The battles of the British Army

by Robert Melvin Blackwood

In 1899, however, the name of the Mullah began to be first heard. In that year Haji Mohammed Abdullah, a strict Moslem and Somali patriot, started a fanatical movement in the Dolbahanta country against both British and Abyssinian rule.

For several months, however, apathy marked the attitude of the British Government towards the Mullah and his following. It was thought that the rebellion would in all probability come to nothing, and nothing was accordingly done to check it. The issue proved the contrary, and as the Mullah’s following increased and he now and again moved within a threatening distance of Berbera, the principal port, it was felt that something must be done. The Abyssinians were the first to make a move, and, massing a large army, they fought a sanguinary battle in the Ogaden country against the forces of the Mullah at Jig-gigga. The immediate outcome of this engagement was to drive the Mullah towards Berbera, and once more his presence in the vicinity, and his frequent daring raids, had the affect of unsettling the countryside.

Accordingly, in 1901, Colonel Swayne, the Consul General of the Protectorate, took the field with a small force, but with most unfortunate results. It has been suggested that not only was the force at Colonel Swayne’s disposal totally inadequate, but that his appeals to the Foreign Office did not receive the backing they merited; in any event, disaster overtook the small expeditionary force. Not at first, however. On June 1st the column reached Sanala, and captured much of the enemy’s live stock. Leaving a Zareba under Captain Macneil with 300 men, Colonel Swayne moved against the Mullah’s camp at Yahel. The Zareba meantime was fiercely attacked, but gallantly defended, and the enemy driven off. Further operations resulted in the break up of the Mullah’s force, but the Mullah himself escaped across the Haud desert, where pursuit was, under the circumstances, impossible.

A period of comparative quiet followed, extending to nearly six months, but at length, in December, 1901, the Mullah once more resumed his operations against the friendly tribes. Colonel Swayne again got together a force, but while operating between Bohotte and Mudug sustained a severe reverse at Erego. Two officers, Colonel Phillips and Captain Angus, with 50 men, were killed, and the British wounded numbered over 100. The force was attacked in the thick bush, and the Somali levies were severely shaken by the savage onslaught of the Mullah’s men. Under the circumstances Colonels Swayne and Cobbe, the latter wounded in the engagement, decided to retreat to Bohotte.

Not a little anxiety was occasioned at home over this setback, and the immediate outcome of Colonel Swayne’s urgent entreaty for more men was the despatch of large reinforcements under General Manning. Such measures were felt to be especially necessary, as a Hungarian adventurer (“of the worst type,” says one account) was reported to be directing the Mullah’s forces, and would assuredly make the most of the British reverse. This report was, however, discredited. In any event, large reinforcements were now despatched to Berbera; Bombay Grenadiers from Aden, and Bombay Infantry from Simla, Soudanese and Sikhs, with maxims and many extra officers—all were hastened to the scene of war.

General Manning himself set foot in Berbera on the morning of the 22nd October, and at once all was renewed activity. The campaign, however, was destined to be a failure, owing to inefficient transport, the service of which utterly broke down, and also to the great daring and activity of the opposing force, whose fighting qualities had been seriously underestimated.

As far on as April 15th, 1903, advices reached this country from Somaliland, telling of successful reconnaissances and bright prospects of success, but two days later, on the 17th, and again on the 23rd of the month, two such severe blows were inflicted on the large British force now in the field as to render a second withdrawal from the country necessary. Colonel Plunkett, in charge of a strong party of the King’s African Rifles with maxims, set out from Galadi in the direction of Walwal, on the 15th of the month for the purpose of rounding-up stock in the bush. After marching 40 miles, the force left its spare kit and maxims, and pushed on after the carriers, who, with the cattle, were following the Mullah’s rear. On the 17th the force was surrounded by the enemy and cut to pieces. No fewer than 10 officers and 174 men were killed, among them Colonel Plunkett himself. The enemy’s force was estimated at 80,000, of whom they left 2000 dead on the field. Only 41 of the little British force managed to reach camp, six alone being unwounded. Both maxims fell into the Mullah’s hands. A force under Colonel Cobbe in the vicinity was, with the greatest difficulty, extricated by General Manning, who left Bohotte at midnight on hearing of the disaster.

But alas! this was not all. A week later, on the 23rd, the flying column under Major Gough, operating to the north, was attacked with a loss of two officers, Captains Godfrey and Bruce, and 13 men. With the greatest difficulty it reached Bohotte, and here the 1902 campaign came to a disastrous termination.

Small wonder that considerable dissatisfaction should by this time have arisen at home over the conduct of the Somaliland campaign. The question of withdrawal from the country was even mooted, but fortunately overruled, and a still stronger force was once more got together to initiate the campaign which is at the present time (1904) in progress.

Meanwhile the Mullah sustained a trifling defeat at the hands of an Abyssinian force on the 31st May, the remains of the British expedition being still at Bohotte, where they were detained until plans of reinforcement and advance had been duly organised.