"After the Revolution, several proposals were made in relation to the establishment of a commerce in the South Sea, which were received with approbation; and it is certain that king William gave instructions to Admiral Benbow, when he went out last to the West Indies, to enquire how far any of these projects were feasible. After the breaking out of the last general war, all the world expected that the first thing the maritime powers would have done, would have been sending a squadron to these seas, either for the service of the prince whom they owned as king of Spain, or for their own advantage. The people of this nation, in particular, were so desirous of seeing the war carried on this way, and on this side, that, to give them hopes, and to shew, at the same time, that the legislature approved their sentiments, a bill was brought in and passed, in the House of Lords, for the better carrying on the war in the West Indies, which was lost, however, by a kind of ministerial craft, in the House of Commons; and soon after, for reasons which have never yet been explained to the public, all designs of this nature were laid aside. The only expedition of this nature, during the whole war, was that of the Duke and Duchess, under the command of Captain Woods Rogers, already related, which was fitted out at the expence of some private merchants of Bristol. On the change of ministry, a prodigious clamour was raised on this head, and all of a sudden a resolution was taken to secure all the advantages that could be wished for to this nation from the trade of the South Seas, which ended, however, only in erecting a company under that title. The nation very soon became sensible that this would not do, and therefore, as soon as our disputes with the king of Spain came to a height, in the reign of the late king, George I. a design was immediately set on foot for sending privateers once more into that part of the world, which ended in the expedition of Captain Shelvocke and Captain Clipperton, already related at large.
"By this short deduction of facts, I think it is demonstrably proved, that, in the judgement of this nation, the most probable way of humbling Spain, in case of a war, is to send a squadron into the South Seas, and I will venture to say, that there is one reason why this is now become more expedient than ever, which is, that we are now no longer at liberty to send ships thither in time of peace, as we were before the South Sea Company was erected. It is not therefore at all strange, that as soon as the present war broke out with Spain, the general voice of the nation dictated such an expedition, or that, when they saw it resolved on, and a squadron actually equipped for that service, they very loudly testified their approbation of the scheme. I believe also, my readers will readily give credit to the assertion, when I affirm, that, during the time this squadron lay at Portsmouth, there was a more general expectation of its performing things of the highest consequence for the service of Great Britain, and reducing the enemy to reason.
"It was in the midst of summer, in the year 1740, that this squadron was formed at Portsmouth, at the same time that a great embarkation was preparing for the West Indies, by which the siege of Carthagena was afterwards undertaken, which turned the eyes of the whole world upon that sea-port. At London, every person spoke of the intended expedition to the South Seas as a design that must necessarily be attended with highly advantageous consequences, if properly conducted; and of this there was not made the least doubt, when it was known that Captain Anson was named to the command, because he had shewn himself upon all occasions equally vigilant in his duty, and moderate in the exercise of power, more ready to correct by his own example than by any other sort of reproof, and who, in the course of his services, had acquired the respect of the officers, and the love of the sailors; qualities that rarely meet in one person, and qualities which, without the least contradiction, were ascribed to him.[2]
"Though this expedition was not attended by so great success in the South Seas as was expected, yet the nation in general was far from believing that its comparative failure ought to deter us from the thoughts of such expeditions for the future, since it plainly appeared, that, if the whole squadron had got round along with the commodore into the South Seas, he would have been able to have performed much greater things than any of our commanders had hitherto done in these parts. Neither is it at all clear that the Spaniards are there in a better condition, their coasts better fortified, their garrisons more numerous, or the country in any respect better provided, than when our privateers had formerly so great success in those parts. The sacking of Payta in this expedition proves the contrary, since it was then actually in a worse condition, and less capable of making any resistance, than when formerly taken by Captain Shelvocke. If this expedition had never taken place, we might have been told that it was impracticable, that the Spaniards were grown wiser, that all their ports were well fortified, and any attempt of this kind would be only to sacrifice the lives of such as might be employed in the expedition. But we now know the contrary, and that the Spaniards remained as unguarded, and as little apprehensive as ever; perhaps even the fate of this expedition may have made them less so, insomuch, that were a new project of the same kind to be put in execution, either at public or private expence, there seems next to a moral certainty that it would succeed. Another expedition might, and probably would be attended by fewer difficulties; at least, it certainly might be undertaken at much less expence; and, besides all the advantages resulting to such private persons as became proprietors, this inestimable advantage would accrue to the public, that we should once more have a number of able marines, well acquainted with the navigation of the South Seas, which we never can have by any other means.
"I would not be understood at all to lessen the miseries and distresses of these who were employed in this voyage; and all I would endeavour to aim at is to convince the reader that the difficulties and discouragements met with in this voyage are not sufficient to ground a decisive opinion by the few in opposition to the sentiments of the many, that all attempts on this side ought to be abandoned. And I really think that the setting the difficulties and discouragements encountered by the Centurion in the strongest light, will serve my purpose much better than lessening or extenuating them. For, if after being ruined in a manner by storms, diseases, and hardships, they landed rather skeletons than men, on the island of Juan Fernandez; if, after their long cruize in the South Seas, their distresses came to be as great when they took shelter in the island of Tinian; if the lying at Macao was attended with many inconveniences; if the taking of the Spanish galleon be a thing almost incredible, considering the small number of men, and the condition they were in, who attacked her in the Centurion; if the difficulties they afterwards met with in the river of Canton, and the hazards run by the commodore in visiting the viceroy, and thereby putting himself into the hands of such a people as the Chinese, who could not but be displeased with his proceedings, are circumstances which aggravate the matter: If so perilous a navigation as that from Canton, through the Straits of Sunda, and thence to the Cape of Good Hope, with little or no refreshment, with a crew that wanted it so much, is still more amazing; and if the bringing the ship home from thence, with a crew composed of so many different nations, in the midst of a French war, and without the least assistance from home, swell the whole into a kind of miracle, what does all this prove? Since all this, under God, was entirely owing to the prudence, moderation, and wise conduct of the commanding officer, it certainly proves, if a right choice be made of commanders, that there are no difficulties which may not be overcome, and therefore that the adverse circumstances attending this voyage ought not at all to discourage us.
"For, with the help of the example afforded by Commodore Anson, I presume that there are many officers who would undertake and execute such an expedition, to the honour of their country, and to the advantage of their employers, supposing them to be employed by private persons. This is the right use that might be made of this expedition: an expedition difficult, dangerous, and in a manner impracticable, considered in one light, but equally glorious and successful when considered in another point of view; An expedition that has demonstrated to the whole world that a train of unforeseen and most disastrous accidents may be remedied, and even turned to advantage, by an honest, skilful, brave, experienced, and well-meaning officer; An expedition which shews that there are no hazards, no difficulties, no distresses capable of depressing the courage of English seamen under a proper commander; an expedition which makes it evident that discontent, sedition, and mutiny, do not arise from the restless tempers, intractable dispositions, and unruly behaviour of the English sailors, but purely from the want of prudence, and right management, and, in short, from the want of experience and capacity of such as are entrusted with the command of them; an expedition, in a word, that puts it beyond all doubt that the British nation is, at this day, as capable of undertaking as great things, and of performing them as successfully, as ever were done by their ancestors; and, consequently, an expedition that must convince not only us, but all Europe, that if our maritime force be not employed in undertakings of the most important nature, it is not owing to the degeneracy or our seamen, nor to be imputed to our want of able or daring commanders, which is not my business, and which indeed surpasses my abilities, to discover.
"We are now to close this general subject of circumnavigations, which relates to the whole world. It is true, that all the circumnavigators did not propose, and that several of them did not make, any discoveries; yet all their voyages are of great, though not of equal importance, down to this last. For, by comparing that by Magellan, which was the first, with this by Mr Anson, we shall find them to differ in many respects, especially in the conclusion; that by Mr Anson being by far the longer of the two. Some of them, also, took quite a different route from others. As, for instance, Le Maire and Roggewein, who never ran at all into the northern latitudes, but sailed directly through the South Seas to the coast of New Guinea, and thence to the island of Java; which is a much shorter course than by way of California to the Philippines. From hence it very clearly appears, that the passage to the East Indies by the South Seas is shorter than that by the Cape of Good Hope;[3] of which the reader will be convinced by considering the following particulars. Captain Woods Rogers, in the Duke, sailed From the coast of Ireland and doubled Cape Horn in four months; and Le Maire sailed from Juan Fernandez to New Guinea and the Moluccas in three months; so that this voyage takes up but seven months in the whole; whereas the Dutch, when the chief emporium of their eastern commerce was fixed at Amboina, thought it a good passage thither from Holland, if performed in ten or eleven months.[4] It is from these stupendous voyages, that not only the greatest discoveries have been made in general geography, but from which all future discoveries must be expected; and therefore this ought to be considered as one of the strongest arguments for encouraging such voyages.[5]Harris.
George Anson, the commodore on this expedition, was born in 1697, being the third son of William Anson, Esq. of Shuckborough, in the county of Stafford. Taking an early inclination for the naval service, and after passing through the usual inferior steps, he was appointed second lieutenant of the Hampshire in 1716. He was raised to the rank of master and commander in 1722, and obtained the rank of post captain in 1724, with the command of the Scarborough man-of-war. Between that time and the year 1733, he made three voyages to North Carolina; and having acquired considerable wealth, he appears to have purchased an estate in that colony, where he erected a small town of his own name, which gave the name of Anson County to the surrounding district. In the years 1738 and 1739, he made another voyage to America and the coast of Africa; and, without proceeding to hostilities, removed certain obstructions under which the English trade on the coast of Guinea had suffered from the French.
In the War of the Merchants, as it was called by Sir Robert Walpole, which broke out in 1739 between Britain and Spain, Captain Anson was appointed to the command of the expedition, the narrative of which forms the subject of the present chapter. Immediately after his return to England from this circumnavigation, Captain Anson was made rear-admiral of the blue, and shortly afterwards, one of the commissaries of the Admiralty. In 1746 he was farther promoted to the rank of Vice-admiral; and in the winter of 1746-7, was entrusted with the command of the channel fleet. In May 1747, off Cape Finisterre, he captured six French ships of the line under the command of Admiral Jonquiere, which had been dispatched for the protection of the merchant ships destined for the East and West Indies. On this occasion, when Mons. St George, one of the French captains, surrendered his sword to Admiral Anson, he addressed him in the following terms: Vous avez vaincu L'Invincible, et La Gloire vous suit."You have defeated the Invincible, and Glory follows you:" alluding to two of the French ships, the Invincible and the Gloire, which had surrendered to him.