, Antiochia, and other places, to the extent of 30,000 pesos for the pay and equipment of his troops; and as Cabrera acted under the orders of Benalcazar, he procured letters to him from that governor by which he was commanded immediately to obey the requisition of the viceroy. On receiving these dispatches, Cabrera immediately secured the funds which he was authorized to take, which he divided among his men, and set out with all possible expedition to join the viceroy at Popayan with an hundred well appointed soldiers. The viceroy had likewise sent orders for reinforcements from the new kingdom of Grenada, the province of Carthagena, and other places, so that his troops daily increased; and having learnt the capture of his brother Vela Nunnez, and the loss of Yllanez and his troops, he had no expectation of procuring any additional reinforcements.
At this time, Gonzalo Pizarro was very anxious to devise some stratagem for inveigling the viceroy into his hands, as he considered his usurpation unsafe so long as that officer remained alive and at the head of a military force. With this view, that the viceroy might return into Peru where he might have it in his power to bring him to action, Gonzalo gave out that he intended to proceed to Las Charcas at the southern extremity of Peru, to repress the disorders occasioned by Centeno, leaving Captain Pedro de Puelles at Quito with three hundred men to oppose the viceroy. He proceeded even ostensibly to take such measures as were proper for executing this design; selecting such troops as were to accompany himself to the south, and those who were to remain at Quito; even distributing money to both divisions, and set off on his march for the south after a general muster and review of his army. Gonzalo contrived that intelligence of these proceedings should be conveyed to the viceroy, by means of a spy in the employment of that officer, who had betrayed his trust, and had even communicated to Gonzalo the cypher which he used in corresponding with his employer. Gonzalo made this person send intelligence to the viceroy of these pretended motions; and Puelles wrote likewise to some friends in Popayan, as if privately to inform them that he was left in the command at Quito with three hundred men, with which he believed himself able to resist all the force the viceroy might be able to bring against him; and these letters were sent purposely in such a manner that they might fall into the hands of the viceroy. Gonzalo likewise took care to spread these reports among the Indians who were present at the review, and who, having seen Gonzalo set off on his march to the south, were perfectly acquainted with the number of troops which accompanied him on the march, and of those which remained under Puelles at Quito. To give the greater appearance of truth to these reports, Gonzalo actually set out on his march; but halted at two or three days journey from Quito, under pretence of falling sick.
On receiving intelligence of these circumstances, which he implicitly believed, the viceroy determined to march from Popayan to Quito, satisfied that he should be easily able to overpower the small force left there under Puelles, who had no means of being reinforced. He accordingly began his march, during which he was unable to procure any intelligence whatever respecting Gonzalo and his troops, so carefully were all the passes guarded to prevent either Christians or Indians from conveying advices on the road towards Popayan. While, on the contrary, Gonzalo procured regular notice of every step taken by the viceroy, by means of the Indians called Cagnares, a cunning and intelligent race. Accordingly, when the viceroy was arrived within a few days march of Quito, Gonzalo returned thither with his troops to join Puelles, and they marched together to meet the viceroy, who was then at Oravalo about twelve leagues from Quito. Although the viceroy was at the head of eight hundred men, and his force increased daily on his approach to Quito, Gonzalo confided in the valour and experience of his troops, among which were many of the principal persons in Peru, his soldiers being inured to war, accustomed to hardships and fatigue, and full of confidence in themselves from the many victories they had gained. Gonzalo did every thing in his power to satisfy his troops of the justice of the cause in which he and they were engaged; representing to them that Peru had been conquered by him and his brothers; recalling to their remembrance the cruelties which had been exercised by the viceroy, particularly in putting to death the commissary Yllan Suarez and several of his own captains. In the next place, he gave an exaggerated picture of the tyrannical conduct of the viceroy during the whole period of his government, owing to which he had been deposed by the royal audience, and sent out of the country to give an account to the king of his conduct: Instead of which, he now endeavoured to disturb the colony by sowing dissensions and encouraging insurrections, and had even levied an army in other provinces, with which he intended to reduce the country under his tyrannous rule, and to ruin all its inhabitants. After a long speech, by which he endeavoured to animate his troops with resentment against the viceroy, they all declared their readiness to march against him and bring him to battle. Some were actuated by interested motives, to prevent the enforcement of the obnoxious regulations; others by a desire of avenging private injuries; and others again by the fear of punishment for having taken up arms. But it is not to be concealed, that the majority acted from dread of the severity of Gonzalo and his officers, who had already put several persons to death, merely for having shewn some degree of coldness or disinclination towards the cause of the insurgents.
On reviewing and mustering his force, Gonzalo found himself at the head of 130 well mounted cavalry, 200 musqueteers, and 350 armed with pikes, or near 700 in all, with abundance of excellent gun-powder[19]. Learning that the viceroy had encamped on the banks of the river about two leagues from Quito, Gonzalo advanced to meet him. Juan de Acosta and Juan Velez de Guevara were his captains of musqueteers, Hernando Bachicao commanded the pikemen, and the horse were led by Pedro de Puelles and Gomez de Alvarado. On this occasion there was no person appointed to the office of major-general, the duties of which Gonzalo chose to execute in person. He detached seventy of his cavalry to occupy a ford of the river, by which he meant to cross over towards the camp of the viceroy, over whom he expected to gain an easy victory. It was now Saturday the 15th of January 1546, and the two armies remained all night so near each other that the advanced posts were able to converse, each calling the other rebels and traitors, those on each side pretending that they only were loyal subjects to the king.
[Footnote 19: According to Garcilasso, the army of Gonzalo on this occasion amounted to 700 men, 200 of whom were armed with firelocks, 350 with pikes, and 150 were cavalry. In the History of America, II. 375, the force under the viceroy is only stated at 400; but both in Zarate and Garcilasso the royalists are mentioned as 800 strong.--E.]