When, in the latter end of the summer 1739, it was foreseen that a war with Spain was inevitable, it was the opinion of some considerable persons, then trusted with the administration of affairs, that the most prudent step the nation could take, on the breaking out of the war, was attacking that crown in her distant settlements; for by this means, as at that time there was the greatest probability of success, it was supposed that we should cut off the principal resources of the enemy, and should reduce them to the necessity of sincerely desiring a peace, as they would be deprived of the returns of that treasure by which alone they could be enabled to carry on a war.

In pursuance of these sentiments, several projects were examined, and several resolutions were taken by the council. And, in all these deliberations, it was from the first determined, that George Anson, Esq. then captain of the Centurion, should be employed as commander-in-chief of an expedition of this kind: and, he at that time being absent on a cruize, a vessel was dispatched to his station so early as the beginning of September, to order him to return with his ship to Portsmouth. And soon after he came there, that is, on the 10th November following, he received a letter from Sir Charles Wager, directing him to repair to London, and to attend the board of Admiralty; where, when he arrived, he was informed by Sir Charles, that two squadrons would be immediately fitted out for two secret expeditions, which, however, would have some connection with each other; and that he, Mr Anson, was intended to command one of them; and that Mr Cornwall, who hath since lost his life gloriously in defence of his country's honour, was to command the other; that the squadron under Mr Anson was to take on board three independent companies of an hundred men each, and Bland's regiment of foot; that Colonel Bland was likewise to embark with his regiment, and to command the land-forces; and that, as soon as this squadron could be fitted for sea, they were to sail, with express orders to touch at no place till they came to Java-Head in the East-Indies; that they were there only to stop to take in water, and thence to proceed directly to the city of Manilla in Luçonia, one of the Philippine islands; that the other squadron, of equal force with this commanded by Mr Anson, was intended to pass round Cape Horn into the South Seas, to range along that coast; and, after cruizing upon the enemy in those parts, and attempting their settlements, this squadron, in its return, was to rendezvous at Manilla, there to join the squadron under Mr Anson, where they were to refresh their men, and to refit their ships, and perhaps receive orders for other considerable enterprizes.

This scheme was doubtless extremely well projected, and could not but have greatly advanced the public service, and the reputation and fortune of those concerned in its execution; for, had Mr Anson proceeded to Manilla at the time and in the manner proposed by Sir Charles Wager, he would in all probability have arrived there before they had received any advice of the war between us and Spain, and consequently before they had been in the least prepared for the reception of an enemy, or had any apprehensions of their danger. The city of Manilla might well be supposed to have been at that time in the same defenceless condition with all the other Spanish settlements, just at the breaking out of the war; that is, their fortifications neglected, and in many places decayed; their cannon dismounted, or rendered useless by the mouldering of their carriages; their magazines both of military stores and provisions, all empty; their garrisons unpaid, and consequently thin, ill affected, and dispirited; and the royal chests of Peru, whence alone all these disorders could receive redress, drained to the very bottom. This, from the intercepted letters of their viceroys and governors, is well known to have been the defenceless state of Panama, and the other places on the coast of the South Sea, for near a twelvemonth after our declaration of war. And it cannot be supposed that the city of Manilla, removed still farther by almost half the circumference of the globe, should have experienced from the Spanish government a greater share of attention for its security than Panama, and the other important ports in Peru and Chili, on which their possession of that immense empire depends. Indeed, it is now well known that Manilla was at that time incapable of making any considerable defence, and, in all probability, would have surrendered only on the appearance of our squadron before it. The consequence of this city, and the island it stands on, may, in some measure, be estimated from the known healthiness of its air, the excellence of its port and bay, the number and wealth of its inhabitants, and the very extensive and beneficial commerce it carries on to the principal ports in the East-Indies and China, and its exclusive trade to Acapulco; the returns for which alone, being made in silver, are, upon the lowest calculation, not less than three millions of dollars yearly.

On this scheme Sir Charles Wager was so intent, that, on the 18th December, a few days only before this first conference, Mr Anson received an order to take under his command the Argyle, Severn, Pearl, Wager, and Tryal sloop; and other orders were issued to him, in the same month and in December, relating to the victualling of this squadron. But, on attending the Admiralty in the beginning of January, 1740, Mr Anson was informed by Sir Charles Wager, that, for reasons with which he was not acquainted, the expedition to Manilla was laid aside. It may well be conceived that Mr Anson was extremely chagrined at losing the command of so infallible, so honourable, and in every respect so desirable an enterprize; especially as he had already, at a very great expence, made the necessary provision for his own accommodation in this voyage, which he had reason to expect would prove very long. However, to render this appointment more tolerable, Sir Charles Wager informed him that the expedition to the South Sea was still intended; and that he, Mr Anson, and his squadron, as their first destination was now countermanded, should be employed in that service. And, on the 10th January, 1740, he received his commission, appointing him Commander-in-chief of the before-mentioned squadron, the Argyle being in the course of preparation exchanged for the Gloucester, with which he sailed above eight months afterwards from St Helens. On this change of destination, the equipment of the squadron was still prosecuted with as much vigour as ever; and the victualling, and whatever depended on the commodore, was soon so far advanced, that he conceived the ships might be capable of putting to sea the instant he should receive his final orders, of which he was in daily expectation.

At length, on the 28th June, 1740, the Duke of Newcastle, principal secretary of state, delivered to him his majesty's instructions, dated on the 31st of January preceding, with an additional instruction from the lords justices, dated 19th June. On the receipt of these, Mr Anson immediately repaired to Spithead, with a resolution to sail with the first fair wind, flattering himself that all his difficulties were now at an end: for though he knew by the muster that his squadron wanted three hundred men of their complement, a deficiency he had not, with all his assiduity, been able to get supplied, yet as Sir Charles Wager had informed him that an order from the board of Admiralty was sent to Sir John Norris to spare him the numbers which he wanted; he doubted not of its being complied with. But, on his arrival at Portsmouth, he found himself greatly mistaken and disappointed in this persuasion: for, on application, Sir John Norris told him he could spare him none, as he wanted men for his own fleet. This occasioned an inevitable and very considerable delay, and it was the end of July before this deficiency was by any means supplied, and all that was then done was extremely short of his necessities and expectation; for Admiral Balchen, who succeeded to the command at Spithead, after Sir John Norris had sailed to the westward, instead of three hundred sailors which Mr Anson wanted of his complement, ordered on board the squadron an hundred and seventy men only, of which thirty-two were from the hospital and sick-quarters, thirty-seven men from the Salisbury, with three officers and ninety-eight marines of Colonel Lowther's regiment; and these were all that were ever granted to make up the forementioned deficiency.

But the commodore's mortification did not end here. It has been already observed, that it was at first intended that Colonel Bland's regiment, and three independent companies of an hundred men each, should embark as land-forces on board the squadron. But this disposition was now changed; and all the land-forces that were to be allowed were five hundred invalids, to be collected from the out-pensioners of Chelsea College. As these consisted of soldiers, who, from their age, wounds, and other circumstances, were incapable of serving in marching regiments, Mr Anson was much chagrined at having such a decrepid detachment allotted to him; for he was fully persuaded that the greatest part of them would perish long before they could arrive at the scene of action, since the delays he had already experienced necessarily confined his passage round Cape Horn to the most rigorous season of the year. Sir Charles Wager joined in opinion with the commodore, that invalids were by no means proper for this service, and strenuously solicited to have them, exchanged. But he was told, that persons who were considered better judges of soldiers than he or Mr Anson, thought them the properest men that could be employed on this occasion; and, upon this determination, they were ordered on board the squadron on the 5th of August. But, instead of five hundred, there came no more on board than two hundred and fifty-nine; for all those who had limbs and strength to walk out of Portsmouth deserted, leaving only those behind who were literally invalids, most of them being sixty years of age, and some upwards of seventy. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive a more moving scene than the embarkation of these unhappy veterans: they were themselves extremely averse from the service in which they were engaged, and fully apprized of all the disasters they were afterwards exposed to, the apprehensions of which were strongly marked by the concern which appeared in their countenances, which was mixed with no small degree of indignation to be thus hurried from their repose into a fatiguing employ, to which neither the strength of their bodies, nor the vigour of their minds, were any way proportioned; and in which, without seeing the face of an enemy, or in the least promoting the success of the enterprize, they would in all probability uselessly perish by lingering and painful diseases; and this, too, after they had spent the activity and strength of their youth in the service of their country.

I cannot but observe, on this melancholy incident, how extremely unfortunate it was, both to this aged and diseased detachment, and to the expedition in which they were engaged, that, amongst all the out-pensioners of Chelsea College, which were supposed to amount to two thousand men, the most crazy and infirm only should be called out for so laborious and perilous an undertaking; for it was well known, however unfit invalids in general might be for this service, yet, by a prudent choice, there might have been found amongst them five hundred men who had some remains of vigour; and Mr Anson fully expected that the best of them would have been allotted to him; whereas the whole detachment sent seemed to be made up of the most decrepid and miserable objects that could be collected out of the whole body; and by the desertion already mentioned, even these were cleared of the little strength and health which were to be found among them, and he had to take up with such as were much fitter for an infirmary than for any military duty.

It is here also necessary to mention another material particular in the equipment of this squadron. After it was determined that Mr Anson should be sent to the South Sea, it was proposed to Mr Anson to take with him two persons under the denomination of agent-victuallers. Those mentioned for this employment had been formerly in the Spanish American colonies, in the service of the South-Sea Company, and it was supposed, that, by their knowledge and intelligence on that coast, they might often procure provisions for the squadron by compact with the inhabitants, when they were not to be got by force of arms. These agent-victuallers were, for this purpose, to be allowed to carry to the value of fifteen thousand pounds in merchandize on board the squadron, as they represented that it would be much easier to procure provisions in exchange for goods, than for the value of the same goods in money. Whatever colours were given to this scheme, it was difficult to persuade the generality of mankind that it was not principally intended for the enrichment of the agents, by the beneficial commerce they proposed to carry on upon that coast. From the beginning, Mr Anson objected both to the appointment of agent-victuallers and to allowing them to carry a cargo on board the squadron; for he conceived that in those few amicable ports where the squadron might touch, he needed not their assistance to contract for any provisions these places afforded; and, when on the enemy's coast, he did not imagine they could ever procure him the necessaries he should want, unless the military operations of his squadron were to be regulated by the ridiculous views of their trading projects, with which he was resolved not to comply. All that he thought the government ought to have done, of this kind, was to put on board, to the value of two or three thousand pounds, of such goods only as were suitable for the Indians, or the Spanish planters on the less cultivated parts of the coast, as it was in such places only that he considered it might be worth while to truck with the enemy for provisions, and it was sufficiently evident that a very small cargo would suffice for such places.

Although the commodore objected both to the appointment of these officers and to their project, of the ill success of which he had no question, yet, as they had insinuated that their scheme, besides victualling the squadron, might contribute to the settling a trade on that coast which might afterwards be carried on without difficulty, and might become of very considerable national advantage, they were much listened to by several considerable persons; and, of the fifteen thousand pounds, which was to be the amount of their cargo, the government agreed to advance them ten thousand pounds upon imprest, and the remaining five thousand they raised on bottomry bonds, and the goods purchased with this latter sum were all that were put on board the squadron, how much soever their amount might be afterwards magnified by common report. This cargo was shipped at first in the Wager store-ship, and one of the victuallers, no part of it being admitted on board the men-of-war; but, when the commodore was at St Catharine's, he considered, in case the squadron might be separated, that it might be pretended that some of the ships were disappointed of provisions for want of a cargo to truck with, wherefore he distributed some of the least bulky commodities on board the men-of-war, leaving the remainder principally on board the Wager, in which it was lost, and more of the goods perishing, by various accidents to be recited afterwards, and as no part of them being disposed of on the coast, the few that came home to England, when sold, did not produce above a fourth part of the original cost. So true was the commodore's judgment of the event of this project, which had been considered by many as infallibly productive of immense gain.

We return to the transactions at Portsmouth. To supply the place of the two hundred and forty invalids who had deserted, there were ordered on board two hundred and ten marines, drafted from different regiments. These were raw and undisciplined men, just raised, and had scarcely any thing more of the soldier than their regimentals, none of them having been so far trained as to be permitted to fire. The last of these detachments came on board on the 8th August, and on the 10th the squadron dropped down from Spithead to St Helen's, there to wait for a wind to proceed on the expedition. The delays we had already suffered had not yet spent all their influence; for we were now advanced to that season of the year when the westerly winds are usually very prevalent and violent; and it was thought proper that we should put to sea in company with the fleet commanded by Admiral Balchen, and the expedition under Lord Cathcart. As we now made up in all twenty-one sail of men-of-war, and one hundred and twenty-four sail of merchant ships and transports, we had no hopes of getting out of the channel with so large a fleet, without the continuance of a fair wind for a considerable time, and this was what we had every day less and less reason to expect, as the time of the equinox drew near; wherefore our golden dreams and ideal possession of the Peruvian treasures grew every day more faint, and the difficulties and dangers of the passage round Cape Horn, in the winter season, filled our imaginations in their room. It was forty days from our arrival at St Helens to our final departure from that place; and even then, having orders to proceed without Lord Cathcart, we tided down the channel with a contrary wind. But this interval of forty days was not free from the displeasing fatigue of often setting sail, and being as often obliged to return, nor exempt from dangers greater than have been sometimes undergone in surrounding the globe. For the wind coming fair for the first time on the 23d August, we got under sail, and Admiral Balchen shewed himself truly solicitous to have proceeded to sea; but the wind soon returned to its old quarter, and obliged us to put back to St Helens, not without considerable hazard, and some damage received by two of the transports, which ran foul of each other when tacking. We made two or three other attempts to sail, but without any better success; and, on the 6th September, being returned to anchor at St Helens, after one of those fruitless attempts, the wind blew so fresh that the whole fleet had to strike yards and topmasts to prevent drifting: Yet, notwithstanding this precaution, the Centurion drove next evening, and brought both cables a-head, when we were in no small danger of getting foul of the Prince Frederick, a seventy-gun ship, which was moored only a small distance under our stern, but we happily escaped, in consequence of her drifting at the same time, by which she preserved her distance, yet we did not think ourselves safe till we at last let go our sheet anchor, which fortunately brought us up.