[27] It ought, however, to be recollected, that though Shalauroff is conceived never to have doubled Shelatskoi Noss, he nevertheless does not appear to have considered there was any particular difficulty in doing so. In his first attempt to sail from the Kovyma to the Eastern Ocean, he was necessitated, by contrary winds, and the too far advanced season of the year, to seek for a watering-place, before having reached that cape. In the following year, again, he was frustrated by want of provisions, and a mutiny of his crew, which forced him to return to the Lena. The progress of his last enterprise is somewhat uncertain, as neither he nor any of his crew ever returned. But there are tolerably good reasons for believing, that, at all events, he had surmounted the navigation of this cape, if not for the opinion, that he actually accomplished the chief object of his voyage, by bringing his vessel to the mouth of the Anadir, where, it is on the whole, most probable, they were killed by the Tschutski. This last circumstance, however, it is to be allowed Mr Coxe, affords no decisive proof that they had doubled the eastern extremity of Asia, for it is possible they might have reached the Anadir by a journey over land. After all, then, we are forced to revert to Deshneff's voyage as the solitary evidence, and that too but imperfectly elucidated, of the practicability of reaching the Eastern Ocean from the north coast of Asia.--E.
The continent left undetermined in our chart between Cape North, and the mouth of the Kovyma is, in longitudinal extent, one hundred and twenty-five leagues. One-third, or about forty leagues, of this distance, from the Kovyma eastward, was explored in the year 1723, by a sinbo-jarskoi of Jakutz, whose name was Feodor Amossoff, by whom Mr Muller was informed, that its direction was to the eastward. It is said to have been since accurately surveyed by Shalauroff, whose chart makes it trend to the N.E. by E., as far as the Shelatskoi Noss, which he places about forty-three leagues to the eastward of the Kovyma. The space between this Noss and Cape North, about eighty-two leagues, is therefore the only part of the Russian empire that now remains unascertained.
But if the river Kovyma be erroneously situated with respect to its longitude, as well as in its latitude, a supposition for which probable grounds are not wanting, the extent of the unexplored coast will become proportionably diminished. The reasons which incline me to believe that the mouth of this river is placed in the Russian charts much too far to the westward, are as follow: First, because the accounts that are given of the navigation of the Frozen Sea from that river, round the N.E. point of Asia to the gulf of Anadir, do not accord with the supposed distance between those places. Secondly, because the distance over land from the Kovyma to the Anadir is represented by the early Russian travellers as a journey easily performed, and of no very extraordinary length. Thirdly, because the coast from the Shelatskoi Noss of Shalauroff[28] seems to trend directly S.E. to the East Cape. If this be so, it will follow, that as we were probably not more than 1° to the southward of Shelatskoi Noss, only sixty miles of the Asiatic coast remain unascertained.[29]
[28] See chart in Coxe's Account of Russian Discoveries.
[29] Here, it is not unlikely, some readers will feel regret, that a greater sacrifice was not made, or a longer continued effort practised, or a renewed attempt hazarded, in order to overcome so inconsiderable a space, and so to double Shelatskoi Noss, whence, it may be thought, there could have been comparatively little difficulty in prosecuting the object of the voyage. The feeling is not unreasonable, provided it be not made the basis of any thing like censure on the management of the undertaking; in which case, it must soon give way to the conviction of the superior good sense, and the higher interest (excluding altogether, which is manifestly inhuman, every concern for the persons immediately engaged in the enterprise) displayed by the determination to abandon the attempt. To the force of this conviction, it may be necessary to add the very material consideration, that, even had it been any way practicable to double the cape in question, and to reach the Lena in the same track as Shalauroff, there would have still remained the space betwixt that river and Archangel, which, though undoubtedly to a great degree explored, does not appear to have been ever altogether navigated. To the merely fanciful caviller at the result of this attempt, it would be a prostitution of time and patience, even if one had both in the requisite quantity, to offer a reply. But the observations which Captain King immediately makes on this subject, will probably obviate any objection which the most sanguine mind will be disposed to entertain, and perhaps there was little occasion to subjoin a single remark to his opinion.--E.
Had Captain Cook lived to this period of our voyage, and experienced, in a second attempt, the impracticability of a N.E. or N.W. passage from the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean, he would doubtless have laid before the public, in one connected view, an account of the obstacles which defeated this, the primary object of our expedition, together with his observations on a subject of such magnitude, and which had engaged the attention and divided the opinions of philosophers and navigators for upward of two hundred years. I am very sensible how unequal I am to the task of supplying this deficiency; but that the expectations of the reader may not be wholly disappointed, I must beg his candid acceptance of the following observations, as well as of those I have already ventured to offer him, relative to the extent of the N.E. coast of Asia.
The evidence that has been so fully and judiciously stated in the introduction, amounts to the highest degree of probability that a N.W. passage from the Atlantic into the Pacific Ocean, cannot exist to the southward of 65° of latitude. If then there exist a passage, it must be either through Baffin's Bay, or round by the north of Greenland, in the western hemisphere, or else through the Frozen Ocean, to the northward of Siberia, in the eastern; and on whichever side it lies, the navigator must necessarily pass through Beering's Strait. The impracticability of penetrating into the Atlantic on either side, through the strait, is therefore all that remains to be submitted to the consideration of the public.
As far as our experience went, it appears, that the sea to the north of Beering's Strait is clearer of ice in August than in July, and perhaps in a part of September it may be still more free. But after the equinox the days shorten so fast, that no farther thaw can be expected; and we cannot rationally allow so great an effect to the warm weather in the first half of September, as to imagine it capable of dispersing the ice from the most northern parts of the American coast. But admitting this to be possible, it must at least be granted, that it would be madness to attempt to run from the Icy Cape to the known parts of Baffin's Bay, (a distance of four hundred and twenty leagues), in so short a time as that passage can be supposed to continue open.[30]
[30] This is the only point on which, it seems possible, to question the reasoning of Captain King, and that altogether on the ground of Mr McKenzie's discovery, which of course was not known to that officer. In virtue of that discovery, it seems obvious enough, that the implied necessity of the run from the Icy Cape to Baffin's Bay in one short season, according to the above argument, is reduced; though it would be erroneous, to say, that the importance of the discovery is such as very materially to modify the occasion for so great a navigation at one stretch. But enough perhaps has been said on a subject, which can scarcely be expected to claim more attention than it has done already, or which, if it be yet destined to prompt to farther undertakings, will do so for some such reasons, and on such grounds, as were formerly adverted to.--E.
Upon the Asiatic side, there appears still less probability of success, both from what came to our own knowledge, with respect to the state of the sea to the southward of Cape North, and also from what we learn from the experience of the[31] lieutenants under Beering's direction, and the journal of Shalauroff, in regard to that on the north of Siberia.