♦The court of Spain not willingly subservient to France.♦
Under the reign of Charles IV. the whole machine of government was falling to decay. The navy which Charles III. left more formidable than it had ever been since the time of the Armada, was almost annihilated. The army was in the worst state of indiscipline and disorder; the finances were exhausted, and public credit at the lowest ebb: foreign commerce had been destroyed by the war with England; and France, meantime, insatiable in its demands upon a helpless ally, continued to exact fresh sacrifices of men and treasure. ♦Godoy not corrupted by France.♦ It has been loudly asserted that Godoy was corrupted by the French government; any thing was believed of one so profligate and so odious, as if because he would have scrupled at no wickedness, he was in like manner capable of any folly. But with what was France to purchase the services of one whose greediest desires were gratified? If Godoy had not felt and thought like his sovereign, he could not so entirely have obtained his confidence; now the disposition of the King could not be doubtful. Charles had been compelled to abandon the coalition, and ally himself with France, but he acted from his heart when he entered into that coalition, not when he withdrew from it. For the example of the French revolution could not but be regarded with fear by all crowned heads, and especially by those who were conscious that the state of their own kingdoms cried aloud for reform; and even when the frenzy fit of that revolution subsided, and anarchy in natural progress had ended in military despotism, it was not possible that princes who reigned by hereditary right should behold without secret apprehensions the establishment of a new dynasty upon an ancient throne. ♦Disposition to join with the allies before the peace of Tilsit.♦ At the first gleam of hope the court of Spain ventured to indicate its disposition: when Prussia began that war which the peace of Tilsit terminated, a rash proclamation was issued at Madrid, exhorting the nation not to be dismayed, for it yet possessed great resources, and a powerful armament was about to be formed. ♦De Pradt. Memoires sur la Revolution d’Espagne, p. 15.♦ This proclamation Buonaparte received upon the field of battle at Jena, and from that hour, as he afterwards declared, swore in his heart that the Spaniards should dearly abide it. That deep determination was, however, carefully dissembled. The French embassador presented a strong remonstrance upon the occasion, in reply to which, Godoy made the sorry excuse that the preparations were intended against an apprehended attack from the Emperor of Morocco. Shallow as this pretence was, it was allowed to pass, and no other immediate consequence ensued.
♦The Prince of Asturias inimical to Godoy.♦
While Charles and his favourite were vainly wishing to free themselves from the yoke of France, that very disposition on their part induced the Prince of Asturias to regard Buonaparte with complacency and hope. The father’s favourite has seldom been the minister of the son. Those Spaniards who were excluded from any share in public affairs under the administration of Godoy, looked naturally to the Prince, and formed a party round him, in which men of the most opposite elements were combined. ♦Parties in favour of the French.♦ When the French revolution began, the young and the ardent in Spain, as in the rest of Europe, eagerly adopted principles which promised a new and happier order of things: they were comparatively far less numerous than in any other country, partly because of the state of the press, still more because of the feeling and devotion with which this nation is attached to its religion and all its forms. There were, however, many, and those of the best of the Spaniards, who hoped to obtain that reformation in their government by the assistance of France, which without such assistance they knew it would not only be hopeless, but fatal to attempt. The attachment which they had formed to the French republic, many of these men transferred to the French empire, with an inconsistency so gross and monstrous, that it might seem impossible, if we had not seen it exemplified among ourselves: having, because of their principles, at first acquired a party feeling, they deluded themselves by supposing that in serving their party they promoted their principles, till at last they had no other principle than the mere party interest itself. Another class of Spaniards had been hostile to the French revolution till its character was changed by Buonaparte: they felt no dislike to the system of his government, because they were accustomed to despotism, and the acts of personal atrocity which he had committed did not sufficiently alarm them. The unhappy circumstance with which the English war had commenced, irritated them against Great Britain, and that sentiment of indignation naturally biassed them toward France. There were some of a third description, who had neither heart nor understanding to feel for the honour, or to wish for any improvement in the state of their native land, but who desired a change for the mere sake of acquiring authority: these men were enemies to the Prince of the Peace, not for his vices, his injustice, and his political misconduct; they hated him because they envied him, and wished to exercise a like tyranny themselves.
♦Unpopularity of Godoy.♦
The people felt the degradation of Spain, and imputed to Godoy not only their present difficulties, but the whole train of inveterate evils under which the country was groaning. Never had any former favourite been so universally detested. His administration would have been instantly at an end, if the Prince’s party could have appealed to public opinion; but being precluded by the nature of a despotic government from any other means of attempting his overthrow than those of intrigue[15], and knowing that all intrigues against him at their own court would be dangerous, as well as ineffectual, they hoped to accomplish this object by help of a foreign power. ♦The French embassador advises the prince to solicit an alliance with Buonaparte’s family.♦ The Prince being a widower, Beauharnois, the French embassador at Madrid, seeing the disposition of the government to shake off its subjection to France, and that of Ferdinand and his friends to get the administration of affairs into their hands through the influence of France, hinted to him how advantageous it would be to connect himself by marriage with the new imperial family. Whether he was instructed to invite a proposal to this effect or not, it is believed that he acted with perfect good faith, and indeed he might well have imagined that in so doing he acted for the interest of both countries. It was at this time generally believed in Spain that Buonaparte, being justly offended with Godoy for the intention which he had manifested before the battle of Jena, would insist upon his dismissal from the government. The friends of Ferdinand therefore never doubted but that he would gladly contract the proposed alliance with the heir of the Spanish monarchy, a connection which would at once gratify his pride, strengthen his power, and secure a wavering ally. The better men of this party seem also to have been persuaded, that under the protection of Buonaparte they might relieve the country from some of its manifold grievances; nor would this persuasion have been unreasonable, if any ties could have restrained the merciless ambition of the man in whom they confided. For though it might be his policy now to keep Spain in her present weakness, and consequent dependence, yet when his own blood acquired an interest in the prosperity of that kingdom, it might fairly be expected that those salutary changes which were essential to its welfare would be promoted by him, and peaceably effected under his auspices.
♦11 Oct.
The prince applies secretly to Buonaparte.♦
Influenced by such considerations, the Prince addressed a secret letter to Buonaparte. It had long, he said, been his most earnest desire to express, at least by writing, the sentiments of respect, of esteem, and of attachment which he had vowed to a hero who eclipsed all those that preceded him, and whom Providence had sent to preserve Europe from the total subversion with which it was threatened, to secure her shaken thrones, and to restore peace and happiness to the nations. He was unhappy enough to be compelled by circumstances to conceal so just and laudable an action as if it were a crime, ... such were the fatal consequences of the excessive goodness of the best of kings. His father was endowed with the most upright and generous heart; but artful and wicked persons too often took advantage of such a disposition to disguise the truth from their sovereigns, and none but the Emperor Napoleon could detect the schemes of such perfidious counsellors, open the eyes of his dearly beloved parents, render them happy, and provide at the same time for his happiness, and for that of the Spaniards. “Therefore,” said the Prince, “I implore with, the utmost confidence your majesty’s paternal protection, to the end that you will not only deign to accord me the honour of allying me with your family, but that you will smooth all the difficulties, and remove all the obstacles which might oppose this object of my wishes.” ♦Buonaparte intends to seize the Peninsula.♦ When Buonaparte was thus entreated by the Prince to lend his influence for the removal of Godoy, he was carrying on secret negotiations with that favourite. Long before he received this letter, he had determined upon seizing Spain; his measures for subjecting it by force had been arranged. But it was necessary to begin by occupying Portugal, and to dupe the Spanish court into a co-operation against a friendly and unoffending power, a power too with which it was connected by the closest ties: thus would the purposes of France be every way served; for while she derived from Spain all the assistance that could be desired, the Spanish government would be preparing the way for its own destruction, and depriving itself at the same time of all claim to compassion when the hour arrived.
♦Spanish troops sent to the North of Europe, and to Tuscany.♦
The first step toward the accomplishment of his design, was to remove the best troops from Spain; and accordingly, at the requisition of the French government, in conformity to treaty, 16,000 men, the flower of the Spanish army, were marched into the North of Germany, under the Marquis de Romana, and another division into Tuscany, under D. Gonzalo O’Farrill. The next business was to introduce French troops into Spain, and for this the occupation of Portugal afforded a pretext. Buonaparte, who was regardless of all other engagements, however solemnly contracted, was always, as far as his power extended, faithful to his vows of vengeance. Exasperated by the service which the Portugueze ships had rendered in blockading Malta, he had said in one of his Egyptian proclamations, that there would come a time when the Portugueze should pay with tears of blood for the affront which they had offered to the French republic. Heavy payments of a different kind had already been exacted. ♦Condition of the Portugueze government.♦ During many years the Prince of Brazil had submitted to insults which he had no means of resenting, and from time to time had bought off at a heavy price the threat of invasion, in the hope of preserving his kingdom by these expedients till peace should be restored to Europe. So often had these threats been renewed, and these respites purchased, that Portugal incurred the burden and the shame of paying tribute, without obtaining the security of a tributary state. Upon this, however, that poor government relied. They thought themselves safe because France obtained greater sums from them in this manner than could be drawn from Portugal as a conquered country; because much of the treasure from Spanish America, so large a portion of which found its way into France, reached Europe in safety by the assistance of the Portugueze; and because they had every reason to suppose that if an attack upon them should at any time be seriously intended, the court of Madrid would use its utmost influence to avert their danger for its own sake. Could any reliance have been placed either upon the understanding or the honour of the Spanish king, upon royal and national faith, the plainest common interest, and the closest ties of alliance, the Portugueze government would have reasoned justly. But Charles IV. was one of the weakest of sovereigns; his favourite had obtained the administration for his vices, not for his talents, which were of the meanest order; and it was easy for Buonaparte to deal with such men, and make them at once the instruments and the victims of his ambition.