It was really wonderful, notwithstanding the severe weather we endured, that no extraordinary accident had happened to any of the squadron since the Gloucester broke her main-yard. But this good fortune now no longer attended us, for, at three next morning, several guns were fired to leeward as signals of distress, on which the commodore made the signal for the squadron to bring to. At day-break we saw the Wager a considerable way to leeward of any of the other ships, and soon perceived that she had lost her mizen-mast, and main topsail-yard. We immediately bore down towards her, and found that this disaster had arisen from the badness of her iron-work, as all the chain plates to windward had given way, in consequence of her having fetched a deep roll. This accident proved the more unfortunate for the Wager, as her captain had been on board the Gloucester ever since the 31st March, and the weather was now too severe to permit of his return. Nor was the Wager the only ship in the squadron that suffered in this tempest; for next day, a signal of distress was made by the Anna pink, and on speaking her, we found she had broken her fore-stay and the gammon of her boltsprit, and was in no small danger of all her masts coming by the board; so that the whole squadron had to bear away to leeward till she made all fast, after which we again hauled upon a wind.
After all our solicitude, and the numerous ills of every kind, to which we had been incessantly exposed for near forty days, we now had great consolation in the hope that our fatigues were drawing to a close, and that we should soon arrive in a more hospitable climate, where we should be amply rewarded for all our past toils and sufferings; for, towards the latter end of March, by our reckoning, we had advanced near ten degrees to the west of the westermost point of Terra del Fuego; and, as this allowance was double what former navigators had thought necessary to compensate the drift of the western current, we esteemed ourselves to be well advanced within the limits of the Southern Pacific, and had been, ever since then, standing to the northward, with as much expedition as the turbulence of the weather and our frequent disasters would permit. On the 13th of April, in addition to our before-mentioned westing, we were only one degree of latitude to the southward of the western entrance into the Straits of Magellan, so that we fully expected in a very few days to experience the celebrated tranquillity of the Pacific Ocean. But these were only delusions, which served to render our disappointment more terrible. On the morning of the 14th, between two and three o'clock, the weather, which till then had been hazy, fortunately cleared up, and the pink made a signal for seeing the land right a-head; and, as it was only two miles distant, we were all under the most dreadful apprehensions of running on shore; which, had either the wind blown from its usual quarter, with its wonted violence, or had not the moon suddenly shone out, not a ship of the whole squadron could possibly have avoided. But the wind, which some hours before blew in squalls from the S.W. had fortunately shifted to W.N.W. by which we were enabled to stand to the southward, and to clear ourselves of this sudden and unexpected danger, and were fortunate enough by noon to have gained an offing of near twenty leagues.
By the latitude of this land we fell in with, it was agreed to be that part of Terra del Fuego, near the south-western outlet of the Straits of Magellan, described in Frezier's chart, and was supposed to be that point which he calls Cape Noir.[1] It was indeed wonderful that the current should have driven us to the eastward with so much strength, for the whole squadron computed that we were ten degrees to the westward of this land; so that in turning, by our reckoning, about nineteen degrees of longitude, we had not in reality advanced half that distance: And now, instead of having our labours and anxieties relieved by approaching a warmer climate, and more tranquil seas, we were forced again to steer southwards, and had again to combat those western blasts which had already so often terrified us; and this too, when we were greatly enfeebled by our men falling sick and dying apace, and when our spirits, dejected by long continuance at sea and by this severe disappointment, were now much less capable of supporting us through the various difficulties and dangers, which we could not but look for in this new and arduous undertaking. Added to all this, we were sore discouraged by the diminution in the strength of the squadron; for, three days before this, we had lost sight of the Severn and Pearl in the morning, and, though we spread our ships, and beat about for them for some time, we never saw them more; whence we apprehended that they also had fallen in with this land in the night, and being less favoured by the wind and the moon, might have perished by running on shore. Full of these desponding thoughts and gloomy presages, we stood away to the S.W. prepared, by our late disappointment, how large an allowance soever we made in our westing for the drift of the current from the westward, that we might still find it insufficient upon a second trial.
Footnote 1: [(return)]
Cape Noir, is a small island off the western coast of Terra del Fuego, is in lat. 54° 28' S. long, 78° 40' W.E.
SECTION IX.
Observations and Directions for facilitating the Passage of future Navigators round Cape Horn.
The improper season of the year in which we attempted to double Cape Horn, and to which is to be imputed the before-recited disappointment, in falling in with Terra del Fuego, when we reckoned ourselves above an hundred leagues to the westward of that coast, and consequently well advanced into the Pacific Ocean, to which we were necessitated by our too late departure from England, was the fatal source of all the misfortunes we afterwards experienced. For, from hence proceeded the separation of our ships, the destruction of so many of our people, the ruin of our project against Baldivia, and of all our other views on the Spanish settlements, and the reduction of our squadron, from the formidable condition in which it passed the Straits of Le Maire, to a couple of shattered half-manned cruizers and a sloop, so exceedingly disabled that, in many climates, they scarcely durst have put to sea. To prevent, therefore, as much as in me lies, the recurrence of similar calamities to all ships bound hereafter to the South Seas, I think it my duty to insert in this place such observations and directions, as either my own experience and reflection, or the conversation of the most skilful navigators on board the squadron, could furnish me with, as to the most eligible manner of doubling Cape Horn, whether in regard to the season of the year, the course proper to be steered, or the places of refreshment both on the eastern and western sides of South America.
To begin with the proper place for refreshment on the eastern side of South America. For this purpose the island of St Catharines has been usually recommended by former writers, and on their authority we put in there; but the treatment we experienced, and the small store of refreshments we could procure their are sufficient reasons to render all ships very cautious in future how they trust to the government of Don Jose Sylva de Paz; for they may assuredly depend on having their strength, condition, and designs betrayed to the Spaniards, as far as the knowledge the governor can procure of these particulars may enable him. As this treacherous conduct was inspired by the views of private gain, in the illicit commerce carried on to the river Plate, rather than by any natural affection between the Portuguese and Spaniards, the same perfidy may perhaps be expected from most of the governors on the coast of Brazil, since these smuggling engagements are doubtless very general and extensive; and, though the governors themselves should detest so faithless a procedure, yet, as ships are perpetually passing from one or other of the Brazilian ports to the Rio Plata, the Spaniards could scarcely fail of receiving intelligence, by this means, of any British ships being on the coast; and, however imperfect such intelligence might be, it might prove injurious to the views and interests of cruizers thus discovered.
As the Spanish trade in the South Seas is all in one direction, from north to south, or the direct reverse, with very little deviation to the eastward or westward, it is in the power, of two or three cruisers, properly stationed on different parts of this track, to possess themselves of every ship that puts to sea. This, however, can only be the case so long as they continue concealed from the neighbouring coast; for, the moment that an enemy is known to be in these seas, all navigation is prohibited, and all chance of capture is consequently at an end; as the Spaniards, well aware of these advantages to an enemy, send expresses all along the coast, and lay a general embargo on all trade; which measure they know will not only prevent their vessels from being taken, but must soon oblige all cruisers, that have not sufficient strength to attempt their settlements on shore, to quit these seas for want of provisions. Hence the great importance of carefully concealing all expeditions of this kind is quite evident; and hence too it is obvious how extremely prejudicial such intelligence must prove as that communicated by the Portuguese to the Spaniards in our case, in consequence of touching at the ports of Brazil. Yet it will often happen that ships, bound beyond Cape Horn, may be obliged to call there for wood, water, and other refreshments; in which case, St Catharines is the very last place I would recommend; both because the proper animals for a live stock at sea, as hogs, sheep, and fowls, are not to be procured there, for want of which we found ourselves greatly distressed, being reduced to live almost entirely on salt provisions; and because, from that port being nearer the Rio Plata than many others of the Portuguese settlements, the inducements and conveniences for betraying us to the Spaniards were so much the stronger. The place I would recommend is Rio Janeiro, where two of our squadron put in, after separating from us in passing Cape Horn. At this place, as I was informed by a gentleman on board one of these ships, any quantity of hogs and poultry can be procured; and as it is more distant from the Rio Plata, the difficulty of sending intelligence to the Spaniards is somewhat increased, and consequently the chance of continuing there undiscovered is so much the greater. Other measures, which may effectually obviate all these embarrassments, will be considered more at large hereafter.