During the fourteen years which followed his victory of Bannockburn, King Robert was consolidating his kingdom. He had obtained recognition even in the Western Highlands and Islands, and the sentiment of the whole nation had gathered around him. The force of this sentiment is apparent in connection with ecclesiastical difficulties. When Pope John XXII attempted to make peace in 1317 and refused to acknowledge the Bruce as king, the papal envoys were driven from the kingdom. For this the country was placed under the papal ban, and when, in 1324, the pope offered both to acknowledge King Robert and to remove the excommunication, on condition that Berwick should be restored to the English, the Scots refused to comply with his condition. A small rebellion in 1320 had been firmly repressed by king and Parliament. The birth of a son to King Robert, on the 5th March, 1323-24, had given security to the dynasty, and, at the great Parliament which met at Cambuskenneth in 1326, at which Scottish burghs were, for the first time, represented, the clergy, the barons, and the people took an oath of allegiance to the little Prince David, and, should his heirs fail, to Robert, the son of Bruce's daughter, Marjorie, and her husband, Robert, the High Steward of Scotland. The same Parliament put the financial position of the monarch on a satisfactory footing by granting him a tenth penny of all rents.

The deposition and murder of Edward II created a situation of which the King of Scots could not fail to take advantage. The truce was broken in the summer of 1327 by an expedition into England, conducted by Douglas and Randolph, and the hardiness of the Scottish soldiery surprised the English and warned them that it was impossible to prolong the contest in the present condition of the two countries. The regents for the young Edward III resolved to come to terms with Bruce. The treaty of Northampton, dated 17th March, 1327-28, is still preserved in Edinburgh. It acknowledged the complete independence of Scotland and the royal dignity of King Robert. It promised the restoration of all the symbols of Scottish independence which Edward I had removed, and it arranged a marriage between Prince David, the heir to the Scottish throne, and Joanna, the sister of the young king of England. A marriage ceremony between the two children was solemnized in the following May, but the Stone of Fate was never removed from Westminster, owing, it is said, to the opposition of the abbot. The succession of James VI to the throne of England, nearly three centuries later, was accepted as the fulfilment of the prophecy attached to the Coronation Stone, "Lapis ille grandis":

"Ni fallat fatam, Scoti, quocunque locatum,
Invenient lapidem, regnare tenentur ibidem".

Thus closed the portion of Scottish history which is known as the War of Independence. The condemnation of the policy of Edward I lies simply in its results. He found the two nations at peace and living together in amity; he left them at war and each inspired with a bitter hatred of the other. A policy which aimed at the unification of the island and at preventing Scotland from proving a source of danger to England, and which resulted in a warfare covering, almost continuously, more than two hundred and fifty years, and which, after the lapse of four centuries, left the policy of Scotland a serious difficulty to English ministers, can scarcely receive credit for practical sagacity, however wise its aim. It created for England a relentless and irritating (if not always a dangerous) enemy, invariably ready to take advantage of English difficulties. England had to fight Scotland in France and in Ireland, and Edward IV and Henry VII found the King of Scots the ally of the House of Lancaster, and the protector of Perkin Warbeck. Only the accident of the Reformation rendered it possible to disengage Scotland from its alliance with France, and to bring about a union with England. Till the emergence of the religious question the English party in Scotland consisted of traitors and mercenaries, and their efforts to strengthen English influence form the most discreditable pages of Scottish history.

We are not here dealing with the domestic history of Scotland; but it is impossible to avoid a reference to the subject of the influence of the Scottish victory upon the Scots themselves. It has been argued that Bannockburn was, for Scotland, a national misfortune, and that Bruce's defeat would have been for the real welfare of the country. There are, of course, two stand-points from which we may approach the question. The apologist of Bannockburn might lay stress on the different effects of conquest and a hard-won independence upon the national character, and might fairly point to various national characteristics which have been, perhaps, of some value to civilization, and which could hardly have been fostered in a condition of servitude. On the other hand, there arises a question as to material prosperity. It must be remembered that we are not here discussing the effect of a peaceful and amicable union, such as Edward first proposed, but of a successful war of conquest; and in this connection it is only with thankfulness and gratitude to Wallace and to Bruce that the Scotsman can regard the parallel case of Ireland, which, from a century before the time of Edward I, had been annexed by conquest. The story we have just related goes to create a reasonable probability that the fate of Scotland could not have been different; but, further, leaving all such problems of the "might have been", we may submit that the misery of Scotland in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries has been much exaggerated. It is true that the borders were in a condition of perpetual feud, and that minorities and intrigues gravely hampered the progress of the country. But, more especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there are not wanting indications of prosperity. The chapter of Scottish history which tells of the growth of burghs has yet to be written. The construction of magnificent cathedrals and religious houses, and the rise of three universities, must not be left out of account. Gifts to the infant universities, the records of which we possess, prove that for humble folk the tenure of property was comparatively secure, and that there was a large amount of comfort among the people. Under James IV, trade and commerce prospered, and the Scottish navy rivalled that of the Tudors. The century in which Scottish prosperity received its most severe blows immediately succeeded the Union of the Crowns. If for three hundred years the civilizing influence of England can scarcely be traced in the history of Scottish progress, that of France was predominant, and Scotland cannot entirely regret the fact. Scotland, from the date of Bannockburn to that of Pinkie, will not suffer from a comparison with the England which underwent the strain of the long French wars, the civil broils of Lancaster and York, and the oppression of the Tudors. Moreover, there is one further consideration which should not be overlooked. The postponement of an English union till the seventeenth century enabled Scotland to work out its own reformation of religion in the way best adapted to the national needs, and it is difficult to estimate, from the material stand-point alone, the importance of this factor in the national progress. The inspiration and the education which the Scottish Church has given to the Scottish people has found one result in the impulse it has afforded to the growth of material prosperity, and it is not easy to regret that Scotland, at the date of the Reformation, was free to work out its own ecclesiastical destiny.

FOOTNOTES:

[44] There is no indication of any racial division in the attitude of the Scots. Some Highlanders, from various personal causes, are found on the English side at the beginning of the War of Independence; but Mr. Lang has shown that of the descendants of Somerled of Argyll, the ancestor of the Lords of the Isles, only one fought against Wallace, while the Celts of Moray and Badenach and the Highland districts of Aberdeenshire, joined his standard. The behaviour of the Highland chiefs is similar to that of the Lowland barons. If there is any racial feeling at all, it is not Celtic v. Saxon, but Scandinavian v. Scottish, and it is connected with the recent conquest of the Isles. But even of this there is little trace, and the behaviour of the Islesmen is, on the whole, marvellously loyal.

[45] Hemingburgh, ii, 141-147.

[46] Diplomata Scotiæ, xliii, xliv.