The battles of the British Army

by Robert Melvin Blackwood

About the 12th June the claimant commenced his march. His army at starting consisted of 2500 cavalry, of whom only 900 were regulars, the rest being Khazadars, or mounted militia; ten regiments of infantry, varying in strength from 350 to 500 men; and 5 batteries, including one mule battery, with about 30 guns. Roughly, he had altogether between 7000 and 8000 men, and when it is remembered how hardy and resolute the average Afghan is, this in itself was a fairly formidable enemy that had set its mask towards the capital of Kandahar.

Hearing of the advance of Ayoob, British forces were at once posted to various parts of the country to obstruct the journey forward, but it was not to be; for, as was afterwards discovered, the unusual precedent was to present itself to Britain of her beginning a campaign in very bad fashion and finishing up brilliantly.

We have already referred to the strength of the forces which Ayoob Khan was to lead, and with these he made splendid progress on his journey to the capital. The obstructions which were put in his way were easily overcome, and the defeat of General Burrows was one of Ayoob’s greatest triumphs of the campaign.

By about 20th July Kandahar was occupied by about 4000 British troops, and on the 9th August General Roberts, according to orders, started his famous march from Cabul to relieve Kandahar.

About this time Ayoob Khan’s army was considerably strengthened by Ghilzais, having an army then under his control of nearly 20,000. But the real crisis was only brewing, and the splendid skill and resource of that ablest of British generals, Sir Frederick Roberts, was soon to be rewarded in the splendid triumph of Mazra.

The arrangements made by General Roberts prior to setting out on his famous mission to Kandahar, were of the most complete order, and he led in round numbers fully 10,000 troops to the scene of hostilities. Of these, close on 2000 were Europeans, and 8000 camp followers. General Roberts took with him a certain amount of European stores, such as rum, tea, and five days’ flour, but trusted largely for other supplies to the food and forage to be obtained on the line of march. But even this was not left to chance, and to facilitate the General’s obtaining such supplies, the Ameer sent with him several chiefs.

It was indeed a curious sight as the troops plodded onward, eager for the fray, for, in view of the difficulty of the road, the General took no wheeled vehicles with him, and even the guns were mounted on mules and elephants. But the commander’s foresight as to the difficulties he would have to encounter did not end here, and knowing that the ordinary road for supplies might be exhausted by the previous passage of troops and the presence of large bodies of insurgents, he changed from this route, and marched by the Logur Valley, which had been comparatively untouched. Although this road had the small disadvantage of hindering a couple of days longer the progress of the army by the ordinary route, it brought him into contact with the latter again a short distance before reaching Ghuzni. Here some opposition was anticipated, but, notwithstanding, none was experienced, and the army continued its march unmolested.

General Roberts accomplished this march, which must, reckoning his detour, have been little less than 370 miles, without any opposition, in 24 days, being an average of 14½ miles a day. Considering the difficulties that had to be encountered on the way, this was splendid progress. Picking up the garrison of 1100 men at Khelat-i-ghilzai, he arrived at Kandahar on August 31. Here was a feat almost unparalleled in history, and reflecting the highest credit on the troops, and their skilful, gallant and energetic commander.

The news of General Roberts’ approach soon spread, and Ayoob Khan, knowing well apparently what he had to face in furtherance of his desires before referred to, at once made an effort to open communications with him. General Roberts, however, having in view the whole situation and the nature of the negotiations, was entirely against this course, and would hear of nothing but unconditional surrender from the other side, and also the surrender of such prisoners as had been previously taken in the course of engagements.

The General then proceeded to encamp, and prepared for the coming battle. Passing round the northern wall of Kandahar, he encamped between the city and the enemy’s position. The British General was continually on the alert, and in the determination not to leave a stone unturned to accomplish his purpose, he immediately sent out his cavalry to reconnoitre. The main reason for this action was the fear that the Afghans, after hearing of the way their leader’s attempt at negotiations had been received, would retreat without fighting, and thus prolong the trouble, another prominent reason being General Roberts’ repeated experience of the moral effect of a prompt blow. In furtherance of his designs, Roberts determined to give battle the very next day.