The tone of the French was somewhat altered in their menaces. There had been no shuddering when the fate of Beja and Evora was announced to the people of Lisbon, nor when the massacre at Leiria was perpetrated. Care was taken to manifest that the French were prepared to execute their threats if needful. The Russian squadron, which lay at anchor in a line from Junqueira to Boa Vista, was made ready for action, the men being stationed at their quarters with lighted matches; they, no doubt, apprehended an attack from the English fleet, but ♦Observador Portuguez, 410.♦ La Garde intimated that they would fire upon the city in case an insurrection were attempted. Justly apprehensive, however, for his personal safety, this Intendant, whom, because perhaps of his office, the people regarded with peculiar hatred, went sometimes to pass the night on board the Vasco da Gama, and General Travot, though he was evidently esteemed by the people for his mild and honourable conduct (so much is a good name worth even in the worst times) thought it prudent not to sleep out of the Castle.
♦Junction of Loison, Laborde, and Junot.♦
Junot went by water to Villa Franca, and leaving Thiebault there to command the reserve, joined Loison at Alcoentre. That General had reached Santarem on the 13th, in a deplorable condition. The weather was intensely hot, without a cloud in the sky, or a breath of air stirring. Whole companies lay down upon the way; many died of thirst, and more would have perished if the officers of the staff, as soon as they arrived at that city, had not gone out with a great number of the inhabitants carrying water to meet them; brandy also was sent out, and carts to convey those who were unable to proceed farther on foot. Each of Loison’s long marches at this time is said to have cost him not less than an hundred men. The troops were so dreadfully exhausted, that he was compelled to remain two days at Santarem. On the 16th he proceeded to Alcoentre, where Junot joined him the next day; they then moved to Cercal, and on the day after the action at Roliça the British army distinctly ♦Early Campaigns, 18.♦ saw their columns in the line of Torres Vedras. To that place Laborde was now recalled, who had retreated beyond it to Montachique; he effected his junction on the 19th, and ♦Thiebault, 190–193.♦ when General Thiebault arrived with the reserve on the 20th, the whole force which Junot could bring into the field was collected there, in number about 12,000 infantry, and 1200 or 1500 horse.
♦The British advance to Vimeiro.♦
Sir Arthur had not pursued Laborde after the battle of Roliça; the line by which the enemy ♦August 18.♦ retired would have led him from the sea. He was beginning his march for Torres Vedras on the morrow, when he received advice that General Anstruther was arrived on the coast. His original intention had been to employ this General’s brigade, and that of General Acland, in besieging Peniche, if that should be necessary; otherwise to land them in some of the bays near the rock, in the rear of the enemy, while he pressed upon their front. But the resistance which he had experienced at Roliça, and his disappointment of any co-operation from Freire, induced him now to land General Anstruther’s troops, and join them to the army. He proceeded therefore to the village of Vimeiro, that being the position best calculated to effect his junction, and, at the same time, a march in advance. Calms prevented the fleet, which was anchored off the Berlings, from standing in, till the evening of the 19th. The brigade was then landed at Maceira, upon a sandy beach, at the foot of a cliff almost perpendicular, the ascent of which is exceedingly steep and difficult. The landing was a measure of extreme difficulty and ♦General Anstruther’s brigade lands.♦ hazard. The boats were almost always filled in going-in by the surf, many were swamped, and a few men perished; the disembarkation, however, by the great exertions and skill of the navy, was effected with less loss than might have been expected. The French could not oppose the landing, but, profiting by their superiority in cavalry, they sent a body of dragoons, in the hope of attacking the brigade on its march. Against this danger due precautions had been taken. The troops, when they had marched about three leagues, found a detachment under General Spencer waiting at Lourinham to receive them, and took their place in the advanced guard.
♦Arrival of Sir Harry Burrard in the roads.♦
The French cavalry were active during this and the preceding day; they scoured the country, and Sir Arthur could obtain no information of the enemy, except that their position was very strong, and occupied by their whole force. On the 20th, at noon, it was announced that General Acland was in the offing; and on the evening of the same day Sir Harry Burrard, the second in command, arrived in Maceira Roads. Sir Arthur immediately went on board, informed him of what had been done, and of the present state of things, and laid before him the plan of operations upon which he had intended to proceed. His purpose was to march on the following morning, push his advanced guard to Mafra, and halt the main body about four or five miles from that place, thus turning the enemy’s position at Torres Vedras. He possessed as much knowledge of the ground as good maps and scientific descriptions could impart; Sir Charles Stuart (a man whose great military talents had never been allowed a field whereon to display themselves) had carefully surveyed this part of the country when he commanded the British troops in Portugal; it had not escaped him, that upon this ground, in case of serious invasion, the kingdom must be saved or lost; and his maps and papers were in Sir Arthur’s hands. The battle would thus be fought in a country of which he had adequate knowledge, and he hoped to enter Lisbon with the retreating or flying enemy. Such was the plan which he had formed, and orders for marching on the morrow had actually been issued, before Sir Harry’s arrival.
♦He alters the plan of the campaign.♦
To Sir Arthur, who had a well-founded confidence in himself and in his troops, no prospect could have been more encouraging; but the new commander did not behold it hopefully. The objections to a forward movement preponderated in his mind; he learnt that the artillery[25] horses were inefficient, that our men, for want of cavalry, were kept close to their encampments by the enemy’s horse; and that it would not be possible to go far into the country, because they depended upon the ships for bread. Weighing these things, he was not convinced that Sir Arthur’s intentions were expedient; the decision which he was now to make appeared to him most serious in its consequences; he thought it was impossible to calculate the disasters to which a check might expose the army, and therefore he deemed it necessary to wait for Sir John Moore’s division. Sir Arthur had recommended that that division, when it arrived in the Mondego, should march upon Santarem, a position from whence it might intercept the enemy’s retreat, whether they attempted to make their way to Almeida or to Elvas; but the new commander hearing on his way of the action at Roliça, and disapproving this arrangement, had immediately dispatched instructions by which Sir John Moore was directed to proceed from the Mondego, and join him as speedily as possible in Maceira Roads. In vain did Sir Arthur represent the precious time that would be lost before this division could be landed and become serviceable at Vimeiro; the far greater utility which might be expected from its presence at Santarem; the evil of at once changing their operations from an offensive to a defensive course; and of allowing the enemy to choose their time and ground. For, situated as the two armies now were, it was impossible to avoid an action. If the British troops advanced, they would have the advantage of acting on the offensive; it was his opinion that they might reach Mafra before the French could bring on a general engagement; and in that case they should turn the French position. But these representations were unavailing; an inauspicious spirit of caution prevailed. The whole plan of the campaign was changed; and with the enemy collected within three leagues, the army was ordered to remain stationary, till a corps should arrive, of which no tidings had yet been received. In a general who commands good troops the want of confidence is as great a fault as the excess of it in the commander of an ill-disciplined army.
♦The battle of Vimeiro.♦