“Besides, there is another thing; that if to-day we provide for their needs and restore order, it is the wish of every inhabitant of Cuba to contribute their share towards this. If these men are supplied now, they will not have the moral support of the people of Cuba should they not go to work; but the people of Cuba will see that they are punished. If, however, they had the moral support of the people of Cuba it would be difficult to punish them.

“There is another point, and that is with regard to the amount of money required. Although they have not said anything about this, nevertheless, there is a tendency to lessen this amount. We want to say that although the measure, in principle, will be very good, even if it does not attend to all of the needs at present; though it will be a moral obligation from ourselves to the United States, it will not solve the problem, because the sum determined upon is not enough. If the revenues of the Island of Cuba ought to be mortgaged to repay whatever advances they have received from the United States now, it will not be a very difficult matter to make this amount a few millions more.”

The above gives a fair summary of the general tenor of the testimony taken, and it is believed fairly represents the views of these gentlemen. Testimony was also taken in relation to the payment of certain legitimate debts which, as these gentlemen felt, the good faith of the people of Cuba had been pledged to pay. On being asked the probable amount of this indebtedness, they said it was not in excess of $2,250,000 or $2,500,000. The first and most important matter and the one which, they insist, will have much to do with the pacification of the Island, is the payment of some sort of compensation to the impoverished Cuban soldiers. These gentlemen were asked if they had in their possession any estimate as to the number of soldiers, the length of service, and the amount of money necessary for the purpose they had in mind. An itemised account, they were told, would make a useful supplement to the interesting and instructive testimony given.

In compliance with this request, these gentlemen prepared and presented certain tables, with additional verbal testimony. This testimony was subsequently reduced to writing. It purports to be a statement showing the number of officers and privates of the Cuban army and their time of service. On behalf of Cuba, these gentlemen informed the author that had Cuba been recognised as an independent nation, their first duty would have been to pay all legal obligations contracted during the struggle for independence. They request that the United States, acting as trustee for Cuba, will give this subject a careful hearing and enable the people of Cuba to disband the army and complete the pacification of the Island. They recognise the fact that $3,000,000 has been appropriated for a purpose similar to this, but regard it as inadequate. The figures submitted by these gentlemen, as representing the pay which the insurgent army, in their opinion, has earned, are somewhat startling. The summary is as follows:

ESTIMATE FOR PAYMENT OF INSURGENT TROOPS
11Major-Generals$179,450
19Generals of Division296,175
54Brigadier-Generals682,825
153Colonels1,491,750
290Lieutenant-Colonels2,362,800
578Majors3,870,240
965Captains4,561,800
1245Lieutenants3,763,800
1794Sub-Lieutenants4,952,880
21301st Sergeants3,796,200
31232d Sergeants4,605,600
4509Corporals5,238,240
30,160Privates21,502,620
45,031 $57,304,380

The pay promised the Cuban army is very much higher (except in the grade of generals) than the amounts actually paid the officers and men in the United States army, as will be seen from the following comparison of the salaries of the two armies:

SALARIES PAID CUBAN AND UNITED STATES ARMIES
PER MONTH
Cuban.United
States.
Major-General.$500$625
General of Division450...
Brigadier-General400458.33
Colonel325290.67
Lieutenant-Colonel275250
Major220208.33
Captain130150
Lieutenant100125
Sub-Lieutenant90116.67
1st Sergeant6025
2d Sergeant5018
Corporal4015
Private3013

It is not assumed by the gentlemen who prepared the above estimates that claims of such magnitude could be seriously considered by an independent Republic. The resources of the Island at present are entirely inadequate to shoulder such a debt. Upon the reduced basis of the salaries paid the United States soldiers, the reduction would be about one half, or less than $30,000,000, an equally impossible sum. On the other hand, that some aid should be rendered by the United States to enable these soldiers to disband and go to work would seem both feasible and just. It could easily be met by the revenue of the Island, and would have a decided effect in securing permanent peace and the early establishment of a stable government in Cuba. If done now under the guidance of the United States it would prevent excessive payment to the troops hereafter. In the same manner the liquidation of the small amount of outstanding obligation—not exceeding $2,500,000—might settle the debt question for all time to come. Especially if all other advances for these purposes were prohibited until such debt was adjusted to the satisfaction of the United States. In case the ultimate solution of the Cuban question should be, as it is quite within the range of probability, annexation, the independent government will not previously have had the opportunity of incurring improvident indebtedness, which ultimately may have to be assumed by the United States. In short, whatever may be done in this matter, or however it may be done, the United States should control and safeguard the finances of the Island for a considerable period. It has been very truly stated that should an independent government be established and recognised, the United States will no longer be able to control the financial legislation of the Island. It can, however, by the plan proposed, and very properly, not only save money for Cuba while under its military possession or control, but also prevent the making of unnecessary improvident or other loans by such independent government, except with the consent, or approval in advance, of the United States. This can be readily done, if, when making an advance for the benefit of Cuba, the right to apply the customs receipts and other revenues of the Island to the repayment of the principal and interest of such advance be reserved to the United States. In this way all reckless expenditure may be prevented and all speculative or independent bond issues be avoided and at the same time quick assistance be rendered those whose position at present is deplorable in the extreme.